

[REDACTED]

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: [REDACTED]

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2015

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC-302, Capitol Visitor Center, commencing at 10:05 a.m.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Appearances:

For the SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI:

DANA CHIPMAN, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL
MAC TOLAR, SENIOR COUNSEL
SARAH ADAMS, INVESTIGATOR
HEATHER SAWYER, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL
SHANNON GREEN, MINORITY COUNSEL
LAURA RAUCH, MINORITY SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF

For the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:

COLONEL NORMAN ALLEN III
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL SEAN MCMAHON
EDWARD RICHARDS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Mr. Chipman. Well, let's go on the record. This is a transcribed interview of -- please state your name.

(U) Mr. [REDACTED]

(U) Mr. Chipman. [REDACTED] And could you spell your last name, please?

(U) Mr. [REDACTED]

(U) Mr. Chipman. [REDACTED] Conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

(U) On behalf of the committee, we appreciate your time and willingness to come in and talk to us today, Mr. [REDACTED]

(U) My name is Dana Chipman, and I am a counsel on the committee's majority staff. I will now ask everyone else at the table to introduce themselves.

(U) Mr. Tolar. Mac Tolar with the majority committee.

(U) Ms. Adams. Sarah Adams with majority.

(U) Ms. Rauch. Laura Rauch with the minority.

(U) Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority.

(U) Ms. Green. Shannon Green with the minority.

(U) Mr. Chipman. And around the table, please.

(U) Colonel Allen. I am Colonel Norman Allen from the Department of Defense.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Mr. Hudson. Bill Hudson from the DOD General Counsel's Office.

(U) Mr. Richards. Edward Richards, DOD OGC.

(U) Mr. Chipman. And the back row, please.

Lieutenant Colonel McMahon. Lieutenant Colonel Sean McMahon from DOD.

(U) Lieutenant Colonel Prussian. Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Prussian from DOD.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Thank you.

(U) I would like to go over the round rules and explain how the interview will proceed. Generally, the way the questioning proceeds is that a member from the majority will ask questions first for up to an hour, and then the minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time, if they choose.

(U) Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or designated staff member. At this time, I am not aware of any members of the committee, that is Congressmen, who are intending to be here this morning, but they may show up.

(U) We will rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side, until we are out of questions, and the interview will then conclude.

(U) Unlike a testimony or a deposition in a Federal court, in a transcribed interview this committee is not bound by the rules of evidence. You or your counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review by the chairman of the committee.

(U) If an objection cannot be resolved in this interview, you can

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

be required to return for a deposition or hearing. Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking questions.

(U) This session will be conducted at the Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information level under the Alternative Compensatory Control Measures used for NICHROME SPIKE protected information.

(U) You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the interview, and if something needs to be clarified, we ask that you make this known.

(U) If you need to discuss anything with your counsel, we will go off the record and stop the clock to provide you that opportunity.

We will also take a break whenever it is convenient for you. This can be after every hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds, whatever you prefer. During a round of questioning, if you need anything, a glass of water, use of the facilities, to confer with counsel, please just let us know, and we will go off the record and stop the clock.

(U) As you can see, an official reporter is transcribing this interview, so we ask that you give verbal responses to all questions, yes and no, as opposed to nodding your head. I am going to ask the reporter to jump in if you do respond nonverbally. Do you understand that?

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Also, I will try to not talk over you and ask that you try to do the same so that we can get a clear record. I would

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ask that you answer all questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible. We will take our time and repeat or clarify our questions, if necessary.

(U) If you have any questions or if you do not understand any of our questions, please let us know. We will be happy to clarify or repeat our questions. If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or do not remember, it is best not to guess. Please give us your best recollection, and if there are things you do not know or can't remember, just say so, and please inform us who, to the best of your knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete answer to the question.

(U) Do you understand that you have an obligation to answer questions from Congress truthfully?

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

(U) Mr. Chipman. This also applies to questions posed by congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Witnesses who knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false statements. Do you understand that?

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful answers to today's questions?

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] No.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Okay. That is the end of my preamble.

(U) Does the minority have anything to add at this point?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Ms. Rauch. Just to thank you for being here today. We appreciate you coming here voluntarily, and we look forward to your testimony.

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] Thank you.

(U) Mr. Chipman. As you can see, the clock on the wall says "currently being repaired," and so it may spin randomly from time to time. My watch shows 10:10, so at this point, we will get started with the first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q (U) Mr. [REDACTED] we are, as a committee, extraordinarily impressed with your actions on 9/11 of 2012. And our focus today is to understand better, in greater detail, what we can about that tragic day. But please understand first that this interview is not intended to undercut what you did personally. You marched to the sound of guns in the great tradition of American servicemen and servicewomen, and we appreciate that greatly.

(U) We have interviewed the Diplomatic Security agents who were there that day, as well as the [REDACTED] personnel and other employees of the other government agency, and we want to complete that effort by talking to you as a DOD servicemember responding on 9/11 to the Benghazi attack.

(U) I would like to start by giving you a chance to describe your professional background. Tell us when you joined the Army, what your initial duties were, when you went to selection, and your professional background, please.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir. I actually am in the Marine Corps. I joined the Marines in January of 2002. I was stationed in Gulf Company 25, Camp Pendleton, California, went through the invasion of Iraq, Ramadi.

(U) And then after 2005, 2006, moved up to Quantico, Virginia, to be an instructor, infantry officer's course, the basic school, and the MACE, the martial arts center for the Marine Corps for about a year-and-a-half, and then I went through selection around 2007 for my current assignment. And I actually got selected and put in a unit in 2008. I have been in that unit since 2008.

Q (U) And you served continuously since 2008 as a member of that unit?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And that is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so since 2008, you have served continuously on active duty as a member of that unit serving in a squadron level assignment?

A (U) Yes, sir, as an operator in a squadron.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) [REDACTED] Okay. And were you there with any other unit members on that deployment?

A (U) Yes, sir, my team leader.

Q (U) Your team leader. And so there were a total of two of you?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Did you arrive together?

A (U) We did.

Q (U) And when did you arrive in Tripoli, Libya?

A (U) Late July of 2011.

Q (U) And what was the anticipated duration of that deployment?

A (U) Four-and-a-half months.

Q [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) We were, somewhat. There really -- the force was kind of small, so we were having to specify who we were going to work with and why and going through the process of getting them vetted to be a partner force.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) -- was conducting the initial auspices of a 1208 effort?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) We did.

Q (U) -- for continuation?

A (U) Yes, sir. And we were the first unit personnel there.

Q (U) Okay. And what particular -- was this an element of the Libyan military special operations force?

A (U) Yes, sir. The military had fallen, but these were foreign members of the Libyan military forces. Not all special forces, but all military.

Q (U) Okay. They were all military?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. So as I understand it, there

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, it was, sir.

Q (U) And that is where you were physically located with your team member, your team leader?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) But you were selecting the Libyan military that you were training or working with from the coast of Tripoli, closer to downtown?

A (U) Yes, sir. It was a former military base. It was Qadhafi's sons' armored base.

Q (U) Got it.

A (U) Some tanks, tracks.

Q (U) And what was your supervisory chain on this deployment? Who were you working for?

A [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And that command structure was physically located in Stuttgart, Germany?

A (U) In Stuttgart, Germany, yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) This deployment to Libya, to Tripoli was in Title 10 status, as I understand?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And did you have any prior experience in Libya or North Africa before this deployment in July of 2012?

A (U) Not in Libya specifically, sir, but I had been to Egypt before that. Other than that, no, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Not before that, sir. I was there in a language capacity.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) In a language capacity. So what is your Arabic language proficiency?

A (U) Fluent, sir. As fluent as we could be locally.

Q (U) And you said you arrived in July. Was it middle of July or early July, end of July?

A (U) Late July, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Was that mission being conducted separate and apart from any duties you were performing [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. What other missions -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Some, some of them we were, and some of them we weren't. When we were included, we were familiar with what they were doing, and when we weren't, we were not.

Q (U) Okay. Tell us what you know of the missions, from your own personal experience, what missions that you knew of or that you were familiar with that they were performing in Tripoli.

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q In Tripoli proper?

A [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) So as I understand it, you would, from time to time, augment [REDACTED] in the conduct of their mission if they needed security for a particular movement. Is that accurate?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) You know. I am not exactly sure, sir. It was [REDACTED] and normally they were -- they were task

saturated. They had a lot of people doing a lot of different things for that very reason, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There were no other unit assets that were located there at the embassy in Tripoli?

A (U) No, sir, we were it.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Two operators again, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

Q (U) And how frequently were you in contact with your headquarters in Stuttgart?

A (U) Daily, sir.

Q (U) And was that typically a written situation report, was it a -- was it a chat, [REDACTED] a mIRC chat, or was it a telephone call?

A (U) It was both. It was normally an email of some kind and a phone call to follow up for any additional questions.

Q (U) So you were in contact with your headquarters back in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Stuttgart. Were you other -- were you in communication with other commands or headquarters during your time reporting from the Tripoli embassy?

A (U) Yes, sir, we were.

Q (U) And who else were you reporting to?

A [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] And then SOCAF --

Q (U) Okay. So --

A (U) -- and AFRICOM.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir, we did.

Q (U) So you had a [REDACTED]?

A (U) We did.

Q [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) We didn't.

Q [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) No, we did not.

Q (U) You did not have?

A (U) We did not personally. We weren't -- I didn't get to see it. It was there. They had the feed playing, but it wasn't on our computer.

Q (U) Okay. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] You just didn't have access -- you just didn't view the feed that night --

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) -- prior to your deployment to Benghazi?

A (U) We did not, sir.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir. We left before the asset got pushed over to cover Benghazi.

Q [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir, it was.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Almost immediately, I think, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir, not Libyan forces.

Q (U) Okay. And how about with any Libyan militia elements?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) And do you recall the identity of that particular militia group? Was it, if you can call, Feb 17 Brigade, Libyan Shield? Do you recall?

A (U) 17 Feb, sir.

Q (U) They were the 17 Feb Brigade. And were they providing the exterior perimeter security or were they an internal guard force at the annex?

A (U) Exterior only.

Q (U) Exterior only?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And they were securing the annex there in Tripoli?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And did you have any interactions during this time, Mr.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] with special operations forces from other countries that may have been working in Libya?

A (U) Yes, sir, we did.

Q (U) And these were partner nations?

A (U) They were.

Q (U) And can you identify the special operations forces with whom you had some interaction during that timeframe?

A [REDACTED]

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Only in Tripoli that I know of, sir.

Q (U) As far as you can recall, they were only in Tripoli?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. We are going to transition a little bit to the approach of the 9/11 anniversary. Mr. [REDACTED] in your military experience and background, do you recall any heightened concern being communicated as the anniversary of the 9/11/01 attacks approaches each year?

A (U) At the embassy or the annex in Libya, sir?

Q (U) And I apologize. I didn't frame that question very well, but you have been in the military since --

A (U) 2002.

Q (U) 2002?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so since 2002, the first anniversary of the attacks

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of 9/11/01, is there heightened sensitivity to security concerns and force protection concerns each year as that anniversary approaches?

A (U) Yes, sir, normally there is.

Q (U) And what is the nature of the communications that you have received, in your experience, as that anniversary approaches? Are you given special directions? Are you given special alert or warning concerns?

A (U) If we are deployed, sir, yes, we do. If we are overseas, it is normally announced that if you are at an embassy or whatever outstation you are at, that everyone knows 9/11 is coming up, and it does get a little more hectic around 9/11 most of the time.

Q (U) And do you take any particular precautions or adjust your force protection posture as a result of that?

A (U) If able, sometimes we do, but it is more of a heightened alert as opposed to a change in status.

Q (U) Okay. And do you recall, on this particular anniversary, as the 9/11/2012 anniversary approached, do you recall any particular warning that September of 2012, as the anniversary was being approached?

A (U) Nothing outside the ordinary, sir, of a heightened alert status, but there was no more personnel than usual.

Q (U) During your time from late July of 2012, prior to 9/11, did you have a chance to form an opinion of the security environment you encountered in Tripoli?

A (U) Yes, sir. I thought the security situation was good in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Tripoli. We looked at the embassy, which we regularly do when we deploy somewhere. One of the first things that we will do, part of it is to gain rapport with the embassy staff and State Department, is to look at where they could possibly make things better or change security, and it was good in Tripoli.

(U) They had the appropriate amount, we thought. Again, part of that was going through taking pictures of doors and windows in the event we ever had to come back for an emergency. So we did all that as well. It looked good to me, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And was that assessment done both of the embassy spaces [REDACTED], or was it primarily embassy?

A (U) Mostly embassy, sir. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] obviously, but that wasn't a priority.

[REDACTED] So they did ask us to tell them our opinion [REDACTED] and we told them, and that was the end of it, sir.

Q (U) And again, [REDACTED] as least as far as perimeter security?

A (U) The outside was, sir. The exterior security was.

Q (U) Okay. And then the interior security was the responsibility of [REDACTED]

A (U) That is right. The other group [REDACTED], the actual security personnel were the ones that were securing the inside [REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. All right. I know you traveled. You said from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

time to time you would augment [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] What was your

assessment of the threat environment in Tripoli outside of the U.S. Government facilities, outside of the embassy, [REDACTED]

What was your assessment of the threat environment you encountered?

A (U) I mean, Tripoli was always -- I think there was always a level of caution you took when you went outside [REDACTED] the embassy because it was in -- you couldn't call it from one day to the other. It would be a week where it was fine and then 2 weeks where it wasn't, so there really was no assessment until you got out there and saw how people are acting. Day-to-day life was normal and people were walking around, it was probably fine. If it looked like a lot of people were staying home and the streets were relatively empty, except for militias, there was a good chance something was going on.

Q (U) And prior to September 11th of 2012, had you ever visited Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Were you aware of the official U.S. facilities in Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. [REDACTED] And again, you were not aware of any U.S. military personnel that were stationed in Benghazi during the time you were in Tripoli?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Were you familiar with the threat environment in Benghazi as opposed to Tripoli? Did you have any different assessment of the threat environment in Benghazi based upon what was reported to you?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) And during the run up to September 11th of 2012, were you aware of any security incidents that occurred over that summer, starting with your deployment end of July or even prior to your deployment? Were you given any orientation on security incidents that may have occurred in and around Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) So nothing -- nothing conveyed to you that would have caused you to adjust your force protection posture or your security posture over that summer timeframe?

A (U) No, sir, not in Benghazi.

Q (U) Not in Benghazi. Okay.

A (U) Our focus was Tripoli, sir.

Q (U) Fair enough. And as the 9/11 anniversary of 2012 approached, were you aware of any additional threat reporting that came in to you either through [REDACTED], through your colleagues [REDACTED] [REDACTED] any additional reporting that caused you any concern about either Tripoli or Benghazi?

A (U) Before that at the incident, sir?

Q (U) Before the incident.

A (U) Not specifically, other than there was an occasional

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

shooting out in town, shooting up in the air, a celebration-type shooting, which wasn't out of the ordinary. And that was going on, I think, that night, but other than that, there was nothing, reporting-wise, that I heard.

Q (U) There were a couple of incidents that appear to be higher profile than normal that occurred in Benghazi over the summer of 2012. And I am trying to figure out whether you were -- learned of any of those incidents, the incident with a UN shooting, a UN convoy being targeted?

A (U) I think I -- I do remember something about a UN -- RPG, something like that?

(U) Ms. Adams. Yeah, there is a British ambassador was the RPG, and then the Red Cross was the kidnapping.

A (U) You are right. It was something like that.

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q (U) Were you aware of those incidents?

A (U) Yes, sir, I was.

Q (U) And as a result of those reports, did that cause you to adjust your security posture in any way?

A (U) In Tripoli?

Q (U) In Tripoli.

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And do you know if Embassy Tripoli adjusted its posture in any way as a result of the reports that came in and from events in Benghazi?

A (U) I am not sure, sir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) All right. Mr. [REDACTED] we are going to start, and I would like you to describe what you recall about September 11th, 2012, and I recognize that was 3 years ago, more than 3 years ago now. You were working in Tripoli on that day?

A (U) Yes, sir, I was.

Q (U) And were you on a normal training cycle, a daylight training cycle?

A (U) We were, sir.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And as that day progressed, do you recall learning at any point about a demonstration ongoing in Cairo, Egypt?

A (U) Yes, sir. It was on the news.

Q (U) Okay. So what was reported, or what do you recall seeing?

A (U) I don't recall exactly what happened. I do remember there being a demonstration at the embassy in Cairo. And I don't remember exactly what it was for or what caused it, but I do remember watching the news article about it.

Q (U) You say it was on the news. So were you given access to a TV during your timeframe in --

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) -- Tripoli?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Absolutely.

Q (U) And so you recall this coming in on a TV feed?

A (U) Yes, sir, it was.

Q (U) Did you get any command reporting on that or reporting from either [REDACTED] or through your [REDACTED], any other reporting about the nature of what was going on in Cairo?

A (U) There was, but I can't remember what it was particularly, sir. They were talking about it, though.

Q (U) Okay. At some point on 9/11 did you learn of an attack at the -- what you are calling the consulate there in Benghazi, the special mission compound, did you learn of that attack at some point?

A (U) The one in Benghazi, sir? Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And how did you learn of that?

A (U) It was through my team leader there in Tripoli. He had texted me on my cell phone, said come down to the TOC, and then told me that the consulate had been attacked, or was being attacked, and then didn't know the, you know, exact specifications of the attack, but knew it was ongoing.

Q (U) So you weren't physically located with your team leader initially. He texted you, and then you joined him up there at the annex?

A (U) It was the end of the night, sir, I think around 9:30 local time that night, so we were getting done for the night, sending out last emails. I had gone back, and he had stayed, and as soon as I got back to our house where we were sleeping, he texted me and told me to come back.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. And what was -- what was -- if you can recall, what did that text say? Did it refer to a protest or a demonstration or an attack?

A (U) It didn't. He told me about that once I got there. He just said come back down to the TOC.

Q (U) Okay. And what did he tell you when you arrived back at the TOC?

A (U) That the consulate was being attacked, the situation was, you know, was not known at the time of the attack or who was attacking or what was going on, but they were preparing to possibly go out to Benghazi.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) You mentioned having access to a TV feed. Do you recall seeing any TV reporting or any other press reporting regarding a protest in Benghazi as you -- as you learned what was going on there?

A (U) No, sir. I went directly from there back to our house, started putting our things together.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And what else did the team leader tell you to prepare to do? Anything else?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Nothing, sir.

Q (U) Pretty standard battle drill?

A (U) It was pretty quick. It was probably a minute-and-a-half, 2 minutes of him telling me what we would be possibly doing, and that he wasn't entirely sure, so bring the kitchen sink. So I went all the way back and prepared a couple of bags of what I thought we may need, extra guns, kit, body armor, helmets, things like that.

Q (U) This house was located on the annex compound?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so you went back and you prepared bags not knowing for sure what you would expect, but you prepared the equipment that you needed to bring with you. At some point, did you then return to the annex to meet up with your team leader?

A (U) Yes, sir, I packed the bags pretty quickly, went back down to the TOC area, and then got more specifics on what could be going on and what he wanted me to do before we went.

Q (U) Okay. And when you came back to the TOC that second time with bags packed and ready to roll, was there a meeting with annex personnel and your team leader?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. And so your task from the team leader was to identify the best four people, [REDACTED] people, to include a medic, to include an interpreter [REDACTED] that you could deploy with to Benghazi to assist?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And what was communicated to you about what was going on in Benghazi when you came back that second time? Were you informed the ambassador was missing?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. You were meeting with the team leader, and you had the task to identify the four additional personnel that would go with you. Was the Tripoli [REDACTED] team leader also there at that meeting?

A (U) He was. He actually requested to go, sir.

Q (U) And is this the individual known as [REDACTED]

A (U) In Tripoli --

Q (U) [REDACTED]

A (U) It would be [REDACTED] sir.

Q (U) It should be [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Checking to see if you know who you are talking about.

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) So [REDACTED] you were at this meeting with, and then who else do you recall being at that meeting with you, your team leader, and [REDACTED] ?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, he wasn't, sir. He was in Benghazi.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) I was fairly certain we were going if we were packing bags when I went back, sir, and when I came back, it was confirmed when he asked me to start looking for guys that would go that were qualified to go. And then we got a confirmation from the chief of station that he would like us to take that team up to Benghazi.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Was your team leader also the team leader for the response effort overall or was it the [REDACTED] Tripoli team leader who led the response team?

A (U) As far as I understood it, the chief of station wanted my team leader to be the initial or main team leader and I would be the assistant team leader for the duration of the extraction.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir, not within the short time while we were all -- we were needing to leave immediately and there was nothing that could be had immediately.

Q [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) It was the first call, I think, that was made, and that was where it stopped.

Q (U) And so this was a meeting that occurred even prior to the attack starting in Benghazi, those were just routine business?

A (U) That morning, sir, was when a case officer had met with him. He said, "How fast can you respond?" He said, "I am not sure; probably within 24 hours." Called back again that night and said, "We need you right now," and he was there. He showed up.

Q (U) This was good timing, wasn't it?

A (U) It was good timing, sir, convenient.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) And so this aircraft asset was a Learjet?

A (U) Yes, sir, it was.

Q (U) And what was the capability of that, passenger capability on that aircraft?

A (U) Fourteen, sir.

Q (U) Fourteen. So you lined up an air asset, you pushed ISR, you inquired about the availability of supporting aircraft and told, at least at that point, nothing was available. Did you make any preparation for the reception on the other end in Benghazi?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. So you mentioned you called your militia contacts in Tripoli. And was that 17th Feb Brigade?

A (U) That was not, sir. Libyan Shield.

Q (U) Libyan Shield?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so the Libyan Shield contact you had in Tripoli then was coordinating with his counterpart in Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) So you thought that the reception on the other end of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Benghazi would be a Libyan Shield militia?

A (U) Should have been, sir.

Q (U) Should have been.

A (U) Should have been.

Q (U) Were there any other militias that you were coordinating with in Tripoli that might have been available to assist in Benghazi?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Local groups or otherwise?

Q (U) Local groups or Libyan military or even foreign military or anyone else that you were pulsing in Tripoli for assistance when you got to Benghazi?

A (U) We had called Colonel [REDACTED] asking if we could take

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

his medic with us, but they were having issues getting ahold of their commander. Colonel [REDACTED] was the SF commander.

Q (U) Right. So you had called Colonel [REDACTED] asking for permission to deploy his medic --

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) -- with your team going from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And this medic was part of that stay-behind SST element?

A (U) He was, sir.

Q (U) So as I understand it, Colonel [REDACTED] had a total of four personnel or six personnel?

A (U) He gave six, including himself, sir.

Q (U) Six, including himself?

A (U) I can't remember exactly.

Q (U) And one of them was a medic?

A [REDACTED]

Q (U) I am sorry?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) A better medic, yeah.

Q (U) And so from that call to Colonel [REDACTED] you or your team leader reached and spoke with Colonel [REDACTED] about getting the medic released?

A (U) We did.

Q (U) And what was Colonel [REDACTED] response?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A Again, sir, they couldn't get ahold of their commander. I am positive he wanted to go, but I think the issue was getting approval to go.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir. I think they were working directly for SOCAF.

Q (U) SOCAF.

A (U) I think.

Q (U) And so that would have been the op center or Admiral Losey who is in command of SOCAF?

A (U) Admiral Losey, sir.

Q (U) Okay. All right. So you had identified the four personnel that your team leader had asked you to locate for the deployment?

A (U) Five, [REDACTED]

Q (U) Five, [REDACTED]. So four were [REDACTED] and then one [REDACTED] interpreter?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And then yourself and your fellow team member?

A (U) Yes, sir. Total of seven.

Q (U) Sorry, team leader.

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so you were anticipating reception on the other end by a Libyan Shield member in Benghazi. Is that accurate?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) We were, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Great. And so you were getting updates from [REDACTED] in Benghazi, [REDACTED] at the annex, at least initially. What was it -- was he at the mission compound or was he back at the annex? Do you recall?

A (U) He was back. I could not -- I didn't get ahold of him, obviously, when he was going to the consulate to pull everyone back to the annex, but I did get ahold of him once he had gotten back to the annex.

Q (U) And what was [REDACTED] providing you in the way of situational awareness?

A (U) We were just asking updates for wounded personnel, are they still under attack? If so, how heavy? Small arms, small, light, medium. So I think the issue was just trying to see the most recent they had been attacked and how long it had been since that attack.

Q (U) So did [REDACTED] relay that there had been attacks that were occurring at the annex?

A (U) He did, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And he gave you the nature of those attacks, whether it was small arms or RPG?

A (U) I think "harassing fire" was the exact verbiage.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Harassing fire. Did he indicate the presence of any crew-serve weapons or higher caliber weapons such as RPGs or rockets?

A (U) RPGs, sir.

Q (U) RPGs, harassing fire, was kind of the nature of the threat that [REDACTED] conveyed to you?

A (U) Sporadic, yes, sir.

Q (U) Sporadic. Okay. And do you recall, Mr. [REDACTED] kind of what timeframe these discussions were occurring? Was this, you know, an hour after your alert, was it -- as best you can recall.

A (U) I believe the conversation that I had was when we had gotten to the airport in Tripoli. That is around the time we found out the ambassador was missing.

Q [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir. I think it was around that time. I can't remember exactly the time.

Q (U) And were you informed also that there was any killed or wounded in Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) You learned of the identity of the one KIA?

A (U) Yes, sir, the one that they had known so far, sir, yes.

Q (U) Okay. And what were you conveyed as far as the injuries or the wounded in Benghazi? Did you have a number of wounded you were anticipating?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) We did. I think the only thing they had at the time was one wounded.

Q (U) But again, the five of you deployed. And what did you have in the way of medical capability in the seven people who were responding from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q (U) Now, when you got to the airport in Tripoli, as I understand it you would have had no longer access [REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Did AFRICOM headquarters or SOCAFRICA have any role in planning your deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) How about the embassy itself there in Tripoli, were they directing the deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A (U) Not that I recall, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) I know they were supportive of us going to Benghazi.

Q (U) You mentioned that you were in contact with Benghazi base. And I suspect that was via cell phone with [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And did you have any, at that time, before leaving Tripoli, any coordination ongoing with the special mission compound or the consulate?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) You didn't have any -- anybody you were talking to there that was --

A (U) At the consulate in Benghazi?

Q (U) -- at the consulate in Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) So your sole node, your sole communications node that you were actually getting updates from Benghazi was through [REDACTED] at the annex?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Were you able to coordinate with any other U.S. military assets prior to leaving the Tripoli airport?

A (U) No, sir. Again, we attempted to talk to Colonel [REDACTED] but he was having difficulty getting ahold of his commander.

Q (U) Okay. And how about any other foreign military assets? Were you in contact with the Tunisians or the Italians or the French or anyone else who might have been able to support you with assets, equipment, personnel?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir. We were trying to leave as quickly as possible. So if they didn't meet the timeline, leave as quick as we were trying to leave, then we got pushed.

Q So what drove the timeline for your deployment? Was it the availability of the aircraft?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q (U) And how long did it take from the time that the call was

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

made to the aircraft owner, what did he say about his ability to take off from Tripoli to Benghazi? How long a timeframe do you recall?

A (U) I don't remember what time he said, but I know we had got there around 11:30 or midnight, but he was ready to go when we had gotten there. And they actually had expedited us through the airport. We didn't go through any -- the actual airport procedures. We had weapons and ammo, obviously.

Q (U) So you had local expeditors or facilitators that enabled you to board the aircraft more rapidly than normal --

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) -- and depart from Tripoli?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And who were those expeditors? Were they arranged by you all, [REDACTED] by --

A (U) They were arranged by us calling our local military contacts [REDACTED]. There was a sheik there that was trying to get us through the airport.

Q (U) And there was no limitation on daylight only flight ops with this Learjet, as I understand was the limitation on the Libyan military C-130?

A (U) Absolutely, sir. He -- I don't think they could fly at night, but he could because he was a privately owned company. The Learjet was privately owned.

Q (U) But your understanding was, at least with respect to the Libyan C-130 --

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Daytime, sir.

Q (U) That was limited to daytime ops?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Do you recall seeing a C-130 on the tarmac there at Tripoli? Was it Mitiga airport?

A (U) Mitiga. I don't recall, sir.

Q (U) Okay. So your team leader led the Tripoli response team, I think, is what you told us earlier?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Composition was the seven you have identified already, yourself, your team leader, [REDACTED] interpreter, and four [REDACTED] personnel?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And you knew all of the other team members? You knew the six besides -- obviously the five besides your team leader and yourself?

A (U) Some better than others. I knew some of them in passing. I worked with some more than others.

Q (U) Okay. But you had at least worked with a few of them in Tripoli as you were providing security [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) As you drove to the Tripoli -- to Mitiga airport that night, did you observe any ongoing protest activity as you traversed through Tripoli to get to Mitiga?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Traffic was unusually bad for that time of night, but I did not see any protests.

Q (U) And had you been tracking throughout the day the demonstration or the activity at the Cairo embassy?

A (U) Not after that, sir.

Q (U) Okay. After you got your initial text from your team leader, then you no longer had any access to updates on what was going on in Cairo?

A (U) We would have, but that wasn't our focus at the time.

Q (U) So what drove the selection of Mitiga airport? Was it just that is where the asset was located?

A (U) Yes, sir. We were more familiar with the personnel at Mitiga than we were at the actual airport, sir.

Q (U) Did the Learjet have to relocate from Tripoli airport to Mitiga to get you, as far as you recall?

A (U) I am not sure, sir.

Q (U) Do you recall roughly or as accurately as you can what time you departed Tripoli Mitiga airport?

A (U) I think it was around midnight.

Q (U) And what is the duration of the flight time with a great Learjet from Mitiga to Benghazi?

A (U) I think we landed 02 local time, sir.

Q (U) So about a 2-hour flight?

A (U) An hour and 45 minutes.

Q (U) An hour and 45. And as you were en route, I imagine you

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

didn't have any ability to do any mission planning as you were airborne from Mitiga to Benghazi?

A [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, it did. And we conveyed that to the [REDACTED] team lead in Benghazi.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. So from your understanding, initially, at least, you would have gone straight from Benghazi airport to the annex to reinforce [REDACTED] and his team securing the annex?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) We did.

Q (U) Okay. You mentioned that you are as fluent as you can be in Arabic, and you had an interpreter [REDACTED] Were the two of you the primary language capability resident in that seven-person element?

A (U) He was the primary language capability. I was just listening. It is much easier than trying to speak with them. Libyan dialect is a little bit different.

Q (U) You mentioned expecting or anticipating the linkup from the Libyan Shield, based upon your prior coordination. When you arrived in Benghazi, was that Libyan Shield individual present?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Was anyone present from the Libyan armed forces or local militia that you could liaison with upon arrival in Benghazi?

A (U) Not as soon as we landed, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And you arrived at Benina airport?

A (U) We did.

Q (U) And what was the nature of the activity ongoing at Benina at 02 in the morning?

A (U) It was completely dead. We were the only plane that had landed in quite some time, it looked like, and the guard actually came out in his pajamas and asked us what was going on.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. So there was no airport personnel. This was not a 24/7 airport?

A (U) I don't think so, sir. It didn't appear to be. Only one individual came out to meet us once we had landed, and it was clear that he had been sleeping before that.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) We did, sir.

Q (U) And what did [REDACTED] relay at this point? This is at some time at 02 or shortly thereafter.

A (U) A lull in fire.

Q (U) A lull in fire.

A Yes, sir.

Q (U) Did he indicate how many harassing attacks they had sustained over the period of time?

A (U) Not specifically that I can remember, sir.

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) Just the last time of it.

Q (U) And there was a lull at some point starting at 02 or after 02. At least there was a lull when you talked to him?

A (U) Yes, sir. When I had talked to him, there had been a lull, and no one had been attacking the annex in quite some time.

Q (U) Did you get an update on accountability of personnel from [REDACTED] at that time?

A (U) We did.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) And what was your understanding about the number of personnel who remained at the consulate or the special mission compound?

A (U) I think it was 26 or 27 that they had at the annex.

Q (U) Okay. And so had anybody, any U.S. personnel remained at the consulate or the mission compound?

A (U) Not at the consulate, no, sir, but the ambassador was still missing.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And so as you arrived to this lack of activity at Benina airport, what actions did you take to try to identify support at that point?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) They were giving updates on reports for ISR, movement of crowds, things like that, in relation to where we were at the airport and the annex.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir, it was being conveyed.

Q (U) I am sorry.

A (U) It was being conveyed by -- just in talking to us.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Not that I know of, sir. I can't remember.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) How long did that exercise take?

A (U) I don't think we actually left the airport until about 0430.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) And how did you learn that? How did you find that out?

A (U) One of the local militia had told us that he -- they thought he was at the hospital. Reporting had indicated he was at the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

hospital.

Q (U) So based upon the calls that were made to Tripoli, your team leader had identified -- or your team leader had called somebody in Tripoli who had called somebody in Benghazi, so there were militia elements that showed up at the Benina airport at some point?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) The least of several bad options?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) So as I understand it, this was a Libyan Shield individual in Tripoli who was vetting the affiliations of the local militia elements that had showed up at Benina airport?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) But these local elements informed you that the ambassador had been brought to the hospital?

A (U) They did.

Q (U) Okay. And did they indicate whether he was still alive or whether he had been deceased?

A (U) They would not say specifically. They were being

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

relatively deceptive about it.

Q (U) All right. Did your contact or your team leader's contact with the Libyan Shield in Tripoli identify anybody who was less bad than the rest that you could trust to transport to the hospital?

A (U) The Libyan Shield commander, I think, Libyan Shield 2, because they had numbers, Libyan Shield 1, 2, and 3. I can't remember the exact number.

Q (U) Okay. And so was the plan then that you would go with Libyan Shield 2 to the hospital to identify the ambassador?

A [REDACTED]

A (U) The time specifically?

Q (U) Roughly, if you can, in that timeframe.

A (U) I can't remember exactly, sir. I want to say it was around 0345.

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) I can't remember, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) It was later, sir. Yes, sir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) We did.

Q [REDACTED]

Q (U) And how were you going to proceed? What was the nature of your transport from Benina to the annex?

A (U) The Libyan Shield commander had several gun trucks that we were using, as well as some Land Cruisers, to get us to the annex.

Q (U) And this is, again, Libyan Shield 2, the less bad element of militia?

A (U) Less bad, yes.

(U) Ms. Adams. Can I interrupt really quick? Who was the Libyan Shield that was supposed to meet you that never came? Was that 1, or did they never give you the guy's name --

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] There was two groups in Benghazi -- and I can't remember the numbers that were there -- and one from Trip -- I can't remember the exact number. I think it was 3.

(U) Ms. Adams. Okay. And so 3 is essentially who never showed up, and then 2 finally is the one who came? I think I have the numbers

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

wrong, but it was a different element. It was a different number designation.

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] It was, yeah.

(U) Ms. Adams. Okay.

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] And I can't -- it was groups mixed together, so it was sort of fluid that 17 Feb and Libyan Shield -- a lot of them worked together and they were interchangeable. So when you are talking about 1, I mean, they don't know who they're working for most of the time, so it's hard for us to keep up with it as well.

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Not Fort Bragg, sir.

Q (U) You were not?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Okay. So did you have any idea that there were other DOD assets that were being mobilized to respond to what was going on in Benghazi?

A (U) We knew that one of our squadrons was getting stood up to try and come over and help.

Q [REDACTED]

Q Okay. Got it. Did you have any sense of the timeline those

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

assets -- those additional assets were operating on? Did you have any sense of how long it would take to expect them to arrive?

A (U) Not exactly, sir. I knew the timeline that we operated on, but I'm not entirely sure -- and I wasn't at the time -- how long it would take me to get there.

Q (U) Fair enough. Okay. So you deployed with gun trucks and armored Land Cruisers, I guess, to the annex?

A (U) They weren't armored, sir.

Q (U) They weren't armored. They were just --

A (U) Just regular Land Cruisers.

Q (U) -- regular Land Cruisers and gun trucks. And during your movement from Benina Airport to the annex, did you learn of any additional vehicles joining that convoy?

A (U) No. We got stopped along the way going to the annex by another militia group that wanted to take us to the ambassador.

Q (U) And do you know the identity of that militia group?

A (U) No clue, sir.

Q (U) Who was navigating from the airport to the annex?

A (U) My team leader was with the Libyan Shield commander. We all had our GPSs out in case we got split up, so each vehicle had a vehicle commander, if you will. They all had GPSs in case something did happen.

Q (U) So who selected the route from the airport to the annex? Was it the team leader? Was it the Libyan Shield commander?

A (U) We decided on it while we were in the plane over. We stepped to it, sir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) And you mentioned you had not been to Benghazi before. Had your team leader also not been to Benghazi before on this deployment?

A (U) Neither one of us had, sir.

Q (U) Neither one, okay. You mentioned trying to raise contacts at the Benina airport from Tripoli so that they could arrange local Benghazi forces to show up. Did you try to contact any other foreign military? The Italians? The Turks? Anyone else?

A (U) Not that I'm aware of, sir.

Q (U) Okay. At least from your efforts, you didn't try to contact any forces.

A (U) No, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Not that I knew of, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Did you have any sense during the 2 and-a-half hours that you spent at Benina airport that you were being prevented from departing the airport? Could you have left at any time from 02 to 0430?

A (U) We didn't have a mode of transportation that was ours, so we were depending on those local militias. So it took us that long to find one that was capable of taking us out into town. Again, initially we were trying to go to the hospital, which we were all being told, "No, we can't take you to the hospital. We can take you to the annex."

(U) So that fight went on for a little while, with us thinking that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

he could possibly be at the hospital needing medical care. So we were pushing hard enough to go there that it prolonged our time at the airport. Then once we found out he was deceased, we had obviously gave that up, and they had no problem taking us to the annex.

Q (U) Okay. And roughly the timeframe for the trip between the airport and the annex is --

A (U) About 30 minutes drive, sir.

Q (U) And was it the Libyan Shield commander who gave your clearance to leave the airport, or was that your team leader's decision? How was the decision made to leave the airport to head to the annex?

A (U) I'm sure it was my team leader's decision. We all decided -- loaded up and then left as soon as possible, once we had found out.

Q (U) And, again, the militia force was supportive of taking you to the annex. There was no problem that hindered your departure from the airport once you determined you were headed to the annex?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Mr. [REDACTED] it's been about an hour, and I'd like to give you an opportunity to take a break. So if we could go off the record, please.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q (U) We'll go back on the record. It's 11:22. And I'll begin with the second hour of questioning.

(U) And I wanted to clear up one issue from the prior hour. I

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

understand there may have been somebody called the Zintanis in Tripoli, a militia force. Is there any chance that your team leader was talking to the Zintanis or the Zintanis were actually performing perimeter security at the annex in Tripoli?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Okay. So it could have been the Zintanis vice Libyan Shield or 17 Feb?

A (U) I'm positive 17 Feb was there, but it was Zintanis as well.

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) Yeah.

Q (U) All right.

A (U) And Libyan Shield I don't think had anything to do with annex security in Tripoli.

Q (U) But both Zintanis and 17 Feb?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Great. Thank you.

(U) Okay. So when we closed the last hour, you had departed on a 30-minute trip from Benina airport to the annex there in Benghazi. When you arrived at the annex, tell us what occurred. And I'd like you to have a chance to go through the narrative, if you want, about what you recall occurring once -- upon arrival at the annex.

A (U) Yes, sir. Once we had gotten to the annex, we called probably 3 minutes out, and the [REDACTED] Team Lead [REDACTED] was actually out there to meet us with the gate open. We didn't take any of the vehicles inside.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We exited the vehicles and walked inside.

(U) We took the Libyan Shield commander inside with us so his guys would stay there, ultimately. Went directly to the main house where the TOC was. I think it was Building Three. Team leader started talking to chief of base, and I was talking to [REDACTED] on the security situation, wounded personnel, what did he need from us that he didn't have already, and how we could help the security posture.

(U) Shortly after us being there, we were all sitting outside while we were talking about this on the front patio of Building Three. We had some sporadic gunfire over the top of Building Three, and immediately following, the first mortar round hit. I believe it went long, hit out in the road where our convoy had been. The gate is obviously closed to the compound now. Next one hit short just behind Building Three on the wall towards the warehouse. The other three or four mortars hit directly on top of Building Three.

Q (U) Now, as a result of your experience, can you tell the difference between a 60-millimeter mortar and an 81-millimeter mortar?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And was this the lighter 60-millimeter or the 81-millimeter, from your own experience?

A (U) The heavier, sir.

Q (U) The heavier, the 81-millimeter?

A (U) Eighty-one.

Q (U) Okay. You arrived at the annex and all seven of the [REDACTED] or the Team Tripoli came into the annex. Again, you started talking

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

with [REDACTED], Your team leader was talking with the chief of base. You brought in, I think, with you six shooters total?

A (U) With the seven that came with us?

Q (U) Right. Were six of that seven shooters or all seven?

A (U) Six out of seven were.

Q (U) Six out of seven.

A (U) Yeah, [REDACTED]

Q (U) And when you arrived and did that initial coordination with [REDACTED] did he indicate, "Hey, we need some immediate reinforcements on the roof here at the annex in overwatch or in security?" Was there any direction about how you would augment their security posture?

A [REDACTED]

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And he went to talk to their medic, which was --

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A Yes.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. And their coordination had been to ascertain the status of the wounded personnel that were there in the annex?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. And then with respect to the 26 or 27 other personnel that were evacuated or that had gone to the annex from the Special Mission Compound, some of whom were already at the annex, some of whom came from the Special Mission Compound, where were they physically located?

A (U) Inside Building Three. There were [REDACTED] and a couple of State Department security guys that were on the exterior security of Building Three, but no one was outside the walls of the annex.

Q (U) And so you arrived at roughly 0500 local?

A (U) Yes, sir. I think it was around 0445. It was just before 0500.

Q (U) Okay. And how much light was there at that time? Was it still relatively dark?

A (U) It was dark.

Q (U) Okay. Did you observe or hear any gunfire upon your arrival at the annex?

A (U) Not upon our arrival, but within 5 to 10 minutes after us being there is when those mortars came in. And prior to that there was some sporadic AK and PK fire into the compound.

Q (U) Upon your arrival, I know you were talking with [REDACTED] and

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the team leader was talking with the chief of base, what did you understand about your mission as you were heading from Benina airport to the annex? Was your mission then evacuation of nonessential personnel?

A (U) It was nonessential personnel only prior to that mortar attack happening.

Q (U) So what was the plan, Mr. [REDACTED] if you can recall? Was it to load up those nonessential personnel in that same gun truck convoy and carry them back to the airport?

A (U) It was. We were going to take 14 personnel back with us to the airport, let the jet take off, take them back to Tripoli. We were going to come back to the annex and help hold up with the [REDACTED] guys until further notice.

Q (U) Okay. So there would've been some security element remaining at the annex, here in the annex?

A (U) Yes. The majority of those people would have stayed there. Shooters, if you will.

Q (U) And then some security elements with the convoy heading the nonessential personnel back to the airport?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And, again, you would see them off in that Learjet?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Returning from Benghazi to Tripoli?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And then was the plan for that bird to turn and come back

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to Benghazi for a second lift?

A (U) It was not. We had not got that far into the plan, sir. We did not make the decision for that bird to come back. We didn't know how long we were going to have to stay at the annex. We were under the understanding they wanted to stay. They did not want to leave. So we were just trying to get the nonessential personnel out to get further direction from chief of station back in Tripoli on what he wanted them to do.

Q (U) Got it. Whose understanding or whose preference was it that they stay, that you understood? Was that the chief of base? Was that [REDACTED] Who had stated, "Hey, we're going to remain here and only the nonessentials are leaving"?

A (U) I believe it was the chief of base that wanted to keep some individuals there. I'm sure he was talking with the chief of station in Tripoli, but I didn't hear the conversation.

Q (U) Okay. And, again, this was all prior to the mortar rounds beginning?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) So your understanding at least was the plan is load up the nonessentials, 14 or so, whatever the Learjet can carry, we'll get them to the airport, they'll go back to Tripoli?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Okay. And then at some point the mortar rounds and the mortar attacks began. And if you would, please just talk us through the actions you took or that you observed in that timeframe.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Once the mortar round -- the first mortar round hit outside the gate where the convoy was, we saw the vehicles driving away, the gun trucks that were out there driving away.

Q (U) So their allegiance to their commander was overcome by their reluctance to stick around and take mortar shots?

A (U) It was, yeah.

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) I can't remember if one had got wounded, but I do believe later on we found out one of those guys had gotten wounded. So their excuse was they were taking him to -- all of them were taking him to healthcare --

Q (U) Fair enough.

A (U) -- leaving the commander behind.

Q (U) I'm sorry I interrupted. Please continue.

A (U) No, sir. Once the first mortar round hit, we moved everybody back into the center of the house. And myself, my team leader, the [REDACTED] Team Lead Tripoli and Benghazi both stayed near the initial entrance, trying to make sure that there wasn't going to be a follow-on attack after the mortars, possibly VBIEDs or suicide bombers coming through the main gate.

(U) I can't remember the direction of the gate right now, the cardinal direction, but there was two main gates to the compound, and we were trying to keep eyes on both. But everybody else was still inside the middle of the house while the mortars were going off.

Q (U) And, again, you mentioned three or four additional mortar

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

strikes that occurred after the first one that was long and the second one that was short. And what actions did you take at that point?

A (U) Once the mortar fire had stopped and machine gunfire had stopped, it was probably between 2 and 3 minutes afterwards, we decided to go and find out what personnel had been wounded and their status, and hopefully get them medical care. We took a team of four guys outside the house to go on top of Building Three to assess the casualties from the mortar fire. That was myself, my team leader, [REDACTED] Team Lead Tripoli and Benghazi.

(U) We move around to the backside of the house. We climb up a ladder to get to the roof, 15 feet, somewhere thereabouts. There is a large lip as you climb down onto the roof which made kind of a bowl for the mortar round to hit so it caused the shrapnel to bounce around and make it more casualty producing, which was obvious once we got up there.

(U) Everybody was wounded, obviously, from the mortar rounds. Two were passing away as we came up to the roof. One was a walking wounded. He had a pretty decent injury to his arm. I think it was his left arm. And the other individual, State Department individual was laying on the ground missing part of his leg, and heavy shrapnel wounds as well.

Q (U) And so at that point you evacuated the wounded as best you could from the roof?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Correct.

A (U) -- had came up to the roof. He was at the bottom of the ladder. We asked him to come up and help the walking wounded down and to go back inside and get a litter to get the other wounded off the roof, and informed him the other two were deceased.

(U) We took the deceased's personal effects, weapons, night vision goggles, things like that, threw them off the roof, and then proceeded with medical care on the State Department's individual that was wounded, and then eventually moved him off the roof as well.

Q (U) At that point, what was the direction from the chief of base? Was that when the decision was made to evacuate the annex entirely?

A (U) We did. Once we got back, we decided that the situation we had was untenable to stay at the compound. We didn't have enough shooters and there were too many wounded, and we were definitely going to lose our State Department wounded if we had stayed there much longer. So we were pushing to get out as fast as we could.

Q (U) And who made the decision to evacuate the annex entirely? Whose decision was that?

A (U) That was us as a whole. We had all gotten together in a group and talked about the situation, and we all agreed, the chief of base, both team lead for Tripoli and Benghazi, and myself and my team leader.

Q (U) So that decision was a consensus between the chief of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

base, Tripoli [REDACTED] team lead, Benghazi team lead, and your team leader as well?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Okay. And so at that point, there were no vehicles to evacuate the annex?

A (U) There was no security vehicles, no gun trucks that would help us get to the airport. And we determined we could probably make it with the vehicles we had inside the compound. They had two to three up-armored vehicles, as I recall, and two or three unarmored vehicles. So we were trying to disperse personnel inside those vehicles or figure out numbers to fit inside the vehicles we had inside the compound. We were going to make a run to the airport, if you will.

Q (U) Was there any resistance to evacuating the annex from any of the OGA or CIA personnel that were there, or was it a unanimous consensus?

A (U) Not that I recall. It was unanimous.

Q (U) Okay. And at some point, do I understand that elements from Libyan Shield returned to assist your evacuation?

A (U) That was a little bit later, sir, after we had already decided we were leaving without them. Our interpreter [REDACTED] was talking to the Libyan Shield commander we had with us about him being on the phone since the attack happened. So we were at first concerned maybe he caused the attack, and then realized that he was just trying to get himself out of there after letting the interpreter listen to what he was saying.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) So he was calling his buddies back to say, "Come get me. You know, obviously there has been some trouble. I need to get out of here." So we were like, "Hey, look, you're not going anywhere without us. You're going to take us to the airport, and here is why."

(U) Again, he said they would show up. He didn't give an exact timeline. Once we had found out he was calling trying to get them back, within 10 minutes they were at the gate.

Q (U) You say within 10 minutes later after he had called and they returned to the annex?

A (U) Within 10 minutes of us finding out what he was doing. He had been calling them all along --

Q (U) I see.

A (U) -- trying to get them back. But within 10 minutes of us actually finding out what he had been doing, they showed up.

Q (U) And at that point then you had sufficient lift capability and fire support capability for that convoy to the annex?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And what was directed about actions to prepare for the evacuation? Were you involved in the preparation of the annex for evacuation?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And what do you recall having occurred?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Okay. And so at some point you loaded up the deceased, the wounded, the nonessential personnel, and all of the security personnel into that single convoy?

A (U) We did. We lined the trucks up in order of movement. And then everybody that was a non-shooter was in an up-armored vehicle, and all the shooters were in thin-skinned vehicles to be able to shoot out of the cars.

Q (U) And at that point, you convoyed back to Benina airport?

A (U) We did. Libyan Shield showed up. They gave us a lead and rear element outside the gate. We pulled in between the two, and they led us to the airport. And as we were leaving, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Was anyone at all left behind at the annex? Was any U.S. personnel left at the annex?

A (U) Not at the annex, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And as far as you knew, there were no U.S. personnel left at the mission compound either, in the consulate?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) When you arrived at Benina airport, talk me through what happened there.

A (U) On the way back it was business as usual. The Sun was up and there were -- the town was as it would normally be, I'm assuming.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We get to the airport, and there are a lot of Libyan Shield militia members waiting for us to come in, probably more people than we would have liked because of cameras, phones, things like that.

(U) We drive directly onto the airfield right back over to the jet and try to get the wounded State Department individual onto the jet. We were trying to keep Lookie Loos away, obviously, but, I mean, the airport is open. They can stand back away from the personnel fence they had made, you know, the Libyan Shield had made, but they were trying to look and see what was going on. So part of the effort was keeping them away and the other part was trying to get individuals on the plane.

Q (U) As we understand, the time of the mortar attack was somewhere around 5:15 that morning?

A (U) Thereabouts, sir.

Q (U) And how long did it take from that mortar attack until the time you all packed up and left the annex in toto?

A (U) From the mortar attack?

Q (U) Correct.

A (U) I want to say about an hour, sir.

Q (U) About an hour?

A (U) I can't remember exactly. I know we got back to the airport around 0730. It was about 35 -- we took a little bit longer route back. Not sure why, probably to avoid downtown areas, but --

Q (U) And so then you loaded the wounded on that Learjet, prepared for transport along with the other nonessential personnel for the first lift from Benina airport back to Tripoli?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And then how was the rest of the party going to proceed from Benghazi back to Tripoli?

A (U) We were asking the pilot to come back and pick us up, once he landed to do a turnaround and come back and take us back as well. The problem was he would not take deceased individuals on his plane, so a lot of the private pilots that were owned by -- you know, private personnel would not allow more than one deceased individual on their plane. Not sure why, but that was the readout we were getting from them. So we were trying to find other planes that would take us at the Benghazi airport.

Q (U) And then at some point the committee understands that a Libyan C-130 was made available?

A [REDACTED]

Q (U) Who was that coordination occurring between? Was that your team leader and the Libyans at the hospital?

A (U) That was myself, my team leader, the [REDACTED] interpreter, and Libyan Shield commander.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) We were not talking to anybody at the hospital. We were talking to the Libyan Shield commander and said, "Hey, you need to get him back from the hospital over to here." He was complaining that the hospital was guarded by Ansar al-Sharia and that it wouldn't be that easy to get him back. And we said, "We don't care. If you don't go get him, we're going to go get him."

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir, it was.

Q (U) And how do you understand that that Libyan C-130 was made available?

A (U) I'm not entirely sure, sir. I think it was at Benina already. I don't remember seeing it fly in, although it may have. But I think it was the only functional C-130 they had on the eastern side of Libya.

Q (U) And that C-130 then was provided to you all to load up the rest of the remaining personnel at Benina?

A (U) Yes, it was. They were more than willing to take all of us and the deceased.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) And did the C-130 return then to Mitiga or to another airport in Tripoli?

A (U) I think we went back to Tripoli International.

Q (U) Tell me what happened when you arrived at Tripoli International Airport. You were in the second bird, that C-130?

A (U) We were, yes, sir.

Q (U) And what did you do or what actions did you take upon arrival at Tripoli International Airport?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q (U) The annex there in Tripoli?

A [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q (U) Were you involved in the effort to evacuate from the embassy to the annex before you left Tripoli to head to Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) So that all occurred after your departure?

A (U) It did.

Q (U) Okay. So you went from the C-130 back to the annex?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And did you remain in Tripoli?

A (U) We did.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) You didn't fly onto Kaiserslautern or Ramstein, or wherever the aircraft took off?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And how long did you remain in Tripoli?

A (U) I think October, late October, sir. I can't remember -- the total time of my deployment was around 4 and-a-half months. I can't remember exactly the date we left.

Q (U) When the party left the Benghazi airport to head back to Tripoli, how many of the State Department people did you know? Did you know the composition of that element that went from Benghazi airport back to Tripoli that you flew with?

A (U) I had not met them before, no.

Q (U) The committee has heard that there were a couple of individuals who may have been contractors to the State Department on that lift from Benghazi to Tripoli. Did you know either of these individuals?

A (U) It was a little bit of a weird situation. Once they found out the jet was leaving, they walked up with suits and rolling suitcases and apparently had been at the airport the entire time. Not sure their role and where they came from, to be honest with you. They kind of came out of nowhere. But they were there, as I understood it, at the airport the entire time, but I'm not sure who they were.

Q (U) They were in Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir, they were.

Q (U) So they must have gotten there sometime between 02 and

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

0730ish?

A (U) I'm not entirely sure, sir. It was a little weird, and they never really brought it up again who they were or what they were doing there.

Q (U) Okay. But they flew on the C-130 with you and not on the Learjet on the first lift?

A (U) They flew on the Learjet, sir.

Q (U) Oh, they flew on the Learjet, okay.

A (U) Yeah.

Q (U) Was anybody in charge of manifesting the party that went from Benghazi back to Tripoli? Were you performing a manifesting role? Was anyone else in your team?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) And so we should be able to identify manifest from both flights, both from the Learjet and the later 130 flight, if they exist?

A (U) Yes, sir, should be.

Q And do you know if those two personnel that showed up with the suits and the rolling suitcases, do you know if they stayed in Tripoli or went on to Germany when that bird later left from Tripoli to Germany?

A (U) I didn't see them after that.

Q (U) Because you were off to the annex?

A (U) We went off to the annex. And they should have been there if they had come back and stayed at the annex, but they weren't. So

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I didn't see them again after that.

Q (U) So they didn't return to the annex with you and the rest of that party. They either went on to Germany or went somewhere else?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And have you seen them since then?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. At any time during these events as they transpired throughout the night of 9/11 and into 9/12, are you aware of any request that was made to the Libyan armed forces for Libyan MiGs to respond to these events?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Are you aware of whether they had any operational MiGs in Libya at the time?

A (U) They had one operational MiG at the time that I knew of.

Q (U) One operational MiG?

A (U) That I knew of, all because I'd seen it doing test flights.

Q (U) And was that MiG located at Mitiga Airport in Tripoli?

A (U) I think it was, sir.

Q (U) Do you have any understanding or awareness of the alert status that aircraft was on?

A (U) No.

Q (U) From your own background and operational experience, can you envision where a MiG would've been any value added to the annex defense mission?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir, I can't. It was in the middle of a populated area. I can't see what they would've been able to do.

Q (U) Did you return to Benghazi annex at any time on a date anytime after 9/11 of 2012?

A (U) We went back for the FBI investigation, sir.

Q (U) And tell me about what you recall from that return trip. What was your role there?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q (U) And how many security personnel assisted in their visit to Benghazi, if you can recall?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q (U) And that squadron deployed from Sigonella down to Tripoli and then to Benghazi?

A (U) Right into Benghazi, sir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) So they deployed from Sigonella into Benghazi?

A (U) Yes.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And how long was the FBI on site in Benghazi?

A (U) It was that entire day. We stayed there the entire day and came back that evening, sir.

Q (U) So you were there only during a single daylight cycle --

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) -- for the FBI to do its forensic efforts?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And then you returned to Tripoli?

A (U) Yes, we did.

Q (U) And remained there until October?

A Yes.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir, we did.

Q (U) Okay. And did you learn anything additional that related to the attack such as the location of the mortars or anything else about the attack?

A (U) On the --

Q (U) On that second visit.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) On the annex, sir?

Q (U) On the annex.

A (U) We did. We were trying to find the location where the mortars could have come from. Speculation only. But, yeah, other than that, that's really all we did to try and find out. I know the FBI went through and they were measuring bullet holes and which direction they came from. We can pretty much pinpoint, if you stood on the roof, where it came from. There was only a few buildings that could see inside the annex, so we knew generally where those shots came from.

Q (U) Is that because you would have to be able to see inside the annex to accurately adjust fire with the mortars?

A (U) From how accurate the mortars were, you would have to have somebody spotting for you to say. For the one to go long, normally what would happen is they would have to know it went long, so someone would have to see it. So one that went long and one went short, and it's called bracketing, so that means normally someone's calling that bracket for you. Says, "Hey, you're long; drop 50. Hey, you're short; add 25."

(U) So that seemed like -- and, again, the pattern, after looking at it, as well, especially from footage shows that long, short, all on target. So that would assume that someone had a spotter.

Q (U) When you say long and short, that typically would imply to me as a trained mortarman that you could kind of know the location that the mortar fire was originating, because it could've been short-long?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) It could have, sir. We thought we knew -- there was a horse track that was nearby around 600 to 800 meters away, and it looked like that was the best place to shoot the mortars from and it seemed a likely spot. They couldn't see the building itself, but they could see the direction of the building and they could have had anything to let them know where that building was located and trying to adjust fire onto them.

Q (U) And, again, this would've been in the hours of darkness that they were adjusting fire?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) So clearly they had an FO, a forward observer, a spotter of some sort to adjust that fire. But you never could definitively conclude where those mortars may have been positioned?

A (U) Not definitively. All speculation, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And so what's your opinion on the skill of those who were actually employing the mortars that evening in the attack on Benghazi annex?

A (U) I would say personally that it was probably a skilled mortar team. It's not easy. And you, being a trained mortarman, know how hard that would be to shoot inside the city and get something on target within two shots. That's difficult. I would say they were definitely a trained mortar team or had been trained to do something similar to that.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir. That's why I was kind of surprised. I had not heard of or seen anybody or talked to anyone that had been trained on mortars at all. So it was unusual.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) I did hear that, sir.

Q (U) And what's your recollection of that allegation, or what do you know about it?

A (U) I don't know anything firsthand, sir. It was all secondhand information. I'm not sure the conversation that was had with Colonel [REDACTED] but I do know that when we left they were having a hard time getting a hold of their commander. That's the only thing I was aware of them having. And they would not release their 18 Delta without talking to their commander, which we understood.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Admiral Losey.

Q [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

A (U) Colonel [REDACTED]

Q (U) Colonel [REDACTED]

A (U) Yes, sir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Did you know him as well?

A (U) I do know Colonel [REDACTED]

Q (U) Did you know him during your time in Tripoli?

A (U) I had known him before that as well. I worked at the MACE in Quantico. He came by pretty often. He started the Marine Corps Martial Arts program, so I was familiar with Colonel [REDACTED] before that.

Q [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A (U) Not that I know of, sir. I don't think that Colonel [REDACTED] was contacted.

Q (U) Do you know if [REDACTED] had a doctor at the annex in Tripoli? Were you aware of any medical personnel stationed -- permanent personnel -- at Tripoli annex?

A (U) I know the embassy had a surgeon, like a trauma surgeon. I can't remember their name right now off the top of my head, but all the medically-qualified personnel at the annex were 18 Delta-qualified [REDACTED] agents.

Q (U) To your knowledge, did the annex in Tripoli ever consider evacuating, or was there an adequate security posture there after 9/12?

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Q (U) You mentioned that the Zintanis and 17 Feb had the exterior security mission for the Tripoli annex. Do you have an opinion

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

about their capabilities, their effectiveness?

A (U) We had talked to them before in passing. They seemed capable. I think they had their own equities, obviously, for keeping us safe, but they were doing a good job of it, as far as I could tell. I never passed them sleeping on post or anything like that.

Q (U) And how about the Blue Mountain Group? Did you ever become familiar with somebody called the Blue Mountain Group?

A (U) The name is familiar, but I can't remember exactly.

Q (U) Okay. Did you know the leader of 17 Feb in Tripoli or ever meet Fawzi Abu Khatif?

A (U) Again, that name sounds familiar, sir, but I can't remember meeting him personally.

Q (U) Do you remember having formed any opinion about the leader of 17 Feb, Mr. Khatif?

A (U) No, I don't.

Q (U) I know that you mentioned before leaving Tripoli you were advised there wouldn't be any additional air assets available to support you. Did you renew the request for air support upon arriving in Benghazi?

A (U) We, again, just asked what we had available. We were referring more to ISR and how our posture as a unit had been, knowing that they were going to be relatively quick as well. And thinking that we could possibly have a situation where we had to hunker down inside of Benghazi, it would've been more likely they would've been the first ones there.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) When you say knowing the posture of your unit, meaning the unit responding from Fort Bragg?

A (U) Yes, sir. We just wanted to know if they had been blown out or not, and they had. And we had gotten informed that they were moving to Sigonella.

Q (U) Okay. But in specific, other than that unit that was responding from Fort Bragg, did you ever learn about a potential response from the Commander's In-extremis Force also in Europe?

A (U) No, I did not.

Q (U) Are you familiar with the CIF or the -- it's now the Commander's Response Force?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And were you aware that when the team from Fort Bragg or squadron back in Fort Bragg was alerted that there was also an alert that extended to the CIF?

A (U) I was aware of the alert, but I did not know they were there before that.

Q (U) You say you were aware of the alert?

A (U) I was. And that was the first time I had known where they were located.

Q (U) Okay. But in terms of any active -- any additional air support, whether AC-130 gunship, armed helo gunship, anything from the Mediterranean, were you aware of any potential for additional air assets from any other source?

A (U) No, sir. They were pretty clear that the timeline we

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

were asking for couldn't be met. And I wasn't exactly sure what assets were even available. We were, of course, asking for anything at that point. We weren't very specific with what we wanted, and we were happy with the ISR that we had. That was better than nothing.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) But you didn't know of anything that was available in the North Africa region that could be called to respond to assist you in the way of air support?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) When you arrived in Benghazi, were you aware whether MedEvac had already been requested, medical evacuation capability for the wounded that were relocated from the consulate to the annex?

A (U) I knew there was already steps in place to prepare for us to bring wounded back. I wasn't sure exactly what that was.

Q (U) And did you have any sense of the timeline for that response effort either?

A (U) No. I assumed that would be relatively immediate because of the -- we had the trauma surgeon there as well as the 18 Delta that stayed back. So there was no doubt in my mind that when we got back they would be ready for us.

Q (U) Okay. There was a statement that Secretary Panetta made sometime after the attacks in Benghazi, and I want to ask your opinion on this statement. And what Secretary Panetta said is, "The basic

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

principle here is that you don't deploy forces into harm's way without knowing what's going on, without having some real-time information about what's taking place. And as a result of not having that kind of information, the commander who was on the ground during that area, General Ham; General Dempsey, the chairman, and I felt very strongly we could not put forces at risk in that situation."

(U) So from your own background and your own operational experience and perspective that night, could the CIF, the In-extremis Force, have provided value to what was going on in that situation in Benghazi?

A (U) In the timeline that we were meeting, I don't think they would have made it in time, sir. I mean, they obviously could have helped, but as quick as we were in and out of Benghazi, I don't think they could have made it. They would've had to have been sitting in the planes ready to go when it happened, which is not likely.

Q (U) So the reality is the CIF wasn't close enough or postured close enough to be able to respond to the situation in Benghazi on that timeline?

A (U) I think had it been prolonged and we had stayed and tried to defend the annex, I have no doubt that someone would have come shortly thereafter. But we were -- I think once the decision was made for everyone to leave as quickly as possible -- I'm not sure the decision that was being made, but I know that -- I'm sure no one knew they could meet that timeline of how quickly we wanted to get in and out of Benghazi. But, again, had we stayed, no doubt that there would've been more than one group coming to help.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) Mr. [REDACTED] did you ever participate in an after-action review at some point relating to this operation?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And do you know of any security changes or policy changes that took effect that were directed based upon what occurred in Benghazi or through the AAR process?

A (U) Not through the AAR process. I met individuals since then that have had different groups stood up because of what happened in Benghazi just throughout traveling to different embassies.

Q (U) Okay. Are there security changes from your perspective that you would recommend based upon your experience of having gone through this attack and responding to the attack in Benghazi? Are there things that you would suggest that they do differently, State Department do differently, [REDACTED] do differently?

A (U) I think they've done a good job reacting to it. I think all those have probably already been done.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) No, sir.

Q [REDACTED]

A (U) Once we got home, sir?

Q (U) Yes.

A (U) We did not specifically for a debrief or an AAR. But

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

for memorial services, things like that, we discussed things that had happened, but wasn't an official AAR.

Q (U) Have you ever talked to the deputy CIA director, Mr. Mike Morell, or other CIA management as part of, you know, either attending the memorial services or as part of an AAR process after the attacks in Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir. I spoke with him briefly at the awards ceremony that we had at the building, but that's the only time I've spoken to him.

Q (U) Any recommendations you might offer about how to improve upon or collect and prepare for an attack scenario like this one that occurred at the embassy or at the annex?

A (U) Again, sir, I think all those steps have probably been put in place since then. Recently had one of the individuals from State Department come to work, and I think he is in charge of all the high-risk embassies and consulates at this point. So I think they've done or taken appropriate action.

Q (U) You say -- I'm sorry. I missed that last -- you say because the State Department implemented this -- you knew this individual?

A (U) I just recently met him before I came here. He was at work and asked to talk to me. And then he is in charge of all the high-risk outstations or consulates and embassies, so obviously have more oversight on what's going on because of Benghazi.

Q (U) So this individual here in Washington that has got that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

additional duty, as far as you know?

A (U) I'm not sure where he's working out of. It's probably here. I would assume so, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Do you ever get up to Foggy Bottom to the State Department headquarters?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Mr. Chipman. Okay. I'd like to go off the record, please.

[Discussion off the record.]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Ms. Rauch. The time is, looks like, 12:20, but I don't think we'll take a full hour, so I think you're good to go here.

(U) Let me reintroduce myself. I'm Laura Rauch with the minority staff. I'm joined by my colleague Shannon Green and our chief counsel, Heather Sawyer. And on behalf of the ranking member, Elijah Cummings, and the other Democratic Members of Congress who serve on this committee, thank you for your tremendous service to our Nation, and thank you for agreeing to be here today to answer our questions.

(U) And my colleague in the last couple of hours did a pretty thorough examination of the narrative. And we appreciate that. And so we just have a few questions for you --

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] Okay.

(U) Ms. Rauch. -- and then we'll wrap this up pretty quickly.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q (U) At the outset of our discussion today, you were asked about a document, an operational narrative --

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) -- and you had -- you said that you had a chance to review it --

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) -- recently. And I just want to confirm that it -- that operational narrative accurately captures your experience.

A (U) It does. It was the -- yeah. It was the soonest thing we wrote. It was within 48 hours of the actual incident, so, yeah, it

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

was the freshest on our mind. Everything in there is the best it could be timeline-wise as well.

Q (U) And so you think because of its -- because of when it was written, it was probably one of the more accurate --

A (U) The timeline, definitely. I mean, there was definitely more -- two or three different timelines put out over a period of time, but we stuck to that one only because it was the first thing that was written and it was the best timeline that we had.

Q (U) And once again, just confirming that you stand by everything that's in it at this point?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Very good. So setting aside -- moving on to your operations at QRF, setting aside the obstacles that you immediately had to deal with, such as the distance and securing a jet and other logistical challenges that you obviously had in front of you, in your initial push to Benghazi, was there ever a pause in your operation?

A (U) No. It actually moved pretty quickly getting to Benghazi. The pause came after we landed. That's really the only pause we had, and it was --

Q (U) So is it correct to say or fair to say that there was never a moment when you and Team Tripoli weren't doing everything in your power to get to Benghazi as quickly as possible?

A (U) No.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) Absolutely.

Q A(U) And just can you tell me, were you in continual communications within your -- with your chain of command?

A (U) Yes. Minus being the flight over, we were.

Q (U) So except for the, you said it was a 2-hour flight, during --

A (U) Hour and a half to 2 hours.

Q (U) -- that time is when you couldn't be in communication?

A (U) But that was the only time.

Q (U) That was the only time. Other than that, it was pretty regular. And as they went up, did information come back down between --

A (U) It did. We had pretty much an open phone call. The radios weren't working at the time, our secure radios, so we were using our cell phones. But it would stay -- either I was talking or my team leader talking.

Q (U) Okay. And you said that communication was mostly through cell phones?

A (U) It was.

Q (U) Okay. Very good. So there's been a book published called "13 Hours" --

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) -- by some of the members of the [REDACTED] team that served in Benghazi. Have you had a chance to read that book?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) I've read portions of that book, yes.

Q (U) And so just portions, not all of it?

A (U) I've not read the complete book.

Q (U) Okay. So in that book, the heroics of some of the [REDACTED] team who authored the book is showcased pretty front and center, but many others, you and your team included, the task force -- or I'm sorry, Team Tripoli, played a critical role in the successful evacuation of all U.S. personnel from Benghazi. Is there anything that you would like to address in or add to the narrative of the book?

A (U) I would say our narrative follows exactly what happened; the book's, I probably could not say the same. The portions of the book I read didn't seem factual after being there. Obviously, we were on the ground in specific situations they were talking about, and the majority of that book was not factual, because of that. And I can attest to it, because we were there.

(U) Ms. Sawyer. Are there particular things in that regard that stood out to you as not resonating factually with your experience on the ground?

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] I think the fact that some of those [REDACTED] agents had said that they were on the roof when their friends passed away or actions they took to secure the compound, things like that, were not factual. I mean, there was more than one or two instances. A lot of it wasn't based on facts, especially after having been there. The majority of the [REDACTED] personnel I saw were the [REDACTED] team leads. The guys that came with us and some of the ones that wrote the book were not as

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

present as they said they were in the book, so I did not give much credibility to that after I read those excerpts of things they were writing that I was actually there for.

(U) Ms. Rauch. Okay. Well, thank you for your candor. And my colleague, I think, had a question.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q (U) I just had a couple quick questions to follow up on some of the discussion from the last hour. And, you know, again, we appreciate both your candor and your willingness.

(U) From our perspective, there were obviously things that were quite tragic that night. There were also tremendous successes. And you've spoken, I think, very clearly about, you know, the steps that your team took. And I think you described it kind of as how quickly you were in and out of Benghazi and helping get all U.S. personnel -- you confirmed all U.S. personnel had been evacuated.

(U) One of the things that had come up was just with regard to medical personnel who could help attend to the wounded.

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And you had indicated that, I think, while you were still in Tripoli, you had been given a sense that there was at that point in time one already killed in action?

A (U) There was, yeah. Smoke inhalation, as we understood it, because of the fire.

Q (U) And that had been at the consulate?

A (U) Yes, ma'am.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q (U) And I think you indicated that there was one additional wounded.

A (U) Yes. We were not sure the extent of the injuries or what had happened. We assumed it was moving from the consulate to the annex.

Q (U) Did you have any under -- you said you didn't have a strong understanding of what the extent of the injuries were. Did you understand them to be at that point life-threatening injuries?

A (U) No, no. There were no life-threatening injuries that we knew of. And the one that was already deceased was, you know, obviously too late.

Q (U) And the individual who was injured at that point in time that you had heard about in Tripoli, and to the extent you know, was that person then ultimately successfully evacuated?

A (U) They were. I think it was as they were moving back, one of the guys had fallen over one of the walls. They were climbing some reasonably large walls, so I think that's what they were referring to. No one had any bullet wounds or anything like that of that nature once we got in there.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) There were.

Q (U) But aside from the individuals who were then killed in action, were all the other injured U.S. personnel on the ground successfully evacuated?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) So, you know, it was our understanding -- we've heard some testimony about pretty tremendous, I think, medical attention that was given. Was it your sense that the people who were there kind of pulled together and provided what they needed in order to get everyone, even the injured, back to Tripoli, where they got additional medical care?

A [REDACTED]

Q (U) So with the exception of the individuals killed in action, we -- we, I say that magnanimously -- you all were able to successfully evacuate all personnel, including the wounded, to Tripoli, where they then got life-saving care?

A (U) Yes, ma'am.

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q (U) Okay. Very good. So this is the eighth congressional investigation into the attacks in Benghazi, and there are a number of public allegations and a lot of speculation. While anyone can speculate, there is only a limited universe of people who have firsthand knowledge about what happened. We're asking about these allegations because it's our understanding that all of these continue to be investigated. So I have a series of allegations, some of them you will have knowledge about, some of them won't relate to you at all, but I just ask you to answer them as easily as possible.

A (U) No problem.

Q (U) It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton initially blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down, and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

assets to help in Benghazi.

(U) Do you have evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night of the attacks?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios, its highest award for false claims.

(U) Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security resources in Benghazi?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in spring 2011.

(U) Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in the spring of 2011?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries. A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria and that they found no support for this allegation.

(U) Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria or any other foreign country?

A (U) No.

Q (U) A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed from departing the annex to assist the special mission compound. There have been a number of allegations about the cause and the appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered to, quote, stand down, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

(U) Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CIA personnel?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Putting aside whether you personally agree with the decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the annex to assist the special mission compound?

A (U) No.

Q (U) A concern has been raised by one individual that in the course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

(U) Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Let me ask these questions for documents that were provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were provided to Congress?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he told Congress that, the CIA faithfully performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and non-partisanship.

(U) Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that ambassador Susan Rice made an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talks show about the Benghazi attacks.

(U) Do you have any evidence that ambassador Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk shows?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that the President of the United States was virtually AWOL as commander in chief on the night of the attacks and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

President was virtually AWOL as commander in chief or missing in action on the night of the attacks?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks, who were considering flying on the second plane to Benghazi, were ordered by their superiors to stand down, meaning cease all operations. Military officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their current location. A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that there was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi.

(U) Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review the attacks, after which, he stated, "Given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have saved lives that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to deploy?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Very good. So that ends our questioning.

A (U) Okay.

Mr. Chipman. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) I served in your command 20 years ago. At the time, we referred to people like you as genetically superior national assets, we referred to the staff as locally inferior regional liabilities. I think that your appearance here today reflects the soundness of that observation. I think, if anything, your command has gotten better in the 20 years since I've seen you, and I just want to thank you for your service to the Nation, your continued service ahead, and for what you've done for all of us.

ZI265001) (U) Mr. [REDACTED] Thank you, sir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Ms. Rauch. All right. Thank you very much.

(U) Mr. [REDACTED] Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

[REDACTED]



Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

(U) I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

Witness Name

Date



Errata Sheet

Select Committee on Benghazi

Department of Defense counsel on behalf of the witness reviewed the accompanying transcript, certified its accuracy, and declined to provide corrections to the transcript.