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SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: CHARLENE RAE LAMB

THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 2016

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC-205,
Capitol Visitor Center, commencing at 9:11 a.m.

Present: Representatives Gowdy, Westmoreland, Jordan, Brooks,

Roby, and Duckworth.

Appearances:

For the SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI:

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SHARON JACKSON, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL

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For the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

AUSTIN EVER, SENIOR ADVISOR

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ALISON WELCHER, ATTORNEY-ADVISED

Ms. Betz. Good morning.

Ms. Lamb. Good morning.

Ms. Betz. This is a transcribed interview of Charlene Lamb conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters, pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Would the witness please state her name for the record?

Ms. Lamb. Charlene Rae Lamb.

Ms. Betz. The committee appreciates your appearance at this interview today. Good morning. My name is Kim Betz, as I mentioned, with the committee's majority staff. And I'd also like to take this opportunity for everybody to introduce themselves again around the table and in the room.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Sharon Jackson with the majority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. O'Brien. Erin O'Brien, minority.

Mr. Rebnord. Dan Rebnord with the minority staff.

Ms. Welcher. Alison Welcher, State Department.

Mr. Snyder. Eric Snyder, State Department.

Mr. Missakian. Craig Missakian, majority staff.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke, majority staff.

Mr. Davis. I'm Carlton Davis.

Mr. Kiko. Phil Kiko with the committee.

Ms. Betz. Before we begin, I'd like to go over some of the ground rules and explain how the interview will work today. Generally the way that we ask questions is that a member from the majority will ask questions first for up to an hour and then the minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time if they choose.

Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or a designated staff. It has been our practice to rotate back and forth 1 hour per side until all of the questions are asked and then the interview will be over.

Unlike a testimony or a deposition in Federal court, the committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness or their counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review by the chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in the interview, the witness can be required to return for a deposition or hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This has not been an issue we've encountered in the past, but I wanted to make sure that you were clear on the process.

This session will be unclassified. If any question calls for a classified answer, please let us know, and we'll figure out a way to

resolve it.

You are welcome to confer with your counsel, and you have State Department counsel with you, at any time throughout the interview, but if you need something to be clarified, we ask that you ask us to clarify it, and then if you need to discuss anything with your counsel, we will go off the record and stop the clock to provide you with that opportunity.

We'd like to take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This can be after every hour of questioning, after every couple of rounds, whatever you prefer. During a round of questioning, if you need anything, glass of water, use the facilities, to confer with your counsel, please let us know, and we'll go off the record and stop the clock. We want to make this as easy as possible for you.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Ms. Betz. And as you can see, we have an official reporter taking down everything you say to make a written record, so we ask that you give a verbal response to all the questions, yes or no, as opposed to nods of the head.

I'm going to ask the reporter to please feel free to jump in in case you do respond nonverbally. Do you understand that?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Just for the record, we're joined by Congressman Westmoreland from Georgia.

~~So continuing on, we should both try not to talk over each other so it's easier to get a clear record. We want you to answer our~~

questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible, so we will take our time and repeat or clarify our questions if necessary. If you have any questions or if you don't understand any of our questions, please let us know, and we'll be happy to clarify it or repeat it if necessary.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or do not remember, it's best not to guess. Please give us your best recollection, and if there are things that you do not know or can't remember, just say so and let us know who, to the best of your knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete answer to that question.

You are required to answer questions from Congress truthfully. Do you understand that?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Ms. Betz. This also applies to questions posed by congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or making false statements. Do you understand this?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful answers to today's questions?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Ms. Betz. Okay. That's the end of my preamble.

Does the minority have anything that they would like to add?

Ms. Sawyer. Yes. Just briefly. Thank you for agreeing to be here voluntarily and answering questions and traveling up from [REDACTED] to be with us today.

Ms. Lamb. Oh, you're welcome. The work you all are doing is very important, and I appreciate that.

Ms. Sawyer. And it's our understanding, we know that you've spoken with Congress before, including a transcribed interview with the Oversight and Government Reform Committee in October of 2012?

Ms. Lamb. That is correct.

Ms. Sawyer. Just so you know, that this committee also has had benefit of that transcript. We have that from the other committee.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. And witnesses previously have been given an opportunity to review prior testimony. Have you been given that opportunity to review that transcript?

Ms. Lamb. Yes, I have.

Ms. Sawyer. Great. Thank you.

Ms. Lamb. Uh-huh.

Ms. Betz. I probably should add, in addition to the interview, you were -- you testified before Congress in a public hearing as well.

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Ms. Betz. And have you had that opportunity to look at that transcript?

Ms. Lamb. No, I did not.

Ms. Betz. So it is now 9:16 and we'll start our first hour.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Again, thank you for taking the time to be here and to answer the committee's questions. We really look at this as an opportunity to dig a little bit deeper into the decisionmaking process as it relates to the security program at the Benghazi Mission. Just want to get a little bit sense of your background. What is your experience prior to joining the State Department?

A I spent almost 10 years as a police officer in Southern California. Do you want me to just continue with my background?

Q Yes. Whatever you're comfortable doing.

A Okay. I did receive several awards during that period of time. Then I joined the State Department, where I spent 27 years, and started as an entry level DS agent, Diplomatic Security agent, and rose through the ranks to become the first deputy assistant secretary in DS, first female.

I served in five overseas posts. They included Nicaragua, Tanzania, Kuwait, Guatemala, and Berlin. I also served two tours on our Mobile Security Division prior to my first overseas assignment.

Following my 17 years of overseas experience, I then came back and was put in charge of the Diplomatic Security Training Center, and this included oversight of the Mobile Security Division as well as the antiterrorism group that DS works with. And then I went from there,

I was promoted and went to be the ^Ddeputy ^Aassistant ^Ssecretary for

Diplomatic Security's International Programs
~~Diplomatic Security overseas operations and programs.~~

I also very early in my career, I did a long-term TDY in Beirut. It was actually my first overseas assignment, and this was during the height of the civil war there in Beirut.

I retired in July 31st of 2014, so I'm a year and a half into retirement at this point --

Q Great.

A -- and I'm enjoying it. And I will apologize up front. When I left Washington, D.C., I rolled into a whole different lifestyle, and I have not continued to live and breathe State Department policy, programs, and other things. So if I say I don't recall something, please, it's not because I don't want to be helpful, because it's very important, the questions you're asking, but without having a paper put in front of me to refresh my memory, I just may not recall some information.

Q And that's totally fine. And we have a number of documents to help refresh your memory as well.

A Okay. Perfect. Thank you.

Q Could you describe your responsibilities as the deputy assistant secretary for DS/IP programs?

A IP programs. Yes. My responsibilities during my tour -- I spent 6 years in charge of that, and I think I was the longest sitting, even to date, supervisor in that position, and during that time, I was responsible for the entire world. That included all diplomatic embassies, missions, outposts.

At the time, there were approximately 285 different locations. If you sat down and counted all of the employees under the security umbrella, there were about 35,000 employees. So if there was a misstep by an employee or an incident involving any of our security employees, it came across my desk.

I was responsible for staying on top of threat information for the entire world and I was also in charge of the changing environment in different places. You know, we're talking specifically at the timeframe of 2011 and 2012 during this hearing, I believe, but during that timeframe, in Iraq we were transitioning from military security control to State Department security control and oversight.

This was huge. This was the biggest operation Diplomatic Security ever took over, and we had joint meetings with the military and the State Department on a regular basis. The lead for the State Department was Pat ^{Kennedy's} ~~Kennedy~~ as special assistant and I was the State Department lead for security. And I was often asked to step in if he was unavailable for these meetings. So we had a very, very close working relationship, but you know, I will not go into the detail of that transition here, but it was huge, and if it wasn't done correctly, it could have been catastrophic. So I would eat, sleep, and breathe Iraq during this period.

We also were standing up operations in Afghanistan at the same time, and we were staffing large numbers of DS agents to support the growing programs in Afghanistan.

Sana'a was on very, very shaky ground at that time. We were

providing a lot of extra assets and support for the security situation at the compound in Sana'a. And then, of course, as we drew closer, there were all kinds of demonstrations at multiple locations across the world, and so it was just daily. I had to stay on top of everything.

I had a large staff in Washington. We were broken down regionally. So we had a desk officer, and then a desk officer for a region would have four to five staff who would assist them in, you know, breaking down and dividing up the different countries.

And then the most important things would come up to my attention. And I had a deputy assistant who also took care of the day-to-day things and would make sure that the important things were coming up to my level.

Q So both the staffing and the physical security elements of those missions, outposts were under your portfolio, if you will, under your direction?

A Yes, yes.

Q What decisions, then, fell under sort of the purview of the assistant secretary for DS?

A Are you referring to Eric Boswell?

Q Uh-huh.

A I had a very large budget, and things that were routine and within the standards, we just would routinely do these things. Anything that was exceptional or out of the ordinary or if the threat levels in that country were so high, unaccompanied post, all the decisions were, you know, at least cc'd and informed going up the chain of command.

So, for example, something very small, TDY personnel going out to a post, if it was an unaccompanied post where there was a high threat, per the guidance within the State Department at the time, only essential personnel could go TDY into that country, because we didn't want to jeopardize people unnecessarily, their safety. Assistant Secretary Boswell would look at those, I would look at those requests, and Pat Kennedy actually had the final approval on who would go into the highest threat countries. So it would vary from post to post, is what I -- it's not a clearcut answer, so I apologize, but --

Q No, that's okay. But is it safe to say, then, Undersecretary Kennedy would have the approval over both staffing and physical security when it rose to his level? I mean, I guess would those decisions have to have his sign-off?

A It would depend --

Q And I'm speaking generally.

A Generally, yes. For example, if you're building a new facility, Pat Kennedy was very conscientious and very focused on making sure everyone was doing the right thing as we stood up new programs. So he held his own very large staff meetings that included following the progress that the different sections were making in standing up new programs, and asked a lot of tough questions. And he made sure people had the resources that they needed to do their job in these high threat environments.

Q So he was very hands-on, so to speak?

A He was, he was.

Q Micromanaging?

A No, not at all.

Q Okay. So let me take you back, then, to the afternoon and night of September 11. And I think you've testified previously that you were in Washington, D.C.

A Yes.

Q Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And how did you first learn of the attacks?

A I was in my office, and I received a phone call, I don't remember if it was directly from the command center or if it was from the desk officer, but I received a phone call that notified me that there was a problem.

Q And that's what they said, it was a problem? Did they elaborate? Did they tell you anything more?

A They said that they had the RSO on the phone and that the compound was under attack. And I didn't ask any more questions. I believe I notified Scott Bultrowicz, and we both went down to the command center.

Q Did you notify Assistant Secretary Boswell?

A That would have been Scott Bultrowicz's job, or it may have even been the command. Generally the command center, if there was a problem like that, they would notify all of us almost simultaneously.

Q And so once you learned of the attack, then what did you do?

A I had a liaison officer that worked for me who had employees that worked in the Annex there, so I immediately called him on my way down to the command center and asked him to join me in the command center. And when we went in there, we initially tried to assess the situation the best we could, and then we started working on trying to identify security assets who could help them with the situation that was unfolding.

Q And what assets would those have been?

A Assets that were at the Annex facility. We made phone calls to Stuttgart, to AFRICOM and EUCOM to see if they had any assets in theater that were nearby that could possibly be drawn on for additional support.

Q And did you discuss those assets and deployment with PDAS Bultrowicz or Undersecretary Kennedy?

A Yes. PDAS Scott Bultrowicz was in the room, he was on the phone with Pat Kennedy and Eric Boswell, and he was relaying information. As we were getting information in, he would relay it to them --

Q And so how often --

A -- was my best recollection.

Q How often would you say you were in contact with Undersecretary Kennedy that evening?

A I didn't speak to him at all that evening.

Q So it was just primarily the PDAS --

A Yes.

Q -- that spoke with him?

A Yes.

Q And was the DS command center your only source of information that night or were you in constant contact with the Annex as well via your liaison?

A Yes. My liaison had constant contact with the Annex. We had almost full-time connection to the DS agents that were on the ground, and then we were -- you know, towards the end, we were getting information off of Twitter and public media. So those were our primary sources of information.

Q Now, it's our understanding that the command center had the capability to feed into the compound via camera. Was that a capability that you were aware of? Did that occur?

A Could you rephrase the question?

Q To get realtime, to video feed into the camera, that there was a way to tap into the compound's camera so that you could see realtime what was going on?

A Which compound are we talking about?

Q The Benghazi, the State Department compound.

A State Department. No, there was not that capability at that time.

Q There was not that capability?

A No.

Q Okay.

A No. At that time, there was not.

Q So you were just getting information --

A It was all verbal over the phone.

Q Verbal over the phone.

A Correct.

Q And did you speak with any of the DS agents on the ground that evening?

A I did speak with [REDACTED] --

Q Okay.

A -- occasionally throughout the evening.

Q Do you recall how many times you spoke with him?

A No, I do not.

Q Do you recall any of the conversations that you had with him?

A It's hard for me to discern at this point, because we're 3 years out from what's happened --

Q I understand.

A -- but there was information he was just providing that because it was coming across the room, you know, I was hearing it and then what we actually talked about. The clearest conversations that we talked about were once we -- he identified the injured agents, the smoke inhalation problems that some were having and then the injuries at the Annex, we were discussing that primarily.

Q Did he talk at all about an attack? Did he talk about potentially how many individuals were there, what type of weapons they used?

A Right. He had visibility on the cameras and we ~~we~~^{did not} We specifically asked him, you know, what type of an attack was this? And to the best of my recollection, again, at this point, was that he said it sounded to him like a large demonstration instantly erupted at the gate. It wasn't like a chanting mob moving down the street where you hear the sound coming towards you. He said it was like instantly he could hear chanting and yelling and he could hear a lot of people. It drew his attention to the cameras.

He saw them coming through the front gate. And he said -- I said, well, you know, what type of an attack is this? And he said, I honestly don't know. He said, there's a mixture of people in normal street clothes, there's young people, there's old people, and there are a handful of people highly armed wearing military-type, you know, combat gear.

And then as it progressed, he talked about seeing people in the cantina rummaging through the food stocks and drinking sodas. And then he talked about people that were stealing their clothes out of their rooms and coming out with hangers with their suits on.

So it was, you know, it was very odd. At that point in time, it was very hard to discern was this a military style attack that was well coordinated with trained people who had, you know, done prior research and had a disciplined group or was this a small group of perhaps disciplined people who had joined into a mob of opportunity and then showed up at the gate. So we didn't know for sure exactly what was happening that night as it was unfolding.

Q So would you say that's sort of like a summation of all of your phone calls with him, or was that, you know, one discrete phone call that he described in that detail?

A No. This was, like, unfolding over the course of the evening. I mean, he was making realtime decisions, he was coordinating with members from the Annex, he was in communication with the people on his team that were in separate locations, because they weren't all together when this happened, they were locked down in different places. So that was not the time for us to interview or interrogate him.

Q No.

A So this was bits and pieces of information that during certain points of the evening, he had the time to relay this information to us.

Q But in his first phone call with you, what was his initial sort of comments or description?

A What we just talked --

Q Okay.

A I mean, basically he did not know what the attack was or why it was happening or who it was.

Q Okay. And this is [REDACTED]?

A [REDACTED]. I mean, [REDACTED] -- I --

Mr. Westmoreland. [REDACTED]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] yes.

Q Okay. Not [REDACTED] who was in the TOC?

A I don't recall right now who was -- it was whoever called the command center.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q If I could, does the command center keep sort of a running log of the calls? Is anybody transcribing and creating, memorializing in any way what is being said?

A Right. You will have to ask them. I don't know what their protocol is.

Q You didn't see anyone doing that?

A Everyone had yellow legal pads in front of them and were taking notes and writing, but I don't know what they were instructed to keep track of and what they weren't. That wasn't my area of responsibility.

Mr. Westmoreland. I was going to say, [REDACTED] was not the RSO, correct?

Ms. Lamb. In Benghazi? I'll be honest, they rotated every 30 days. I am not sure which one of them was in charge that -- as the designated RSO.

Mr. Westmoreland. But you don't know where [REDACTED] was, at the time the attacks started?

Ms. Lamb. Now that you've said [REDACTED], I believe it was [REDACTED] who was in the command center and it was actually [REDACTED] who had the inhalation problem, and he was the one with the Ambassador.

And, again, I apologize. I have not reviewed these documents and

information. And it will come back to me in floods as we, you know, walk through this.

Mr. Westmoreland. We're just trying to make sure we understand.

Ms. Lamb. I know. And I apologize if I'm confusing you all, but I'm doing the best I can here.

Ms. Betz. So I'd like to show you a document --

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Ms. Betz. Which we'll mark as Exhibit 1.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 1
Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And I'll give you time to read it. And for identification purposes, it's State Department document C05388896, dated September 11, 2012. And it's from the witness to a [REDACTED].

A Okay.

Q So do you recognize this email?

A Actually, I do not. I mean, I'm sure I wrote this, but I don't recognize it.

Q Do you recall who [REDACTED] is?

A Yes. He was, I believe, the second in command of the Mobile Security Division.

Q And it's a series of emails. So there are two emails, and the last email is from you to him, and you say, Benghazi is bad news. And I just wanted to dive into that a little bit more.

What did you mean by Benghazi is bad news? And I'm looking at

the time, 9:02 p.m. Is there certain information that you had at that point?

A I don't -- because I don't recall this and I don't know what came before this, I assume that -- I don't know if this email was written before or after the incident. So, I mean, I don't know how to answer what you're asking.

Q Well, later that evening -- so if the incident started 3:42 p.m. eastern time and this email is now 9:02 p.m. eastern, my understanding is the event -- or the attack would have started and that there was some information that you had that would sort of elicit this response from you.

Mr. Snyder. Are we sure the 9:02 is eastern standard? I know the times get a little whacky, and I don't know where Mr. [REDACTED] was at the time.

A Correct. I mean, if the attack was in progress and unfolding, that would be -- and I said it's bad news, that would indicate to [REDACTED] as the second in charge that he would need to be -- you know, anything that was bad news anywhere in the world, MSD would start, you know, preparing to deploy.

Q Correct. Well, let's go to the underlying email --

A Okay.

Q -- and I'll read what he writes to you in sort of the first couple of sentences.

Ma'am, don't know what's being communicated, but I know you saw visas being submitted for two separate teams to cover Libya and Egypt

both. Additionally, [REDACTED] is pulling imagery in the morning for both and one of ours that served in Benghazi. Will conduct a briefing with the teams that would deploy discussing compound layout. We have several folks that are still in MSD that did Cairo, so we know the layout and folks are briefing it.

Does that help refresh your memory?

A Okay. If he is briefing me on that, that means that amongst the phone calls and the assets that we were reaching out to in the early stages, I would have made the call or had someone make the call to [REDACTED] to tell him that there was an attack in progress in Benghazi. And the Mobile Security Division is our go-to team to come in as quickly as they can get to a place to maintain security and assist the RSO after an incident. So that would fall in line with this email.

Q And do you recall visas being submitted, and would those visas be submitted for the MSD teams that you were describing?

A The visas were a logistical issue that had to be --

Q Correct --

A -- so, I mean, I didn't get involved in the visas. I'm not sure.

Q I'm just wondering if the visas are for the teams or are the visas being submitted for another asset other than the MSD teams?

A This would have been for their teams, yes --

Q Okay.

A -- because at that point, they had to have visas to get in there.

Q Okay. And then the reference to, Benghazi is bad news?

A Well, it's never good news when a facility is under attack.

Q At that point, did you have any awareness of the status of the Ambassador?

A I have no idea where this email fell in the timeline.

Q Okay. In the days after the attack, were you consulted or asked to review any type of talking points drafted by the State Department, by DS?

A After the --

Q After the attack.

A Yes.

Q In the days after.

A Yes.

Q And so did you feel like those talking points reflected an accurate assessment of what was going on or had gone on?

A If I didn't, I edited them and sent them forward with my recommended changes.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And by "talking points," what do you mean? Can you describe what you would have reviewed?

A Well, in my position, it was daily: talking points, Freedom of Information, redactions, congressional inquiries. I mean, I started my job in DS/IP 3 days after Nisour Square. And for a year I answered and cleared on press releases from the Department and all

kinds of requests for information, and it was my job to read it and make sure that it was factual and that nothing had been missed by my staff who were the subject matter experts for whatever information was being requested. So clearing things was a routine daily thing that I did as part of my job.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Let me go back. I want to go back to the night of the attack. I wanted to ask you one additional thing.

Among those assets that you were contemplating and discussing, did you discuss ever deploying the FEST?

A No.

Q That was not brought to your attention?

A No, no. The FEST is -- they're a wonderful asset, they're a great team, but they primarily focus on providing a strong communications package, policy experts, and investigative abilities.

They have a dedicated plane for rapid response, but even their rapid response, I believe the plane was actually being housed in New Jersey, and it would come into Andrews Air -- and it would take 2 hours to get it from New Jersey to Andrews Air Force Base. And then the team would assemble here, whoever the appropriate people from respective agencies that were needed for the situation would all come together and then they would all jump on the plane and they would all deploy.

Because we were half a world away and this was unfolding immediately, the FEST does not carry armed individuals and it would not land and open the doors with a rescue or emergency response team

on board. That's not what they did. So in this particular case at that particular time we were in the command center, it was not considered as an immediate need for that team.

Q What types of assets would have been or, in your mind, were immediate that could be easily deployable?

A Any military assets in the region. Our military is very robust in training and working together as partners in foreign countries around the world, so by us immediately making phone calls to EUCOM and AFRICOM just trying to find, you know, did they have any assets in training anywhere nearby that we could get on a plane and get there to assist, that was our main focus originally.

Q And were you having those conversations with DOD or were others within DS having those conversations?

A In the command center, we had people dedicated to making phone calls to the military. My Annex liaison was dedicated to their -- and likewise, he was also reaching out for their assets that may have been deployed regionally as well that could possibly have been of any assistance.

Q And what were you being told by your military liaisons in terms of what assets were available?

A If I remember correctly, it came in through Scott via Pat Kennedy and post, there was some sort of small group in Tripoli, that they were able to respond and send over to the airport, and so they were working on that.

The only thing we were able to get immediately, they were able

to reprogram and reposition a drone, which gave us some oversight, but it did not get there until it was time to make the move to the airport. So it got there, but it was later in the event.

Q And then the FAST team, were you involved in assisting or facilitating the deployment of the FAST team that arrived in Tripoli later?

A Later. Pat Kennedy would have requested that on behalf of -- and then the RSO supported the FAST team in providing them close liaison and security coordination.

Q How did you decide who -- so it sounds like Pat Kennedy was in contact with DOD and then others were in contact with DOD. Were you just reaching out to your different points of contact or did you have different tasks to whom you were going to reach out to within DOD, or was it just a free-for-all and calling whoever you wanted within DOD?

A It wasn't a free-for-all, but we all worked at different levels. And obviously because of my involvement with Iraq and the Iraq transition, I got to know people personally on the DOD side that were at the working level. The people who would have the schedules with where the assets were, where Pat Kennedy was calling people at his level who then had to, you know, go down and ask the same questions, you know, where are our training assets. You know, most people at that level would not know off the top of their head. So we were generally asking the same questions at different levels.

Q Okay.

A If that helps.

Mr. Snyder. Point of clarification. You said FAST team earlier that Pat Kennedy would very requested the FAST, F-A-S-T, correct?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Snyder. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You said that your Annex liaison was in the command center with you that night as the attacks were unfolding. Was he there the entire evening for the duration?

A He was there as long as I was, yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall, I mean, were you there till midnight, past midnight? Was there a point in time when --

A We were there until it was over.

Q And until everyone had evacuated from Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q So wheels up from the airport?

A I did not go home until they landed.

Q In Tripoli?

A In Tripoli.

Q Okay. And the Annex liaison was there the entire time?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A We left together that morning.

Q And even after they left the compound and went to the Annex, did you continue to have continuous conversations with your DS

personnel that were on the ground in Libya?

A No.

Q No. Okay. How did you get reports after they went to the Annex that evening?

A There were updates that came in through the desk officer level, but they had a lot to do, and because of what had happened in Benghazi, they needed to do a quick reassessment of our resources in Tripoli and they had to, you know, potentially readjust and make sure they had the right people in the right places based on what had just happened in Benghazi.

Q Okay. So those updates kept coming in?

A They kept coming in, yes, but --

Q Okay. And would the Annex liaison have -- would he be privy to that information also as those updates came in?

A Yes. I mean, because we had regular meetings for the next several days to continue sharing information.

Ms. Betz. So the desk officer who was the recipient of that information would then distribute it to those who were in the command center, including the Annex liaison, the DOD liaison.

Ms. Lamb. Okay. I think we're getting confused, because you're talking about the day after and going forward, correct?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I was talking the night of the attack, during the attack.

A Okay. Excuse me.

Q Okay.

A I misunderstood your question.

During the attack, we were all physically elbow to elbow in the same room, and everybody was sharing information.

Q And so the Annex liaison heard all of that information as it was coming in?

A Exactly.

Q Okay.

A Exactly.

Q And do --

A We shared everything.

Q Was it your understanding that your Annex liaison, who heard these firsthand accounts of what had occurred in Benghazi, was relaying that information to his counterparts at CIA headquarters?

A I don't know who he relayed them to, but he was given all the information to share as appropriate through his chain of command.

Ms. Betz. Do you recall the names of the liaisons that were with you in the DS command center? The Annex liaison, do you recall his name, or the DOD liaison?

Mr. Snyder. The agency liaison might be a problem.

Ms. Jackson. Did he have a name that was allowed to be used?

Ms. Betz. Used.

Ms. Lamb. Now that you have raised that, I've been out of the program so much, I mean, I don't know where he is today, so I don't -- it's out -- I mean, the information is out there. I am not comfortable answering that question.

Ms. Betz. Okay.

Mr. Snyder. Especially transcribed, just because it might get released or we may miss it or something.

Ms. Betz. Is that something that we can follow up with you on?

Mr. Snyder. Yeah. Off-line --

Ms. Betz. Off-line.

Mr. Snyder. -- we can have that discussion.

Ms. Betz. -- we can have than discussion?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Okay. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Going back to these talking points you reviewed, do you know who those talking points were for? Were they for people within the State Department, were they for the broader interagency?

A I reviewed so much stuff. Most of it was for immediate press releases that were coming out of the State Department, and that -- you know, I was just in the general line that they came through for clearance.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Well, let me clarify. So would those be talking points within the DS public affairs or would those be talking points within the Secretary's sort of public affairs, or NEA, or any interagency talking points that you were asked to review and edit?

A I reviewed whatever DS public affairs sent me.

Q Okay.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Westmoreland. I can't imagine. I mean, I've heard of so many assistant deputy secretaries and everybody else. The protocol that these things go through, I mean, can be very confusing.

You talked about that one of your jobs was to assess the change of environment --

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- in a situation. Would that be what would bring your attention to that, to a change in the environment?

Ms. Lamb. Security incidents in any country. For example, if the British were targeted somewhere, their diplomatic facilities or personnel, we would reach out to our RSO in that country and say, are you talking to your counterparts in security? Are you talking to host government about this attack? Is this an isolated attack for a specific reason or is this going to be something that could carry over into other foreign diplomats in that country?

And we would ask them to hold an Emergency Action Committee meeting to review the incident, and for the entire core or large scale country team to come together under the ambassador or DCM to review the circumstances and to make an informed decision at post, if this is something that they fear could carry over and affect our own security programs or protocols. And then they would make any changes to security that they felt necessary.

Mr. Westmoreland. So this would have been as a result of what they called tripwires?

Ms. Lamb. Exactly. It --

Mr. Westmoreland. Emergency Action Committee kind of thing?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. And when they had Emergency Action Committee meetings --

Ms. Roby from Alabama.

Ms. Roby. Hi. Nice to meet you.

Ms. Lamb. Welcome.

Mr. Westmoreland. When they had these Emergency Action Committee meetings, did they send a report or the outcome of these meetings to you?

Ms. Lamb. They're required to send a cable back to Washington. It will go into the main State Department system, where the desk officer on the policy side will receive it, and Diplomatic Security also receives it.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah. But, I mean, if you're over change of environment, you would seem to me to be the logical --

Ms. Lamb. Oh.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- one to get the report.

Ms. Lamb. Right. Any time a post anywhere in the world sent in an Emergency Action Committee cable, if there was anything substantial in it, it would be brought up at our morning briefings. Normally they would all cross my desk, but some of them didn't rise to the same -- I mean, sometimes we would send out if there was a -- for example, with the cartoonist and all the things, the flurry around that of

anti-American sentiment, I believe we went out with an ALDAC worldwide and said, okay, everybody have an Emergency Action Committee meeting, discuss it, and report back how you think this is going to affect your post and identify any changes that your post may make in anticipation of this.

So, you know, we may have 180, 200 responses come back, and some would be negative, you know, we don't believe this is going to impact us, or, you know, we think we could potentially have fallout, and here's what we're going to do for that timeframe.

Mr. Westmoreland. How about the RPG through the British Ambassador's -- or one of the vehicles in this convoy, would that be a tripwire? I mean --

Ms. Lamb. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you get a report from that? I mean, did they have an Emergency, whatever you call it, Action Committee?

Ms. Lamb. To the best of my recollection, yes, they had an Emergency Action Committee and a cable went forward. Again, I am at a loss, because I don't have access to these documents.

Mr. Westmoreland. No. I --

Ms. Lamb. But, yes, that absolutely --

Mr. Westmoreland. That would have been a tripwire, in your opinion?

Ms. Lamb. That would have been a tripwire, yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. How about a bomb on the perimeter wall?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. That would have been?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. I believe the bombing of the Red Cross happened?

Ms. Betz. ICRC.

Mr. Westmoreland. Huh?

Ms. Betz. Yes. The ICRC.

Mr. Westmoreland. The International Red Cross. I know it got bombed or burned?

Ms. Betz. Two RPGs in May and then later in that summer.

Mr. Westmoreland. Would that have been --

Ms. Lamb. Was that in Tripoli or Benghazi?

Ms. Betz. Benghazi.

Mr. Westmoreland. That was in Benghazi.

Ms. Betz. Yeah.

Ms. Lamb. It should have been a discussion item.

Mr. Westmoreland. Would demonstrations where there were Al Qaeda members and members of al-Nusra, or whatever it is, that were identified at these demonstrations, would that have been a tripwire, a change in the environment?

Ms. Lamb. I'm not exactly sure what -- you know, you're starting to cross over into intelligence kind of reporting. If nothing happened at the demonstration -- we have demonstrations worldwide on an almost daily basis somewhere for some reason. So a demonstration itself if it's against our facility would merit a Spot Report.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, if I was an RSO and I got the information that they had a demonstration and there was Al Qaeda and al-Nusra flags or indication of their involvement in it, to me, that would have been a red flag that this thing is kind of getting heated here in Benghazi when these people are openly showing who they are, but you don't remember that -- or if that had have happened, I'm not -- because I don't know if you remember if it happened --

Ms. Lamb. Not that night.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- but had you found out that that had have happened, would that have been an indication of a change in the environment?

Ms. Lamb. If the demonstration was against our facilities -- I don't know what was normal and what was not regarding demonstrations during this timeframe. My focus was on incidents and things that were directly targeting our facilities and our people.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. But there were several. But, I mean, I understand what you're saying, but to me environment means something that would include the surrounding areas of our compound, but --

Ms. Lamb. But it would be post's job at that point to share that information back with Washington.

Mr. Westmoreland. I know. But they would have an Emergency Action Committee meeting and then you would get the results of that, right?

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. You also mentioned that Mr. Kennedy

paid particular attention to the TDY assignments that were sent into some of these high risk posts, I guess, that he paid special attention to that. And I'm assuming he paid special attention to that because he wanted to send the most capable people into those positions, or the best trained or --

Ms. Lamb. You would have to ask Mr. Kennedy that. I don't know what his thought process is. In my mind, when I looked at the list, I can tell you what I was looking for was -- and please don't get me wrong. I love AID. They do wonderful work. So I don't want this testimony to get me on the wrong side, but --

Ms. Betz. And just for the record, can you elaborate on what AID is.

Ms. Lamb. AID does work outside of the diplomatic circles in assisting people, especially in third world countries.

If, for example, in Tripoli, all of a sudden we saw a request come in for a team of five people from AID, we only had nine extra beds on the compound, and we were trying to get walls put up, cameras put up, lighting put up, all of our technical security was not in place. The compound was being built. We needed those nine beds for the teams that were coming in to do the security infrastructure in the very early days. So AID and other -- or DOD came in frequently. They wanted to come in for various reasons. And someone had --

Mr. Westmoreland. In Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. No. No, no. I'm talking about Tripoli now.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Well, I want to talk about Benghazi.

Ms. Lamb. Okay. Forget all of that.

Mr. Westmoreland. These TDY assignments, because what we have found is that most -- all the DS agents, RSOs, the principals and everything else were on TDY, temporary duty assignments.

Ms. Lamb. Absolutely.

Mr. Westmoreland. And most of them, you know, maybe 60 days, 30 days, 45 days, different times.

Ms. Lamb. You're correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you made the point to say that Mr. Kennedy was very particular about who got these TDY assignments.

Ms. Lamb. No. Sorry for the confusion.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. Benghazi was an interim facility. No one was assigned to Benghazi full-time. They were all TDY. They fell under the umbrella of Tripoli. So Tripoli had a master sheet for TDYers that were rotating through Tripoli. And when these TDY personnel would come in, it would just show their name and it would say security and then have Benghazi after it. So they had --

Mr. Westmoreland. Who made that sheet?

Ms. Lamb. That came from Diplomatic Security. As people rotated, we would change -- fill in the names, the change.

Mr. Westmoreland. But who made the sheet?

Ms. Lamb. I honestly don't know, because it was a compilation of policy people from the State Department side and the security people --

Mr. Westmoreland. Was Tripoli considered a high threat post?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. So Patrick, Mr. Kennedy, would have been the person to say who was going to be on that list, correct?

Ms. Lamb. You would have to ask him. These were requests from --

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I'm just trying to recall what you said.

Ms. Lamb. Right. It was a matter of making sure the right people were getting into post to do the immediate jobs that needed to be done.

Mr. Westmoreland. That's what I was trying to get to.

Ms. Lamb. Yes. I'm sorry. I thought I said that earlier.

Mr. Westmoreland. No. That's okay. So he did that. That was him that did this. And so he would have had some input into who was going in to Tripoli, because it was a high threat post, and he wanted to make sure the correct people were going into Tripoli, right?

Ms. Lamb. At the right times, yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. At the right times.

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. And I understand. Now, who made the list of who was going to be in Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. The post and the RSO.

Mr. Westmoreland. So the RSO in Tripoli would have taken this list and then they would have said, okay, we want TDYer [REDACTED], TDYer whoever to go to Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. Let me back up just a little bit. My desk officer, who at the time was [REDACTED], he would make the list -- he would put out a broadcast asking for volunteers to go to Benghazi specifically, because we had a continual rotation there. So he would come up with the list of people to go to Benghazi, but everybody had to go into Tripoli. And whoever the RSO -- or the RSO in Tripoli could assess the weaks and strengths of all his TDYers. Because he had so many of them, he could choose to keep someone that we sent him for Benghazi, he could keep that person in Tripoli, and maybe he had a more experienced person that was there TDY that he felt stronger about. So he could interchange the DS agents, but we would send him the list of people who had volunteered to go.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I guess where I'm still confused, and I don't know if I can't explain it right or not, but what list did Mr. Kennedy use -- I mean, did he just do it in his office and just kept it to himself?

Ms. Lamb. No. It was a matrix.

Mr. Westmoreland. I mean, did he ever give it to anybody?

Ms. Lamb. It was a matrix. It would come out on a regular basis.

Mr. Westmoreland. So would it go to [REDACTED]? Would that list go to [REDACTED] or did [REDACTED] make up --

Ms. Lamb. No. [REDACTED]

Mr. Westmoreland. -- his own list?

Ms. Lamb. No. [REDACTED] contributed to the master list.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. But it was, like, because it was such a high threat post, we needed to have -- an official head count was critical, because if we had to send in assets to do an evacuation, we had to know if we had enough assets in theater with capacity on helicopters to put everybody on the helicopters, and so there was a magic number of how many helicopters were there, how many resources the military had sitting off that could respond, and we could not exceed that number in the early days.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. So to get on that rotation list, that TDY list, it didn't matter what your qualifications were as far as being a DS agent?

Ms. Lamb. For a DS agent, we were putting high-threat trained people in there.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. High-threat trained people.

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. Anything else? Just high-threat training?

Ms. Lamb. Well, they had to be a qualified DS -- I mean, the basic DS training --

Mr. Westmoreland. Right.

Ms. Lamb. -- plus high-threat training, yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. But the high qualified was the only thing you looked at?

Ms. Lamb. The high-threat training.

Mr. Westmoreland. I mean, high-threat training was the only thing you looked at?

Ms. Lamb. Yes. DS agents are interchangeable for the most part.

Mr. Westmoreland. Right. Because what I'm trying to get to is my understanding is that the RSO that was in Benghazi, this was his first assignment?

Ms. Lamb. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. Going into a high threat? That just seems weird.

Ms. Lamb. My first overseas assignment was Beirut. It --

Mr. Westmoreland. Were you an RSO?

Ms. Lamb. By default I ended up being the RSO. When I got there, the RSO had a medical emergency and had to evacuate post. So sometimes it happens, but, again --

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. I don't want to take up all the time, but --

RPTR YORK

EDTR ROSEN

[10:09 a.m.]

Mr. Westmoreland. I'm doing a pretty good job of that.

But Mr. [REDACTED], I thought you said that you were in a room that you could hear his voice or he may not have been talking to you directly, but you could kind of hear his voice?

Ms. Lamb. When I went over to the person who was on the phone with him, yes. I mean, it's a -- the command center's a very large room, and there were lots of conversations going on in the room.

Ms. Betz. But I think let's clarify, we clarified that it was [REDACTED] and not [REDACTED].

Ms. Lamb. [REDACTED] and not [REDACTED]. Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Because I was going to say, [REDACTED] would be doing a lot of different things with a phone in his hand, but so -- but you never talked to him after they got to the Annex. Or nobody ever talked to them after they got to the Annex?

Ms. Lamb. No. He called when he got to the Annex.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Welcher. Could you clarify who "he" is.

Ms. Lamb. [REDACTED]

Ms. Betz. [REDACTED]

Ms. Lamb. [REDACTED] I'm sorry.

Mr. Westmoreland. I gotcha. Now, the only other thing I was

going to ask you about is EUCOM and AFRICOM. You all asked them about the assets. Did anybody ask where any of the special operations assets were at?

Ms. Lamb. We just -- when we work with DOD, we don't ask them specific questions. We tell them what our mission is and what the problem is, and then we leave it to their expertise.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I mean, you mentioned EUCOM and AFRICOM. So I didn't know if there was some other COM or some other --

Ms. Lamb. No. Because we were in their theater of operation, it would be -- they would be the point of responsibility to reach out and locate.

Mr. Westmoreland. All right. Can I just ask one --

Ms. Betz. Oh, yeah. You're good.

Mr. Westmoreland. I'm sorry. Through the chain of emails, we learned that the Secretary asked that the FBI become like immediately involved in this. Who would she have given that directive to?

Ms. Lamb. I have no idea. The investigative --

Mr. Westmoreland. Were you aware of it?

Ms. Lamb. I knew the FBI was involved, yes. And they -- I mean, they came and spoke to --

Mr. Westmoreland. They were asked to be -- or asked to get involved. Do you know what their answer was?

Ms. Lamb. No, I do not. I'm on the operational side, not the investigative side.

Mr. Westmoreland. Oh, okay.

Ms. Lamb. So I had no insight on to what followed on.

Mr. Westmoreland. So you wouldn't have known anything about that?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q In followup to that, was there any discussion about getting the FBI into Benghazi as soon as possible? And I'm talking about was there any discussion the night of the attack or early the next morning, the next day, about getting the FBI deployed to Benghazi?

A Again, I had nothing to do with follow-on. I'm still running security for the rest of the world. So I was not focused on the investigative things that unfolded after.

Q You talked about the FEST earlier. Is the FEST the mechanism to get the FBI into a country for a crisis response?

A The FBI has their own assets, and I guess it would depend on the country and the circumstances. Certainly, they can be part of a FEST team, but it would depend on the mission.

Q Okay.

Mr. Snyder. Can I just make sure it's F-E-S-T so that when we --

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. Snyder. Both of those were FEST.

Ms. Betz. I think I have only a few minutes. And I want to get into a lengthy discussion. So I'll go off the record now.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. So we'll go back on the record. The time is 10:27.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And, Ms. Lamb, again on behalf of the Select Committee's minority staff, I want to thank you for your appearance here today. Welcome back to Congress.

A Thank you.

Q I appreciate your willingness to speak with us. This is the eighth congressional investigation into the attacks in Benghazi, and your appearance here, as we had noted at the outset, is not your first -- the first time you've appeared. So I'd just like to ask you briefly about some of your previous experience before Congress. And I also note that you wanted to make a clarification. But before we do that -- well, we can go ahead and do that now if you'd like.

A Okay. Congressman Westmoreland had raised the question about the list of TDYers that were going into Benghazi and Tripoli since it was all the same list. And I would just like to -- he also raised the point that the RSO in Benghazi at the time, it was his first assignment. I would like to clarify on that. We scrutinize the background of every TDYer that went in there. And they had to have successfully completed DS training and high-threat training. And then we looked at their past backgrounds. Of the RSO and DS staff that were in Benghazi that night, several of them had military backgrounds. In fact, one of them was from an infantry and was able to, during the mortar attacks on the Annex, was able to tell us that they were walking them

in, which is something that's done with the precision of a military unit versus just a random person on the street who got ahold of a mortar and just lobbed it over the wall.

So we were able to gain valuable information from our DS agents during all of this because of their prior training and background besides what they had learned through DS and diplomatic security.

And as for -- so everyone from the security side was thoroughly screened to make sure that they were the right people to send in for the job. The totality of the list of TDYers, the reason why there was a running list is posts are notorious for getting what we call mission creep. If they have a job to be done or policy people that need to get in because there's an urgent need for some sort of a policy issue, TDYers will just shoot in a request, they get rubber stamped and they come in. You cannot do that in a country in a high threat that's volatile with no true government in charge.

During this first year, there was not a solid government security system that could come in and save us. We had to defer to our own contingency planning to evacuate posts. And Pat Kennedy is the person who evacuations go through. It's his job to make sure he accounts for the safety and security of every single individual in that country. And I don't want to quote a number, but my recollection is we had -- well, I know for a fact we had a ceiling of how many people could sit on three helicopters, which is what was available in the theater. And if we had one person over that limit and the balloon went up and we had to evacuate, somebody would be standing on the tarmac and not

getting onboard a helicopter.

Q Can I actually just stop you right there?

A Yes.

Q So you're referring to three helicopters that were available. You mentioned in theater.

A In theater.

Q So can you just clarify for us to the best of your recollection what time period you're referring to? Is this during active military operations in Libya?

A This is during that first year when we went in there and there was no host government support at all.

Q So this would be 2011?

A Correct. This would have been 2011 and into 2012.

Q Okay.

A So, but the contingency planning and not to exceed the numbers is what was critical. And because we were standing up -- security infrastructure needed to be stood up as quickly as possible so we could support the policy needs which were unfolding very quickly in this new developing government that was forming. So it was critical to monitor which people were being allowed into posts to make sure that our goals and commitments to meet security timelines did not get pushed back.

Q Okay.

A And that was the gist of it. It was not a screening who the right people are. It was the right mission and then it was left

to the -- you know, if anyone was responsible for the folks that went in there being qualified that would have stopped on my plate on the security side.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's helpful.

Just to pick up, because I think there are a couple different components to what you discussed, maybe we can drill down --

A Okay.

Q -- just a little bit further so that the record is --

A Okay.

Q -- clear on this as to exactly what you mean. We don't want to misconstrue anything that you say. So of course, if I say anything or if I mischaracterize anything, feel free -- please feel free to --

A Okay.

Q -- to let me know. But if I understand you correctly, at the end there, you mentioned that you weren't screening for particular people and their backgrounds but rather the screening was for the particular slot or billet or mission that those positions would fill. Is that --

A The skill set that they were needed for. So a communications person who's going in to set up the computers needed to be a competent computer person with the skill set to set up computers.

Q And then for diplomatic security, which was your purview --

A Correct.

Q -- so there would be DS billets, then, in that staffing matrix that you described earlier. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And as far as the backgrounds, then, for people who would fit that, you had mentioned personnel who had completed high-threat training, for instance, as being persons who would be eligible.

A Correct.

Q Is that right?

Okay? And I thought it was helpful when you described what sounded like your confidence in your DS agents, those particular DS agents who were on the night of the attacks who the ARB and others, I think, have cited and found had performed some extraordinary feats on the night of the attacks.

A Correct.

Q And it sounds like you personally didn't have -- or you had confidence -- full confidence in their abilities. Is that accurate?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay.

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. There has been some criticism, some of it's a little bit muted, of DS agents, that the training that they receive is perhaps not the same caliber as, say, a special forces-type training. But perhaps you could just help us understand for a DS agent what that skill set versus, say, a military or a special forces type of background.

A Would you ask that question one more time? Sorry.

Q Sure. No, I appreciate that.

So just to preface this by saying there appears to have been some criticism of DS agents in general, that they lack some of the training that, say, very highly specialized or high qualified military personnel would have.

A Correct.

Q And I'd just like for your understanding, if you could perhaps differentiate for us or explain for us what the DS skill set is.

A Okay. Because I've been with DS for 27 years, over that 27 years, the mission has changed. And the way we do foreign diplomacy has changed. We're going into more dangerous places now than we ever did before. And we're going into places where the military is not, per se, welcomed with open arms. And Tripoli, Benghazi was one of those places. They were adamant, especially in the early days, that they did not want any visibility of U.S. military troops on the ground as we started to filter back into Benghazi in the very early days of our transition in.

So over time, DS has had to increase the training that we give our agents. DS agents are trained to be program managers. That is their number one function, to be a program manager. They have to oversee local guards. They have to liaison with host government security assets. They have to manage budgets. They have to hire and fire large guard forces. They have to manage contracts. So they are program managers. They are not brought in as soldiers and trained to be a soldier. So that's where the difference is.

But as we found over time in these dangerous countries, DS was kind of a unique -- diplomatic security, in particular, had a unique set of skill sets. And we were used to and operating under pressure in high-threat countries. And it just made sense to start increasing the training. We started by our mobile security division becoming a very highly specialized unit with additional training. And then as we realized we could -- we didn't have enough people with that type of training, then we came up with the high-threat course. I was actually in charge of the training center when we started that high-threat course, and it has grown exponentially since I started that program.

We have also -- the -- it was called the FACT, F-A-C-T, course was designed under my tenure out at the training center. And that was designed to educate foreign service officers on how to operate and how to be part of the security package at posts and to be a useful set of eyes. And what to do if they were in a situation where there was a bombing or something critical happened. And, you know, repeatedly, I had ambassadors and foreign service officers come through my office that had been near an attack or in an attack tell me that they believe that training saved their life. So it was a wonderful course that went out to the general State Department.

Q Okay. Thank you. And it's helpful, I think, to understand a bit about how the mission has evolved over time. You described the world as being something of a more dangerous place. I think you put Libya in that category.

A Right.

Q Just again, in that context, the DS agents that you sent to Libya in 2011 and 2012, you had confidence in their abilities to perform their mission?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. Another aspect of the clarification, as I understood it, was that you were describing a running list of new hires. And you used the term "mission creep." I'd first just like to understand when you're referring to the staffing matrix, this is the staffing that applies to the country writ large. So it would include policy personnel, programming. I believe you'd mentioned USAID in the last round. Is that correct?

A I just put them out. I don't even know if they were trying to get in at that point. It just used that as an example.

Q Okay. But when you referred to "mission creep," you're referring to policy personnel who would want to do a TDY in country. Is that correct?

A I'm -- probably so.

Q Not DS. That's what I'm trying to understand.

A But not DS. Yeah, mission creep at a normal post, if an Ambassador feels that he needs, he or she needs 125 TDYers at post for various policy reasons, that doesn't affect us back here in Washington, because they're in a stable country, and the airports are open. And if they had to leave, there would be indicators or signs, and people could leave through normal resources. But in a country where

there -- it's not safe so drive on the road, we don't have enough armored vehicles to put everyone in the armored vehicles to move them across land and there is no airport access for commercial flights, then we have sent people to a country that are totally 100 percent dependent on getting out of there safely and alive, based on the resources that Pat Kennedy and Eric Boswell and diplomatic security can put together. And so those types of contingency plans have to be built on a bottom line number of the people that can be at post. And it has to be strictly adhered to and --

Q These are protectees we're referring to? I'm just -- I'm trying to disaggregate you -- we're talking about matching DS resources to the number of people who would be under the security umbrella that you described earlier. Is that correct?

A Right. Right.

Q Okay.

A But, you know, when you're the Ambassador and you need your computer to work, you need telephones in everyone's office, you need furniture, you need extra bed space, you become very focused on the management issues of getting all these logistical things in as quickly as possible so you can bring more policy folks in to do the job that's so important to do there. And sometimes it is easy to lose track of numbers because people tend to come in in teams to do things.

Q Right. So when -- in your -- in this discussion, the discussion we had the last hour, was one of the concerns -- I'd heard you refer to beds. So was one of the concerns for this mission creep

that you described that the embassy would become overwhelmed with the number of TDYers who were coming to post?

A It was not that they would be overwhelmed by the number, but that they would exceed the number that we could evacuate on our contingency evacuation plan that was in place.

Q Okay. From DS perspective, that was your concern?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q And would then having the Assistant Secretary Boswell or Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy's visibility into that, would that sort of senior level attention help if there was, say, senior level interests in deploying more personnel to posts? Do you understand the question?

A I don't understand the question.

Q Okay. So if I understand you correctly --

A Right.

Q -- we're describing a process by which post is attempting to manage the number of personnel there --

A Right.

Q -- under the DS security umbrella.

A Right.

Q Is that right?

Okay. And you'd indicated that a top line number may have been set by the Assistant Secretary, perhaps with input by the Under

Secretary for management. Is that correct?

A Okay. The number was dictated by military assets.

Q Okay. But what is the --

A How many people can be --

Q -- number we're referring to? It's a top line number --

A Let's just say 42.

Q Okay. I don't mean which number, but what -- it's a top line number, and that's everybody who can be at post. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A And they cannot exceed that number --

Q Okay.

A -- on the ground. So it was capped and they couldn't exceed it by one body because one more body would not fit --

Q Okay.

A -- in the evacuation plan.

Q Okay. And do you recall for Tripoli that there was an evacuation plan, or a cap, that had been set before the revolution?

A Prior to the original embassy closing?

Q Correct.

A There would not -- I don't know that for a fact. But because prior to the revolution, airports were open and roads were open, generally there is not a cap in countries that have free safe passage on roadways and commercial flights available.

Q Okay.

A Those --

Q So the numbers would then just depend on the ability of the host to --

A Exactly.

Q -- absorb or --

A And that's why there's a drawdown procedure within the State Department when posts start to falter.

Q Okay. Okay. I would you like to return to our discussion about the night of the attacks. I think you did a good job of walking us through your recollection of some of the actions you took, and some of your observations from that night. I was wondering if we could perhaps take a step back so that we could understand some of the context of not only that night, but that week.

A Okay.

Q And I'd first just like to ask, before you received the phone call notifying you of the attack in Benghazi, do you recall hearing about a demonstration that had occurred at Embassy Cairo?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what do you recall hearing about that?

A It was a large demonstration. It had to do, I believe, with a video that had been released.

Q Okay. Did you understand at some point that the attackers had actually breached the compound wall?

A We had a -- there was a huge series of demonstrations in a very short period of time. Several of our embassies had the compound

walls breached. And I don't recall exactly which ones where and when --

Q Okay.

A -- it happened.

Q Okay. That's fair. But did Embassy Cairo, do you recall being concerned about the security and safety of the personnel there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you recall what actions you may have taken in response to hearing about the demonstration?

A The RSO there was a strong RSO with good working relationship with host government. And we had a host government that did provide protection for the embassy. And, you know, at that point, it falls, you know, in their hands.

Q Okay. And you had mentioned a moment ago a video. What do you recall about that video?

A At this point I don't -- it was an anti -- it was an inflammatory --

Mr. Kenny. I want to note for the record that we're joined by Congresswoman Duckworth.

Ms. Duckworth. I'm going to stay right here.

Mr. Kenny. That's fine.

Ms. Sawyer. Please continue.

Ms. Lamb. I mean, this was during the -- we had the cartoonist doing the inflammatory cartoons of Muhammad. There were videos being released. There were -- across the board, there were just a lot of

things going on. I don't remember exactly what it was.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. And did you have an understanding of why something like a video could cause a demonstration or cause potential unrest in the region? Was that something you'd seen before?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you recall where you had seen that before?

A The cartoon incidents came before the video did.

Q I'm sorry, Khartoum?

A Cartoon.

Q The cartoon.

A The artist that drew cartoons.

Q Okay. The Danish --

A Yes.

Q Okay. Okay. I'd heard you use an acronym in the last round, ALDAC. Can you explain for us what an ALDAC is.

A It's a cable that goes out to all posts all over the world.

Q And do you recall whether an ALDAC was issued on the night of the attacks in reference to the video that we just discussed?

A I don't recall. I know we -- there were so many demonstrations over about a -- I believe it was like a 10-day window or a month that there were ALDACs that went out during that period of time. But I don't know specifically where they fell in the timeline that you're asking about.

Q Okay. Did you have an understanding in some of those other

locations about what might have been the cause or precipitated those incidents or that unrest?

A It was all from this video.

Q Okay. So was there a concern at the time that the video would spread throughout the region --

A Yes.

Q -- and cause more unrest?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you don't recall any specific steps that the Department may have taken in response to that?

A The information was shared with all RSOs worldwide.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And it could have been in the form of an ALDAC.

A Yes.

Q But you just don't recall.

A Correct.

Q Okay. So in the last round, you were asked about some talking points you may have participated in the clearance process or reviewed, I believe, during the week after the attacks.

A Right.

Q Again, just so we can better understand the context of what you and your colleagues were experiencing that week, if you could just walk us through some of the events of that week and perhaps describe for us the mindset of you and your personnel, you and your colleagues.

A I'm not sure what you want from that question.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Yeah, and maybe I can help a little.

You know, obviously in the 3-some years since the attack, Congress has focused on particular aspects, and Benghazi itself has become a very clear focus of what --

A Yes.

Q -- Congress has looked at.

A Yes.

Q And in particular, certain aspects of Benghazi, like was there a protest, was there not a protest. But I think it would be helpful for us to just understand, because you've talked about there were so many demonstrations over a 10-day period or a month, just what that atmospherically and what you all were focused on, in a general sense, that week and where your priorities were and what it just, as a day-to-day matter, felt like.

A The day-to-day issues were making sure that all of my desk officers were in close contact with the RSOs, making sure they had all the resources that they needed and that they were comfortable with decisions that were being made at posts. And that the EACs were meeting. They were meeting with host government to make sure we had host government support in place, that they were not going to, you know, step back or slow roll a response should the embassy need them, and this type of a thing.

Q Is it fair to say that you certainly, in your position and

the folks within DS were very focused on the immediate need that was happening at the post?

A Absolutely. I mean, we had -- at that point we had every MSD team, I believe, was deployed. And we were pulling them off of assignments and then shifting them to posts that were concerned that perhaps host government would not be there if they needed them. We were trying to be pro-active in getting additional help for the RSOs at the most critical posts where we thought this was going to be an issue.

Q You know, and certainly understanding that there would be a time where you would want to dig in and figure out what had happened, is it fair to say that certainly in the day and week that followed Benghazi and the unrest there, you were not primarily focused on figuring out what had happened in the past in Benghazi on that night, but were focused in kind of a current-day-forward-looking way?

A Yes. My job was to be pro-active and to look forward and make sure we were pushing out all the resources that we had to the right places where they were needed. And to, you know, prevent incidents from happening.

Q And certainly, then, and I'm sure we'll get into it, as is true whenever there's a significant incident, there was a mechanism put in place to do this deeper drill-down as to specifically what had happened in both the run-up and the night of the attacks in Benghazi in particular?

A Correct. That was outside of my purview.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. I'd like to shift gears a little bit.

A Okay.

Q In the last round, you discussed or mentioned the structure of your office, that you had desk officers responsible for different geographic bureaus. And I believe you'd mentioned that your desk officer for the NEA region was [REDACTED]. Is that right?

A He was the assistant. [REDACTED] was the senior desk office --

Q Okay.

A -- at the time.

Q Would he also be referred to as the regional director for NEA? Is that a title you're familiar with?

A [REDACTED] was the senior desk officer.

Q Okay. So [REDACTED] was a desk officer underneath him?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And the desk officer, is that a position that would be in regular contact with the RSOs at post?

A [REDACTED] the senior desk officer oversees the entire region. And then he will -- he or she will have four to five more junior DS agents. But most of them have already served overseas. And then the region will be divided up amongst those five individuals. So each of the lower level desk officers have a list of countries that they are specifically responsible for. And those are the people that have the daily contact. And then when issues or problems arise, they take

it to the senior desk officer. And then the senior desk officer may or may not get involved directly with the RSO.

Q And in the fall of 2011 through the fall of 2012, who would have been that -- who was the junior desk officer who had responsibility for Libya?

A [REDACTED]

Q Okay. And --

A And [REDACTED] was his senior.

Q Okay. And Mr. [REDACTED] would have been in regular contact with the RSO at post. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q So that would include the RSO in Tripoli?

A Yes.

Q And that would also include any TDY RSOs in Benghazi as well?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And would that be the primary conduit through which information about security resources would flow from post back to Main State?

A Back to Diplomatic Security, yes.

Q Okay. Okay. Not Foggy Bottom. So Diplomatic Security headquarters?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Is that the -- is there a preferred way of referring to DS Main?

A When we hear -- in Diplomatic Security, if we hear DS Main,

we're thinking about the policy side of the house, which is physically located at 2100 C Street. And if you're talking about DS headquarters, you're talking about our office in Rosslyn.

Q Okay. So when we refer to DS Main, we're referring to the DS front office? That's where the front office would sit, to include the Assistant Secretary and his staff?

A The -- Eric Boswell sat at Main State on C Street.

Q Okay.

A The PDAS and all the DS folks below on the operational side for overseas programs all sat in Rosslyn at the DS headquarters.

Q At DS headquarters. Okay. So I'll refer to DS headquarters. Which is where --

A Okay.

Q That's where you sat?

A Yes.

Q Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And the senior-most DS official at DS headquarters would have been the PDAS?

A Correct.

Q And that would have been PDAS Bultrowicz during this time?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Okay. Returning to the desk officer, how would you, in general, describe your relationship with Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED]?

A It was a close-working relationship.

Q Okay. You'd mentioned earlier that if there were matters that were important, that they would be brought to your attention.

A Correct.

Q Is that correct?

Okay. And so those would be brought to your attention by Mr. [REDACTED] or Mr. [REDACTED]?

A Correct.

Q Okay. You'd rely on them to provide information to you that was pertinent to post security.

A Right. And I had a deputy at that time. So they would take issues to the deputy. And then if the deputy could resolve them, it stayed at that level. And then if the deputy had a concern, then the three of them would frequently come into my office to brief --

Q Okay.

A -- me on something.

Q And that deputy was Mr. [REDACTED] during that time?

A Yes. That's correct.

Q Okay. Have you ever served as a junior desk officer?

A No. I have not.

Q I'd like to understand just a little better your understanding of Mr. [REDACTED] experiences with Embassy Tripoli or with the special mission in Benghazi.

We've heard the desk officer/RSO relationship described as a little bit of a give and take. That post will come in with resource

requests, requirements, and there'll be some follow-on discussion where some sort of consensus is arrived at. Is that a fair characterization --

A Yes.

Q -- of the relationship between DS headquarters and post?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And would -- those would generally be about available resources, perhaps, on the one hand, and what the needs of the post were on the other hand. Is that right?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And you had described in the last round that DS has a fairly broad responsibility, that there are 35,000 U.S. government employees, I believe, under their security umbrella. Is that right?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Do you recall about how large the DS agent pool was that could be deployed to overseas posts?

A Okay. I'm trying to think back in that time frame. We were under 2,000 DS agents, and approximately half of them were domestic, either in investigative field office positions or headquarters positions.

Q Okay.

A And the other half were overseas.

Mr. Kenny. Okay. I'd like to welcome Congressman Schiff this morning.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So would you describe it as a -- the DS pool of agents who were available to deploy, is that a somewhat limited universe of personnel of people that could be dispatched or sent to post?

A I'm not sure what the question is.

Q It's more just a general question about the availability of resources that you had within DS, so, of personnel.

A Okay.

Q Was --

A Everybody in DS has an assigned job. If we have a post in need, for example, elections in Third World countries are sometimes very strenuous on an RSO, because the policy folks want to send teams out into the hinterlands where perhaps security is lacking. So, the RSO would come back with the cable from post cleared by the Ambassador saying, We would like to have five TDY DS agents to assist us for 2 weeks, a week leading up to the elections, and a week after the elections, just to make sure that the country's stable. We say, sure. And then we take that request and we would send it out to -- the domestic field offices were generally the first place we would pull people from.

So we have -- at that time, I believe we had 17 to 20 domestic field offices. And then the field offices would send us the names of personnel that were available to fill those TDYs. And then our desk officer would work with them to get them the funding and the tickets and -- to coordinate with post to get them into post for that assignment.

Q Okay. I think that's helpful. And in the example you just

used, some of these requests could be quick turnaround, very short --

A Right.

Q -- notice projects.

A Right.

Q And DS/IP would do its best, obviously, to reach out and try to provide TDY DS personnel to send to the requesting post.

A Right.

Q Is that fair?

A Correct. And --

Q Okay.

A -- we do have several posts out there that -- not so much now, but we used to have a lot of one-man RSO posts. So if that RSO went on vacation, posts would -- could come back and say, the Ambassador, the CONGEN would like to have a TDY during the -- my 2-week absence on vacation. So we would then look for someone either in the region who had regional knowledge that we could borrow from another post and TDY over, or we would find someone back at the headquarters level that could go out to fill that position. So there were lots of reasons for filling TDY assignments.

Q Okay. And when you had mentioned that in DS, everyone has a job. So if a domestic field office would have provided an agent, who would have funded that agent's travel, or TDY, to Libya?

A My budget and the DS --

Q Okay.

A -- program operations would have done that.

Q Okay. And would that be -- if it pertained to a specific region, would that be that geographic --

A Yes.

Q -- sub unit?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Exactly.

Q So for Libya, that would be the DS/IP NEA budget?

A Correct.

Q Okay. So as we promised, we'll be referring to some documents to help aid our discussion.

A Okay.

Q And we'll go ahead and mark -- this is going to be -- this will be exhibit 2.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 2

was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I'll give you a moment to read it, but just I'm going to read some identifying information for the record.

This is exhibit 2. It's an unsigned action memo dated October 24, 2011. It's from DS/IP NEA [REDACTED] to DAS Lamb. DS/IP with the subject ARSO TDY funding, and personnel support for Benghazi, Libya. And the document number is C05391928.

A Okay.

Q Do you recall this --

A Yes.

Q -- this memo?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you just describe for us what this request is?

A I had actually requested that they draft this memo because it's very easy for people to take for granted -- when there's a need for TDY people, they don't take the budget into consideration. And when we don't have full-time positions authorized, this TDY money is coming out of the international program's budget. And at \$9,000 per agent for 45 days on a continual basis for a year, this money adds up very, very quickly and depletes the budget that I have for worldwide TDY assignments. So I wanted this to be documented and I wanted to be able to forward this -- forward and to go to the DS budget people to make sure that we had appropriate funding, and that they knew we were going to need additional funding, should this TDY status continue for a long period of time.

Q Okay. And I'll just read for the record, the summary in the document states, quote, "DSA/IP/NEA lacks funding and effective pools of high threat trained candidates for TDY support to draw from to support the mission in Benghazi. To date, the IP front office has approved the allocation of \$90,000 for TDY support in the NEA region, including Yemen, Tripoli, and Damascus," closed quote. And I believe you had just touched a moment ago on the funding aspect, but there's also a reference here to the pools of available agents as well. Could

you elaborate on that, please?

A Yes. DS -- I don't know if they do now, but at this time, they did not have pools of agents just sitting in a room waiting to go TDY. If we needed TDY assistance, we had to reach out to offices and programs where they had normal 8-to-5 jobs, duties, and assignments and borrow someone. So we -- at that time, high-threat training was optional. And as a result of this, it was taken up to Scott Bultrowicz and Eric Boswell and identified as a problem with our growing need for high-threat, trained individuals, we didn't have enough that were high-threat trained. High-threat training at that time, I believe, was almost a 3-month course. So that's a lot of time to ask a field office to be without an agent who's working a criminal caseload, because they get called to testify, they're making arrests, and it would slow down their program. So it was becoming more and more difficult to get these folks through training. So --

Q Can I just take a quick detour --

A Yes.

Q -- on that?

So the high-threat training program, you're very familiar with the program, given the time commitment, the 3 months it required, was it typical for a new DS agent to go through the high-threat training course as opposed to a more seasoned DS agent who perhaps may have had some field experience?

~~A At this point in time, they were two completely separate~~
things. A brand-new DS agent did not roll over right into high-threat

training. And once all of this happened during this period of time, DS realized every agent needs to be high-threat trained, and they need to be completely interchangeable. And this was the beginning of the policy change --

Q Okay.

A -- that drove that.

Q Okay. And just to tie this a little bit to our discussion, you were asked about the level of experience of some of the TDY RSOs to Benghazi.

A Correct.

Q But in your experience, was it generally easier to send a new DS agent to the high-threat training course as opposed to an agent who was in a position, perhaps, at a domestic field office?

A Easier to send an -- when you say "new agent," are you talking about a new agent that just came out of training, or a new agent that was already in his first assignment?

Q Let's say a relatively inexperienced RSO. Somebody with less than 2 years.

A Okay. They would be in a field office.

Q Okay.

A So that's where the -- our newly minted DS agents were all assigned to field offices first.

Q Okay. So their first tour would be a domestic field office.

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A Correct.

Q Okay.

Mr. Snyder. Can I have a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Lamb. Right. Yeah. And, you know, as a result, once we realized we needed more high-threat trained people, it was easier to take the new agents, run them through DS training, add on high-threat training, and then if they were needed or we had a worldwide crisis somewhere, we had this pool of agents that we could also draw from, that though they were new, they were trained, and we would not have sent them out had they not passed that training.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay.

A And if you look statistically at DS agents, we get -- and I don't know that it's changed much from the time I came on. We get about a third of our DS agents just come from all walks of life; librarians, life guards, teachers, bankers. A third of them are former police officers. I was a former police officer. And then about a third of them are military. And I believe we still run a pretty close ratio of that type of diversity for new agents coming in.

Q Okay. But, again, irrespective of their background before coming in as an RSO, coming out of the new agent training, performing the high-threat training, you had confidence in the ability of those agents to perform --

A Absolutely.

Q -- the mission in dangerous locations?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. Returning again, just briefly, to the mention of the funding and the effective pools, I just wanted to touch real briefly on some of the recommendations here, and it appears that there's five of them.

A Okay.

Q One of which is a request for funding. The third recommendation there seems to be a request to remove the requirement for high-threat training. Can you explain the basis for that request?

A Yes. These were options based on -- so basically in the summary, the desk officer, who at the time was [REDACTED], he identifies that we have a shrinking pool of high-threat trained agents. And because we've added Damascus and Yemen and Tripoli to the NEA region, and we're already still supporting Iraq and Afghanistan with TDYers, he says, "One of our options is to stop requiring high-threat training. Do you approve that?" And that was never approved.

Q Okay.

A Instead senior management within DS made the call to train more people.

Q Okay. That is helpful. I would just like to direct you to the second page. The first sentence in the background reads, quote: "The Benghazi mission is going to be short staffed by several positions within a few weeks. Staffing is currently seven of eight. On October 28 staffing will be six of eight. On November 17, DS staffing will

be three of eight," closed quote. Were those projections accurate at the time this memo was written --

A Yes.

Q -- do you recall?

Okay. And do you recall at this time hearing that security staffing would begin to draw down in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And I'll note the fifth recommendation, which is immediately above --

A I'm sorry. Go back and reask me that question. Let me make sure I heard it correctly.

Q Sure. Do you recall hearing at the time of this memo that security staffing would draw down in Benghazi or was projected to draw down?

A It was not drawing down. It was short-staffed.

Q Okay.

A So there's a definite distinction between those two.

Q Okay. A drawdown would be an intentional --

A Exactly.

Q -- decision.

A And this was not -- there was no intent to --

Q Okay?

A -- shorten the numbers. It was that because we couldn't get visas and we didn't have people volunteering. You know, we literally -- at this point in history in Diplomatic Security, we had

hundreds of agents doing high-threat TDYs. And many of them that were on their second, third and fourth TDY in a high-threat country. So it was -- we were absolutely saturated with a need for high-threat TDY positions.

Q Okay. And just above the background that I read to you is the fifth recommendation which is, quote, "DS lowers the overall required number of TDY personnel for the mission from eight to seven. Note DS/IP recently lowered the staffing requirement from ten to eight," closed quote. And this particular recommendation, like the others, was intended to help alleviate some of the concerns about funding and personnel. Is that your understanding?

A Again, this was the desk officer's suggestion of ways to meet the numbers with the resources that they had. What we actually did in this case, if you look directly above that, DS authorizing SPS personnel from the graduating class to be redirected to Benghazi. That was actually the approved recommendation. So we did not have to look at lowering the staffing numbers.

Q Okay. So --

A So these -- these are options. So it's, like, the desk officer is trying to find alternatives to solve the problem. So he's putting these out there. And it's kind of like multiple choice. Which one would you like to pick? And what's going to happen if you don't do anything.

Q So your interpretation, then, of this memo is that this is a menu of options --

A Correct.

Q -- so to speak?

Okay.

A Correct.

Q And so not all of the options are being recommended to be implemented at the same time?

A Exactly. Exactly. And generally, what the desk officer would do would be to put the most desirable recommendations first.

Q Okay. Do you recall, though, that, just to be clear, so this fifth recommendation was not approved?

A Fifth recommendation. You're talking about the --

Q Reducing the number of DS security personnel.

A Right. DS headquarters does not reduce the number of TDY personnel. That is done by post. You know, as long as post needs TDY support, and they, you know, continue to request it, we continue to fill those positions to the best of our ability.

Q Okay.

RPTR GENEUS

EDTR ROSEN

[11:16 a.m.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'll just note here that there is a note in that recommendation that says DS/IP recently lowered the staffing requirement from 10 to 8. So was that outside of the normal process?

A No, that's not correct, because staffing requirements don't get lowered back at headquarters.

Q Okay. So the best of your understanding, this specific recommendation was not approved?

A It was not approved.

Q Okay. Do you recall around this timeframe that DS staffing did, in fact, drop its -- the special mission?

A And we're talking about in Benghazi?

Q Correct.

A I do know because of the numbers and the fact that the mission had moved, the embassy was now, I believe we're in the timeframe, the embassy was stood up in Tripoli. So the mission and the bulk of the people had all moved to Tripoli, which left a very skeletal crew on the ground. And so because of our shortages of these trained TDYers, I asked the senior desk officer to go back to the desk office, go back to the RSO and evaluate what are all of the DS agents doing, and are there any other ways that we can alleviate some of the

duties that they're conducting with other resources.

Q Okay.

A For example, we found that a DS agent was being used as a driver. That is generally not something DS agents do.

We use host country drivers, because they are much better qualified, and when you have a TDYer, every -- change every 30 days, there's no continuity. So it was -- and then we found that one was watching -- there was a classified piece of communications equipment that had to be safeguarded, and they had one DS agent basically babysitting a piece of equipment 24/7. So we worked with our countermeasure folks and say, is there another way we can secure that equipment without using a human body.

Q So we've had the benefit of reviewed documents. You mentioned at the outset you haven't reviewed documents before appearing here today.

A Right.

Q Our understanding is that some of those discussions occurred at later timeframes, say, early 2012, February of 2012. At this point in time, which is October of 2011, when we refer to resources and limitations, availability of resources, are you referring both to availability of personnel and the availability of funding within your office?

A In '11, we were frequently going back and asking for more money. Anything that post asked for, if we were not funding for, we went back and we asked for that money to come from somewhere else within

the Department.

Q Okay. And at this point in time, this is October of '11, so for government financial planners, it would be fiscal year 2012?

A I believe that's correct.

Q Okay. And do you recall at this time whether a continuing resolution was in place?

A Probably. We had them frequently. I don't recall exactly --

Q Okay.

A -- the dates or times of the continuing resolutions.

Q Okay.

I have just a few more minutes, so I would like to just close out this document. I would like to direct your attention to the third page in the last paragraph. I'll just go ahead and read this paragraph into the record. It reads, quote, "The extraordinary amount of TDY support to date may warrant comment from the NEA bureau asking NEA to acknowledge DS' funding requirements to maintaining effective security posture is advisable and could afford support from NEA. With a yearly financial plan of 228,000, DS/IP/NEA is on track to obligate its yearly funding in 90 days or less. This only means to continually fund the recurring TDY support within NEA region is by transferring funds from other DS/IP regional directors or other IP officers, including DS/IP/OPO," closed quote.

And I would just like to first ask, there's a reference to financial plan. Could you just explain to us what that is?

A The financial plan would be our annual budget and funding.

Q Okay. And it says here that the financial plan for DS/IP NEA was \$228,000. Does that sound about right?

A Oh, I see where you're going. Okay. That is what we had projected -- the financial money that you get in a given year is based on what you project the year before when you ask for it. So, based on the tempo of operations in the prior year, we had asked for \$228,000 to support TDY operations in the NEA region. We were not anticipating what happened and the need that we had. So, basically, what we're saying is, you know, hey, within 90 days the money we had projected a year ago is not going to be sufficient to cover the current needs that we have.

Q Okay. So the money was going to run out?

A The money was going to run out.

Q Okay. Within 90 days?

A Correct.

Q Okay. So within 3 months of this memo, DS/IP NEA --

A -- was going to run out of money.

Q Okay. There's also a mention here of asking to borrow money with no obligation to reimburse.

Can you explain that for us?

A What we -- where?

Mr. Snyder. Where are you reading?

Mr. Kenny. I'm sorry. Yes. It's actually just above there.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q You had mentioned the TDY tempo. There's a reference to TDY tempo in the paragraph directly before.

A Your statement about -- with regards to not paying it back. I don't remember seeing that in here. But -- restate your question, please.

Q Sure. So I'll just read. The sentence is -- it reads, "However, ultimately, IP/NEA will likely have to ask for additional funding with no obligation to reimburse if the TDY tempo is commensurate with 2011 levels," closed quote.

Do you see that?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

A Okay. So, basically, what we're saying is we have \$47,000 left that we can reimburse with if another office steps forward, because the money was being doled out, I believe, quarterly. Like, you didn't get your full budget all at once. And if we were under continuing resolution at the time, you got even less money.

So what he's saying here is at this tempo, we're going to run out of money. You know, we're asking to borrow money from anybody that's got money available, and we'll pay you back. But as soon as this 47,000 is gone, we have no more money, and we can't reimburse you.

Q Okay. I understand. And you mentioned if there was a CR, there would have been even less money?

A Correct.

Q Does that jog your memory about whether a CR was in place

at the time?

A I believe that there was.

Q Okay.

A Because the money -- during a CR, money gets doled out in very small little portions, just enough to kind of keep the normal stuff going and nothing for anything extra. And it's very difficult to operate emergency operations when we have a CR.

Q Okay. And that's because of the availability of funding under a CR?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Again, there's a note here about, perhaps, requesting a comment from the NEA bureau. Would that have been a request for financial assistance from the NEA bureau? Do you recall?

A During times of crisis, when DS resources are being tasked above and beyond what we had budgeted for, it was not uncommon for us to go back and work with our counterparts within the Bureau to see if they could help us secure additional funding, or if they had regional resources that, you know, they felt comfortable that they can, perhaps, share some.

Q And do you recall if that happened in this instance?

A I'll be honest, there were so many operational things going on, my intent with this memo was to get this into the hands of the budget people and to have the budget people work together to come up with a solution to get the money that was needed.

Q Okay. Okay. And do you recall if this \$47,000 was ever

approved?

A We never ran -- we never ran out of money to the point where we said, okay, we can't send anybody else, there's no more money. We never went anti-deficient with funding. So the Department, collectively, between DS, financial personnel, and the Department, we were always funded for these types of posts.

Q But, specifically, this request for \$47,000, do you recall whether that was approved?

A Yes.

Q That was approved?

A It would -- yes.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And turning back to the recommendation page.

A The first --

Q Yes, just that first page.

A Okay.

Q And you had described those five as the potential options. So is it then accurate that that first recommendation was ultimately approved of these options laid out?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall whether any of the other options were approved or whether the approval of that one obviated the need to approve any of the others?

A Without seeing the final signed and cleared memo, I can't,

with 100 percent certainty, tell you what was approved on this document. I can tell you we never ran out of money. So funding was made available.

So it makes sense that this was approved, it was not denied. No one in the Department would deny funding required to support the emergency operations at any of our posts.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q You said funding didn't run out to your recollection. But funding was a consideration at this point?

A It was -- the funding that was in my pot of money was running out. But, collectively, the Department was pooling money from places where they could to fund this operation.

Q And do you know under a continuing resolution whether there would have been restrictions on the transfer of money?

A I am not a financial person --

Q Sure.

A -- so, I think the direction these questions are going on would be best directed at financial personnel.

Q Okay.

Mr. Kenny. I see with that, we're out of time. So we'll go off the record.

Ms. Lamb. All right. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Ms. Betz. I think we're ready to go back on the record. The time is now 11:39, 38.

Mr. Jordan. 38?

Ms. Betz. And I just want to note for the record, we are joined by two additional members, Mr. Jordan from Ohio and Mrs. Brooks from Indiana. So they are with us right now.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Ms. Lamb, I want to go back to just a couple of issues that we talked about in the previous hours, just to help my understanding.

In our first hour, we talked about spot reports.

A Correct.

Q And that you had indicated that spot reports were issued when demonstrations had occurred. And is that -- is that correct? Is my recollection correct?

A Correct. A spot report is the initial immediate reporting so we can get the information as close to live time as possible, and also may not have time to do a full report, or a full cable. There may not be an emergency action committee meeting, but we get the information right away. There's a demonstration occurring right now, here's what we know, or it just occurred, ended peacefully, and everything's fine.

Q And are those a requirement, or are those just a routine --

A It is a requirement.

Q -- practice? It is a requirement.

A It is a requirement. And DS has a policy that lists the criteria of the threshold that meets spot reporting.

Q Great. And then just shifting issues, we talked about, in the last hour, my colleagues alluded to the CR that was in place.

A Uh-huh.

Q And I just want to clarify, because you had previously testified, I believe, before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee in 2012 that resources weren't an issue as it relates to Benghazi and the terrorist attack. And I wanted to clarify, or confirm, whether or not that is still your position, or --

A That's -- that's a very good point, and that's a good question. And to clarify that, I would say, yes, any time there's a CR in security, our programs suffer across the board, because we are boxed in to a minimalistic maintenance of the current tempo. And we all know security doesn't work that way. Security peaks and valleys. So we need and the Department needs some sort of funding that does -- does not depend on a CR in any way, shape, or form.

So were we affected by it? Yes. But the Department did not let that affect the level of security or resources that got sent out to any post in need. And Pat Kennedy was absolutely, 100 percent amazing at focusing on and making sure that if there was a financial problem and if anybody ever came to him and said, you know, we really need this for this security reason, and we're out of money, Pat would go back, and he would have the financial people scrubbing the books to find money in the appropriate pots of money that could be shifted. Even if it was a temporary shift, he would prioritize the security needs on a worldwide basis for posts that were in need.

Q So is it fair to say that Pat Kennedy was aware of the funding issues that were associated with the TDYs in Benghazi?

A It would -- he, during his regular staff meetings when we discussed all of the Tripoli and Benghazi issues, he was aware, and he had financial people there from his staff that reported to him directly.

Q So he was shifting resources as it relates to --

A If it was necessary, he would not hesitate to do that.

Q -- Benghazi?

We talked a lot about staffing in the last hour, and I want to take a step back and focus on then-envoy Stevens' initial entry into Benghazi. Were you a part of those discussions and decisions about his security detail going in?

A Originally, when we first went back in Benghazi?

Q Yes. April 2011.

A Yes.

Q Yes. And was it a protection mission, that's my understanding, was the security posture?

A The DS role was to protect the envoy going in.

Q And what is a protective mission?

A It's to provide safe passage in and out of the country; and/or if they're staying, to maintain the security envelope around the protectee.

Q Is there a set number of DS agents that are associated with a mission?

A It depends on the mission, and it's generally established. In this particular case, we -- I called for a large meeting. The number

one and number two DS agents in charge of the mobile security division came. My deputy was there. There were other members of senior DS management. And we worked on the game plan to go back in and what was prudent and how many people. And however many people you send in, you have to be able to sustain them.

So bigger numbers is not always better once you get in there on the ground. And we needed to go in before we brought the protectee in, was key. And then once the first team went in, they were able to provide more detailed information on what resources we needed to come in with, what was available there, what wasn't available there. Food was one of the things we had to make provisions for. Water, some of the simple things that you would have thought we could have gotten on the local market.

So the initial team that went in provided the wealth of information that provided the final information that determined the teams that went in.

Q So in terms of decision-making, were you the decision maker as it relates to the staffing numbers and the staffing security profile that went with the envoy?

A I made the original recommendations, and the ops plan was drafted under my guidance. And that op plan went up through Scott Bultrowicz, if he was there, it would have gone through him and to Eric Boswell for clearance.

~~Q So Assistant Secretary Boswell would have had a final say, or would it have been an Under Secretary decision, or approval, I should~~

say?

A I'm not exactly sure how the approval went or not. I know that this type of operation would have been -- Assistant Secretary Boswell would have briefed it to Pat Kennedy. And then if Pat Kennedy had any concerns, he would raise them, and then we would walk backwards and address them.

Q So, initially, I believe there were eight agents that went in, and then an additional two agents came immediately, or right thereafter. Was that your decision, then, to send two additional agents?

A Unless I have the ops plan in front of me, there were so many ops before and after that, I don't recall exact numbers.

Q Did you consult with any of the other U.S. Government agencies that might have been on the ground at the time before going in regarding any type of security or security environment, threat environment?

A We were briefed by other agencies, yes.

Q Were you part of the decision, or did you make the decision to leave the Tibesti Hotel and move into other U.S. Government agency facilities and then to the interim agency, or interim facility?

A Okay. Say that one more time, please.

Q So at one point, or at a certain point, the mission left the Tibesti Hotel. Is that correct?

A Right.

Q Was that your decision to leave?

A No. This was a post recommendation from the security people on the ground that post and the senior policy person on the ground, then, felt it was in their best interest to move of the hotel and that was fully supported by all elements in Washington.

Q Okay. And from that point, to move to an interim facility, were you in charge of the security posture for those facilities in which the mission moved into?

A The physical security did not fall under my oversight. That fell under -- at that time, it was [REDACTED] in charge of physical security. And any facilities or compounds that were considered as viable options, he actually sent subject matter experts from his office out there to survey these properties and to make decisions on, you know, which ones were best for what reasons, and then they worked with the Department management as far as identifying which ones, and then the Department would lease the properties and work with the landlords regarding our --

Q So did [REDACTED] report to you, or was he your equal?

A No. He was my equal, and he was in charge of physical and technical security.

Q So [REDACTED] was in charge of the physical security. Were you in charge of the staffing, the DS agent, the personnel side of it?

A I was in charge of providing them the staffing resources that they requested.

Q And those were TDY?

A Yes.

Q And where were those TDY personnel drawn from? What pool?

A There is no pool. They were drawn from all office bureaus across DS. The majority would come from field offices.

Q Okay. So you were not involved in making any type of physical security assessments on --

A No.

Q -- either the interim facility or what would later be --

A No, I was not involved.

Q Were you part of any discussions once embassy Tripoli reopened regarding the change in terms of the protected mission to a more traditional RSO model, if you will?

A Can you be more specific?

Q So at a certain point the security posture of the mission changed, and it went from a protective mission to a RSO, more traditional post model, if you will, RSO, ARSO, reliance on a post mission, support. Were you a part of any of those discussions or decisions to change that security posture?

A Changes made to a security posture come from post, and then if they need additional resources, or even if they want to cut back resources, they will come in with their justification, and then it's reviewed back to Washington level, and then it's -- the requests are supported and filled. Or sometimes there are other options when -- if you drill down on the question, there may be another option to solve the problem than putting another person there. There may be something

technical that can be done to accomplish the same thing.

Q Well, let me ask it this way: And I'm going to read just some testimony from [REDACTED], your regional -- your desk officer for Libya at the time. He says, "The mission" -- it's page 18. Actually, we'll just go ahead and put this in as an exhibit.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. Just for the record, this would be testimony given by [REDACTED] before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee in 2013. And I'm focusing on sort of the fulsome paragraph, answer, which reads, "Prior to that, it was a desk officer colleague of mine. The mission in around the same time, September, October, the mission in Benghazi changed essentially from a protection mission, which was run by our dignitary protection unit here in Washington to a more traditional RSO program management position, which pushed it back into DS/IP's, my officer's realm."

Ms. Welcher. Can we go off the record so she could read the --

Ms. Betz. Oh, I'm sorry.

Ms. Lamb. And I don't know that I've got the same page you have got.

Ms. Betz. It's page 8.

Ms. Welcher. Feel free to read it.

Ms. Betz. I'm sorry. I thought she was reading it.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Betz. We can go back on the record. And I'll further

identify the document as exhibit 3. It is the interview of [REDACTED] conducted on Thursday, August 8, 2013, by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

Ms. Jackson. What pages?

Ms. Betz. Pages 17, 18, and 19, but we'll focus on page 18.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So the witness has had a chance to look at the document.

A Uh-huh.

Q And as I had mentioned before, focusing on this paragraph, which is the answer given by [REDACTED], he talks about the mission in -- around the same time, September, October, the mission in Benghazi changed essentially from a protection mission, which was run by our dignitary protection unit here in Washington to a more traditional RSO program management position, which pushed it back into DS/IP's, my office's realm."

A Correct. Now I understand.

Q So going back to the envoy's entry into Benghazi, were the TDYs, the DS agents, under your sort of portfolio? Did the dignitary protection unit fall under DS/IP?

A No. We all worked together, and MS -- the mobile security division was the first group that took them in. Okay? And then, I believe, they transitioned from the mobile security division to dignitary protection, and/or a mix of the two. And that was funded, and the staffing at that time was -- as it was rotating staffing, that was controlled by dignitary protection and paid by them.

Once we realized we were going to go back into Tripoli and raised the flag, then it became a permanent presence. It was no longer just a temporary envoy in Benghazi. So the minute we raised the flag and it became a permanent -- what was meant to be a permanent presence, that shifted it all back over to DS/IP.

Q And when you say "permanent presence" --

A An embassy. We were reopening an embassy.

Q In Tripoli?

A In Tripoli.

Q But for purposes of Benghazi, what was your understanding?

A At that point in time, we had no idea what the new Ambassador and what post was going to do with Benghazi. And I think Benghazi was -- you know, we had it, we had invested money in it, and they kept it until they were sure -- and the situation was very volatile when we first went in to Tripoli. So, you know, that was a policy decision. It wasn't a DS decision.

Q So to clarify, when say they kept it, who is "they"?

A The Department, posts.

Q But it wasn't a post at the time. So "they," was that something in Main State?

A Once -- once the flag is raised --

Q Correct.

A -- the Ambassador is in charge. The Ambassador owns that country, and DS is responsible for security under the direction in support of the Ambassador. The Ambassador answers back here to the

Department. And any policy decisions are outside the realm of DS or my position, DS/IP. Whether or not they keep Benghazi, why they keep Benghazi is not important to me as the head of DS/IP. What is important is that they are able to articulate what resources they need and that I'm able to get those resources for them to keep everybody safe.

Q So what was your understanding of the mission's legal status, if you will, at that point where it changed from a protection mission to a traditional RSO?

A I am not a legal person, I don't know.

Q Well, was it an official -- was it an official post in your mind? Did someone convey to you that it had some sort of official status connection with the embassy?

A You're talking about Benghazi?

Q Benghazi.

A Benghazi was a U.S. Government-, State Department-funded facility, and no matter what it was called when we first went in there, once the flag was raised and we had an Ambassador, in my mind, it would clearly fall under the Ambassador and post responsibility to support and maintain for everything.

Q And was that clearly communicated, that Benghazi fell under Tripoli?

A You would have to ask the policy personnel. I mean, this is how it's done all over the world. Albeit, we don't go into that many places the way we did there.

Q Well, what other places have we done that? Or done this?

A Well, I mean, we left Kuwait during the occupation. I served in Kuwait right after the occupation. And so when we go back in and we raise the flag, we're taking possession, and we're restarting our embassy. Had we not been able to go in -- in this case, I was the second RSO to go back into Kuwait. But the first facility is damaged, and they don't -- say, they don't originally go back into the first facility, so they started at the Ambassador's old residence, and that's where the small core group that first goes in raised the flag and declare their presence back in country until the new facility gets fixed and repaired or whatever.

So it doesn't mean that just because they leave there and go back to the official residency that we don't have a responsibility for the facility that we left behind. They either have to shut it or maintain responsibility for it.

Q Are those facilities typically given some sort of official status as it -- for example, an executive branch office, a consulate or a post?

A That -- those are policy decisions. They are not DS decisions, and, you know, some are closed, some are kept.

Ms. Betz. Mr. Jordan, I believe you had some questions?

Mr. Jordan. Sure. Thank you.

Ms. Lamb, thanks for being here. Admiral Mullen interviewed you as part of his responsibilities as one of the co-chairs for the ARB.
Do you remember that interview?

Ms. Lamb. Yes, I do.

Mr. Jordan. Tell me about that. How long was it?

Ms. Lamb. Oh, that's been 3 years ago, 4 years ago. I have no idea how long it was.

Mr. Jordan. 10 minutes, 5 minutes, 2 hours?

Ms. Lamb. No, I was in there several hours. More than 1.

Mr. Jordan. More than 1. Okay. Who was there?

Ms. Lamb. Whoever sat on the ARB.

Mr. Jordan. Was the full board there?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall.

Mr. Jordan. Well, was Mr. Pickering there?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. Were there three other members there, or -- I don't recall all the five members' names.

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall the exact member. There were more than three people on the other side of the table. And Pickering sat in the middle and Mullen sat to his right.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Who, if anyone, from the State Department was there?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall. I testified, was interviewed repeatedly over all of this, over an extended period of time, and I do not recall.

Mr. Jordan. So you don't know if anyone -- was Patrick Kennedy there?

Ms. Lamb. No, not -- the interview with the ARB, I was there by myself.

Mr. Jordan. You were there by yourself?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. You just said you testified repeatedly. How many times -- I recall a couple of times in front of Congress, and once in front of the OGR Committee. What other times you testified before Congress, just refresh my memory?

Ms. Lamb. In front of Congress, I believe those were --

Mr. Jordan. Just twice in that year?

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. And this meeting with the ARB, if my memory is right, that was the day before you were scheduled to testify in front of Congress? Is that right?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall. I have no -- without seeing actual papers or calendars, I've been in retirement for a year and a half, and I apologize, but I have no recollection of time windows and exact dates. Unless you have papers to refresh my memory, I can't confirm dates and time.

Mr. Jordan. Do you recall testifying in front of the OGR Committee in October of 2012?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. And did -- the ARB interview was done prior to that?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall if it was before or after.

Mr. Jordan. Well, Mr. Mullen has testified that it was done before.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. So at any point after the Mullen ARB meeting, or interview with you, did anyone from the State Department -- did you have any conversations, any meetings, from folks from the State Department regarding your testimony in coming up in front of the congressional committee, in front of the OGR?

Ms. Lamb. No, I don't believe so.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Do you recall if the interview with -- the one I'm describing with -- do you recall how many interviews you had with ARB?

Ms. Lamb. I believe I only had one.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. There may -- I'm trying to remember. There was the one meeting, and I can't recall -- it may have been when the ARB originally convened. It was one meeting where there was Eric Boswell, Pat Kennedy, and myself, and I don't remember which group it was with.

Mr. Jordan. What other group would there be? If it wasn't ARB, and it was about Benghazi, who would you be talking to?

Ms. Lamb. Well, that's why I'm saying, in my mind, I'm thinking it was when the ARB first started, they called the three of us in to walk them through the incident, and --

Mr. Jordan. Wait. Wait. Wait. Who called you in -- so you are saying two different things, then. You said there was no State Department personnel in the meetings with -- in the meeting with the ARB, and now you're telling me that there are or there were.

Ms. Lamb. I am telling you my recollection of -- it was a

whirlwind during that time period.

Mr. Jordan. Focus on the ARB.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Mr. Jordan. So you are saying --

Ms. Lamb. The ARB, I am not 100 percent sure. I do know there was a meeting, which I believe possibly could have been the beginning of the ARB, where they wanted to hear from the three of us. And I remember that there were some sort of easels and drawings and statutes --

Mr. Jordan. Let me ask you this: Was there a meeting where Admiral Mullen was present, along with you and other people, other personnel, from the State Department?

Ms. Lamb. If that meeting with the three of us was in front of the ARB, yes, Admiral Mullen would have been there.

Mr. Jordan. And those other two individuals from the State Department were you, Patrick Kennedy, and who else?

Ms. Lamb. I believe Scott Bultrowicz might have been there.

Mr. Jordan. And do you know if that meeting took place prior to your testimony in front of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee?

Ms. Lamb. I do not know where it took place.

Mr. Jordan. Did Cheryl Mills talk to you before you testified in front of Congress?

Ms. Lamb. I mean, we were -- because of all the documents that were being sent up around this, we were in daily contact. [REDACTED]

was my primary contact at that time.

Mr. Jordan. [REDACTED] is who?

Ms. Lamb. He was in State legal.

Mr. Jordan. Same department these folks are in?

Mr. Snyder. I am not -- I'm not now.

Ms. Lamb. Yes. I mean, [REDACTED] was my primary contact. But if Cheryl Mills needed documents or needed -- or sometimes she would have a document and not understand --

Mr. Jordan. Did you have direct conversations with Ms. Mills?

Ms. Lamb. Yes, I would speak directly with Ms. Mills.

Mr. Jordan. And when you described earlier you had countless meetings and all, that would include the meetings you had with Cheryl Mills prior to testifying in front of Congress? That's part of that countless number of meetings you had?

Ms. Lamb. Part of, yes.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Anyone else in the State Department that you met with on a regular basis, or at all, prior to Mr. [REDACTED], you mentioned Ms. Mills? Anyone else prior to testifying in front of Congress?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall.

Mr. Jordan. Pat Kennedy?

Ms. Lamb. I met with Pat Kennedy and Eric Boswell routinely.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. I mean, I was still involved with world security and operations and -- I don't recall.

Mr. Jordan. Did anyone -- Mr. Mullen has testified that after he talked to you and prior to you coming in front of Congress, he gave Cheryl Mills a phone call. And he has testified under oath that he said he gave her a heads-up phone call, these are his words, because he thought that you were not going to be a good witness for the State Department. Are you familiar with that testimony from Admiral Mullen?

Ms. Lamb. Nope. First I've heard it.

Mr. Jordan. Did anyone specifically come up to you and talk about, Ms. Lamb, we need to make sure you're ready to go in front of Congress tomorrow; we need to talk a little bit about how your testimony is going to go, briefing meetings, those kinds of meetings? Did that happen?

Ms. Lamb. There were support meetings through DS legal and, you know, people had to clear off on the testimony -- you know, my presentation of the testimony, that there were examples of questions that may or may not be asked and that sort of thing.

Mr. Jordan. So they gave you sample questions?

Ms. Lamb. Uh-huh.

Mr. Snyder. If we can insert, this is getting into --

Mr. Jordan. Are you guys her lawyers?

Mr. Snyder. We represent the State Department, but this would be privilege, privilege would be held by the State Department, but it's still attorney-client communication.

Mr. Jordan. She works with the State Department?

Mr. Snyder. She's a former employee.

Mr. Jordan. I didn't ask that. I said did she work for the State Department?

Mr. Snyder. She currently does not work for the State Department, but the privilege still holds.

Mr. Jordan. All right. So the question is, were there sample questions given to her prior to coming from OGR?

Mr. Snyder. How her lawyers prepared her at the time she was at the State Department would be privileged and attorney-client privilege.

Mr. Jordan. I didn't ask the question. I asked were there sample questions.

Mr. Snyder. Yeah, but that gets into what preparation was done, and what her lawyers discussed with her. Just an unfair question.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. How long were those -- how long were those briefings and meetings and preparation meetings? How long were those?

Ms. Lamb. I have no idea. I have no recollection.

Mr. Jordan. Was it 10 minutes? I'll guess the same question I asked with the ARB, was it 10 minutes or was it 3 hours?

Ms. Lamb. I have no recollection of exact timing.

Mr. Jordan. Were there more than one?

Ms. Lamb. More than one?

Mr. Jordan. More than one prep session that you had prior to coming in front of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

Ms. Lamb. I had multiple discussions with [REDACTED] and multiple sessions of reviewing documents.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Okay. And -- okay. Good.

Now, the -- do you agree with Mr. -- Mr. Mullen's assessment that you were going to be a poor witness? Do you think that's in any way accurate? And why would he say that?

Ms. Lamb. I have no idea.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. The ARB, I think, cited you for mismanagement, and you were subsequently disciplined by the State Department. Is that accurate?

Ms. Lamb. I was never disciplined by the Department, and I have never seen anything in writing that that was their assessment.

Mr. Jordan. Okay, well, we can get you a copy of that. Were you ever suspended by the State Department?

Ms. Lamb. We were put on -- four State Department employees were put on administrative leave for a short period of time.

Mr. Jordan. Right. With pay or without pay?

Ms. Lamb. With pay.

Mr. Jordan. And was there any due process for you to go through to -- what was the due process measures? They come to you -- State Department comes to you and says, you're going to be suspended on administrative leave -- not suspended -- on administrative leave for 4 weeks. Was there some kind of due process rights that you had when that was first given to you?

Ms. Lamb. I was not given any guidance.

Mr. Jordan. They didn't tell you had any way to appeal that or anything?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. And who told you that? Who told you that you were going to be suspended? Or you were going -- you were going to be on a 4-week administrative leave?

Ms. Lamb. Eric Boswell.

Mr. Jordan. All right. And when he told you that, he didn't say there's -- tell me how he gave it to you, he told you that information.

Ms. Lamb. He called me and Scott Bultrowicz in, and he said that we were to be out of the building by the end of the business day, and that we were on administrative leave.

Mr. Jordan. And did you ask him -- what was your response? I think I would say, really? Can I talk to anyone? Can I give my side of the sorry or --

Ms. Lamb. No, I -- Scott and I have been around DS a long time. And, I mean, we've seen this process, and we knew that there were administrative things that people were looking into, and we just said, yes, and did as we were told?

Mr. Jordan. And then how were you notified that you were -- you were -- when you could come back? Did you know right ahead that today you are going to leave and you can come back to a date in the future? What did they tell you?

Ms. Lamb. We were sent a letter telling us when to report back to duty.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

All right. That's all I have right now.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Just a couple of points of clarification. Were you afforded the opportunity to read the ARB's report?

A No.

Q So you don't know what they had conveyed or described regarding the personnel decisions that were made?

A No.

Q You had mentioned several meetings with Cheryl Mills. Were those specifically related post attack, or had you been in contact, or did you have meetings with her through -- substantively on Benghazi or any other issues prior to? Or did you -- let me rephrase it. Did you have regular meetings with her? Had you met with her previously?

A No. And these weren't regular meetings -- like one-on-one meetings.

Q Or part of a broader meeting that you might have been invited to?

A She -- it was my understanding, she was responsible for getting all of the documents that were being requested in -- and compiled in, you know, organizing the documents so they made sense, and making sure nothing got left out.

Because Cheryl Mills is not a security expert, she had a lot of questions about security policies, procedures, you know, what was routine, what was done under exigent circumstances. So there were several DS people there, not just myself, that were working to help bring all these documents together and to answer questions that she

had.

Mr. Jordan. Had you ever talked to Cheryl Mills before the Benghazi attack?

Ms. Lamb. No, I didn't even know her.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Just to clarify, are you saying that Cheryl Mills was responsible for organizing the documents that the ARB used and evaluated as part of its investigation?

A I have no information as to how the ARB got their documents or what they requested.

Q Just to clarify, when you say that she was organizing documents, did she ever convey what those documents were for? Were they for congressional requests? Were they for the ARB?

A At that point in time, they were for congressional requests, and they were compiled -- because they were compiling not just DS documents, but also Department -- documents from throughout the Department having to do with Benghazi, they sequestered a large room in the basement. And it was like a processing center in there, pulling hard copies of documents and getting them all organized and copied to send over.

Ms. Betz. Oh, I'm sorry.

Mr. Jordan. In those prep sessions, just to go back again. You mentioned two names specifically, Ms. Mills or Mr. [REDACTED]. Am I saying that right?

Ms. Lamb. [REDACTED]

Mr. Jordan. [REDACTED] Okay. Anyone else in those sessions?

Ms. Lamb. There was someone else that worked for Mr. [REDACTED]

There were other people that were compiling documents in there that -- so it was an effort, because there was such a volume of documents in a short period of time for me to -- I mean, many of these documents I never saw before. And in an effort to enlighten myself fully on what was going on behind the scenes at a lower level than what I was getting on a daily basis, I was trying to consume as much information as I could, and they availed these documents to me.

So the folks that were working different sections of compiling documents, I had the ability to ask them if I --

Mr. Jordan. Do you know names?

Ms. Lamb. -- needed something. No, they were staffers, staffer types.

Mr. Jordan. Have you ever talked to -- ever had a conversation with Secretary Clinton?

Ms. Lamb. She came in one time, I believe. She came in after Pat Kennedy and I came off the Hill, I think, in -- she just thanked us for our service and for testifying, and that was all.

Mr. Jordan. Wait. Wait. Wait. So when -- when did you have -- when you say you had one conversation, sounds like, when was that?

Ms. Lamb. It was after the testimony on -- the one that was televised.

Mr. Jordan. Oh, just recently, this past year?

Ms. Lamb. No. No. No. It was not a conversation with her.

Mr. Jordan. You've talked to Secretary Clinton once?

Ms. Lamb. No. I did not talk to her. She came into the room. There were several people in the room. It was after the joint testimony that Pat Kennedy and I did, and she just thanked us for --

Mr. Jordan. The one time you had interaction with Secretary Clinton was after Benghazi, and specifically, after you testified in front of Congress? Is that accurate?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. And who was in that meeting when she came in the room to thank you?

Ms. Lamb. Small room. I believe it may have just been Cheryl Mills, Pat, and I.

Mr. Jordan. Four people in the room, Cheryl Mills, Pat Kennedy, you, and the Secretary?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. And this is the only time, if any, interaction with the Secretary?

Ms. Lamb. Me, personally, yeah.

Mr. Jordan. So you never talked to her before Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. I had sat in for Eric Boswell in staff meetings where she was -- where she led the staff meeting at part of my job.

Mr. Jordan. But you never had a personal interaction with the Secretary until after the tragedy in Benghazi and until after you had

went and testified in front of Congress?

Ms. Lamb. To the best of my recollection, yes. I mean, I never sat down and had a conversation with the Secretary.

Mr. Jordan. Great. Thank you.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Let me just follow up. When you said you sat in the place of Boswell, Assistant Secretary Boswell, where she was in meetings, did any of these meetings have to do with Libya?

A No, they were just general staff meetings.

Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Ms. Lamb.

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Ms. Betz. I believe Congresswoman Brooks would like to ask a question.

Mrs. Brooks. I believe earlier you testified about the fact that there seemed to be an unprecedented number of high-threat post requests during this period of time, and you've been there for 27 years? Is that right?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. All in diplomatic security?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. And, so, when did -- approximately when did this unprecedented number of requests for high-threat posts begin?

Ms. Lamb. It began when we stood up Iraq.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. So approximately what year was that?

Ms. Lamb. Oh, my gosh. That would have been 2010, I believe.

I don't -- I don't remember when we -- I mean, we were -- because the military was in there first, and we were a small presence. But as we started building the new facility and then the transition, the numbers just kept growing. So it was in the 2010 timeframe.

Mrs. Brooks. And can you give us examples of the other -- so Iraq, Afghanistan, of course. What were some of the other posts that you had this unprecedented number of requests for high-threat training?

Ms. Lamb. Yemen, Tunisia, when they had their demonstrations and problems. So it was -- most of this stemmed from when the demonstrations, if they got out of hand and caused damage, which several of them did, the damage created weaknesses in our perimeter security. So we sent in -- we needed to send in resources to plug the holes that we had.

Mrs. Brooks. And we didn't have military in those personnel? Is that correct? In those places? That was where there was nonmilitary presence?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. And at the time that you -- do you have any recollection at the time that you were assigning all of this personnel to Benghazi and Tripoli, any idea, roughly, how many different posts and places you had high-threat, you know, personnel -- high-threat trained personnel posted?

Ms. Lamb. You may be able to go back in the records. I mean, there's records kept of which posts are considered high threat, but I know, for a fact at that time, the big ones were Iraq, Afghanistan,

Yemen, where we were providing TDY support, which was the guiding light here, and then Benghazi and Tripoli.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Can I clarify just something to follow up? When you talk about Afghanistan and Iraq, those are fortified embassies, correct?

A Yes.

Q Sana'a is an embassy?

A Correct.

Q Tunis is an embassy?

A Correct.

Q Juba, I think, has been mentioned, thrown in the mix? That is an embassy, correct?

A Right, correct.

Q And what is Benghazi?

A It was an interim facility.

Q Okay. So not heavily fortified?

A There were no standards required to be met for an ~~unarmed~~ ^{interim} facility.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And who made that decision, that the standards would not apply to Benghazi?

A The standards are written as such that they apply to permanent facilities, and interim facilities are to be -- we are -- we provide as much temporary security as we possibly can, and their security postures to be reviewed every 6 months, and then it's not meant

to be a prolonged period of time in an interim facility. It's meant to be at a point somewhere not far from probably the second extent -- you know, somewhere in the policy that has to make a decision, are we going to keep it, is it going to be a permanent facility or not?

RPTR HUMISTON

EDTR ROSEN

[12:26 p.m.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And did those discussions ever occur with regard to Benghazi?

A They would have taken place in December at the 6-month mark.

Q December of 2011?

A If we -- yes, because we were in mid December when we -- or mid 2011 when we first went in, so, yes, that is correct.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And to follow up on that, I'd like to show you a document, which I'll label as exhibit No. 4 for the record, and it's what appears to be a cover sheet.

And while the witness is looking at the document, I'll go ahead and identify it. It is State Department SCB0048116. It is an email from [REDACTED] to a number of individuals, one of which is the witness, dated February 10th, 2012. The document is identified as Secret except when separated from the attachment, and then the email itself is unclassified. So --

A Okay.

Q Just following up our discussion on the standards, physical

security standards and the applicability to Benghazi, the subject of this email says, 2012 extension of Benghazi exception approved and signed, and it appears that it is signed by Assistant Secretary Boswell.

Are you familiar with this email?

A No. I don't recall. I'm sure I got it, but I don't recall at this --

Q Do you -- are you aware of any type of discussion about extending the -- well, first let me ask, what was the Benghazi exception as it relates to OSPB standards?

A I was not --

Ms. Sawyer. Can I just make a comment here? We don't have the actual underlying memo, because we've separated it. I am concerned about the possible representation on the record as to what that underlying document actually represented, so if we are going to pursue this line of questioning, I think we need to go into the classified setting and let her see it.

Mr. Snyder. Well, for the record, she doesn't have a security clearance.

Ms. Betz. Right. And so I'm not going to get -- I wanted to know -- I'm just going to ask her about the email.

Ms. Sawyer. I have a serious concern --

Ms. Betz. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. -- that you are representing the content of a document that is not actually reflected in the document attached to this email.

Ms. Betz. I'm not representing anything.

Ms. Sawyer. You were trying to get her to --

Ms. Betz. I'm just asking about the email.

Ms. Sawyer. -- acknowledge that it's about an exception that --

Ms. Betz. Well, I'm just asking her --

Ms. Sawyer. -- I don't know what the underlying email is about.

Ms. Betz. Well, it says the exception on the email.

Ms. Sawyer. It doesn't mention OSPB standards, which is our concern.

Ms. Betz. It says OSPB, approved and assigned Benghazi exception to OSPB.

Ms. Lamb. I can make this answer very simple. I was not responsible for OSPB standards or enforcement. That came under the physical security division within DS. This was not in my purview.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And are you aware of any type of exception, special exception for Benghazi? Not that we have to go into the detail, but what -- was there some sort of assumption or exception for Benghazi?

A You should go back to the folks who signed that memo.

Ms. Betz. Okay. And now I'll defer, or yield back to Congressman Jordan.

Mr. Jordan. Thank you.

Ms. Lamb, I want to go back to the conversation the day you were told that you were going to be put on administrative leave. Tell me about that conversation again. Who was it, Mr. Boswell or --

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. Mr. Boswell came into your office?

Ms. Lamb. No. He was in Scott Bultrowicz's office and called me. Well, we had a staff meeting, and following the staff meeting, he asked Scott and I to step into Scott's office, and --

Mr. Jordan. What did he say?

Ms. Lamb. When we went in, he just said that while the Benghazi incident was being reviewed, that we were going to be put on administrative leave.

Mr. Jordan. And did he tell you that you were definitely coming back, or what -- give me -- what else did he say --

Ms. Lamb. All he said --

Mr. Jordan. -- if anything?

Ms. Lamb. -- was that we had to be out of the building by the end of the business day and that we would be notified when we were coming back --

Mr. Jordan. And your reaction, again, was what?

Ms. Lamb. -- if we were coming back. Well, actual -- no. He did not say anything about coming back. All he said that was while it was under review, we were on administrative leave, and that was it. I mean, it was -- there was not a -- a discussion.

Mr. Jordan. Did anyone else -- prior to that conversation, did anyone else come up to you and talk to you and say, hey, you may be put on administrative leave. You may be taking the fall for the tragedy that took place in Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mr. Jordan. No one talked to you about this at all?

Ms. Lamb. No. Not from within the State Department, no.

Mr. Jordan. Anyone outside of the State Department?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. So you get one meeting from Mr. Boswell telling you you got to go.

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mr. Jordan. And your reaction was?

Ms. Lamb. I mean, we were speechless. I mean, we -- we didn't see that coming, but, I mean, we've dedicated our lives to the State Department, we --

Mr. Jordan. And now they're blaming you.

Ms. Lamb. Well, no. It was under review. And, you know, I've done the best I can in 27 years with the resources I was given. And I would follow both of those men anywhere, and I found that their standards were the same. And until it's reviewed --

Mr. Jordan. When did you -- when did you come back to work for the State Department, then?

Ms. Lamb. Oh, my gosh.

Mr. Jordan. Do you remember the date that you were put on administrative leave?

Ms. Lamb. December 18th.

Mr. Jordan. December 18th?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. 2012?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. And when did you come back?

Ms. Lamb. I believe it was August 25th of 2013.

Mr. Jordan. In that time, did you -- did you call anyone? Did you try to say, you know, what's going on? Why is it so long? When can I get back? I mean --

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mr. Jordan. -- it seems to me if I'm taking the fall for something that -- and I am told, you got to leave today, that I would have some kind of reaction like, I want to get back to work, I want to, you know, clear up any concerns about my reputation. You didn't do anything?

Ms. Lamb. No. I worked for the government. I have been a public servant my entire life. I enjoy helping people. I started as a police officer, I worked my way up in DS. And to me, that -- I've had a full career, and if I was not -- I was confident that a review would bring facts to light and that we would be returned to work.

Mr. Jordan. In that 8, what was it, so 8-month time frame, did anyone from the State Department contact you?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mr. Jordan. Did you --

Ms. Lamb. Not that I recall.

Mr. Jordan. Did you contact anyone at the State Department?

Ms. Lamb. I mean, some of my personal friends I may have had conversations with, but, specifically, not with regards to everything

that was going on, no.

Mr. Jordan. And how were you notified that you were -- you were to come back to work in August?

Ms. Lamb. I received a letter via FedEx, I believe, or UPS. Came in the mail in one of those cardboard things.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. All right. Thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And, Ms. Lamb, you then retired in the end of July of 2014? Is that correct?

A Yes, correct.

Q Okay. Have you done any work for the State Department since your retirement?

A No.

Q There's something called a WAE?

A No.

Q Okay. And have you done any other type of employment -- have you had any other time of employment --

A No.

Q -- since your retirement?

A No. [REDACTED]

Ms. Betz. And I believe Congressman Westmoreland has a few questions.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. [REDACTED]

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- is that right? He was in charge of the physical security, right?

Ms. Lamb. That is correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you mentioned that he would go out and even do walk-arounds or, I guess, personal visits to these sites?

Ms. Lamb. I had not mentioned that here today. He controlled people who would go out and do surveys.

Mr. Westmoreland. Oh, okay.

Ms. Lamb. And his staff would do surveys, and they would come back and give him complete reports with photographs and technical specifications of what needed to be done to upgrade post.

Mr. Westmoreland. And I'm assuming that was done for Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. Yes, yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. So an actual survey saying this needs to be improved, this needs to be improved or whatever?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. Do you think that Mr. [REDACTED] would have been one of the people Ms. Clinton described as security professionals? You know, we were asking her about when the request came in, you know, and she said that she gave that to the security professionals.

Ms. Lamb. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. Do you think that Mr. [REDACTED] would have been one of those security professionals?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Did you ever have any discussions with him -- since you had the DS, he had the physical, did you all ever have any discussions about what may have been felt necessary that a security agent have, a fighting position, whatever it might be that they -- did you ever --

Ms. Lamb. Our offices were physically right next to each other, so we frequently had conversations on requests that came in from posts all over the world.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you ever have one about anything that may have come in from Benghazi or the --

Ms. Lamb. At this point in time, I can't specifically recall.

Mr. Westmoreland. But --

Ms. Lamb. I mean, I'm sure we did, but I can't recall a specific conversation.

Mr. Westmoreland. But he would be the security professional that all these requests would have come into?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. And would he have had the authority to either approve or deny those requests?

Ms. Lamb. You'll have to ask him. It would depend on the request. If the request was something that was not normal to the resources he had to be able to provide, and he'd have to go outside and spend additional money, perhaps he would have to go elsewhere for approval. If it was something that was within his toolbox, he would certainly have authority to approve it, but you would have to ask him

based on specific requests.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes, ma'am. I mean, I'm just trying to picture how this thing --

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- kind of worked, if he had to --

You said when the flag's raised, the Ambassador controls the country.

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. And, I mean, I can understand that. I mean, he controls the country. Does he control what visits he makes to different places in the country?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. Does he control how he would go from one place to another place?

Ms. Lamb. Just to clarify, are you talking about logistics or in security, or just his decision to do it? It would be a joint -- in an environment like that, which was very different than a normal post --

Mr. Westmoreland. No. I mean, like, if he said, hey, I'm going to Libya next week --

Ms. Lamb. Right. Or if he was in Tripoli and --

Mr. Westmoreland. I mean, to Benghazi.

Ms. Lamb. -- and says, I'm going to Benghazi next week --

Mr. Westmoreland. He was already in Libya. He was just going to go to Benghazi.

Ms. Lamb. Right. He should sit down with his security -- senior

security officer at post and they -- he should say what he would like to do, and then they should discuss the security logistics of what the RSO believes is necessary. They should also consult all resources at post for information on the security of where he's going.

Mr. Westmoreland. But if he wants to go --

Ms. Lamb. If he wants to go, he can go.

Mr. Westmoreland. He can go.

Ms. Lamb. And he will go.

Mr. Westmoreland. And it's up to his security team to figure out the best way to take him down there --

Ms. Lamb. Exactly.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- wherever he's going.

Ms. Lamb. Exactly.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Now, he controls the country and what he does and whatever, you know, what's going on there.

Ms. Lamb. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. Would a request for security upgrades -- since he's in control of the country, I'm assuming he doesn't answer to Patrick Kennedy. Does he?

Ms. Lamb. Well, I don't -- I'm not sure about the answer to that question, and I mean, he can't spend money that he doesn't have.

Mr. Westmoreland. No, I know. Yeah.

Ms. Lamb. So depending on what he needs or what he wants, but he's -- he has an obligation to report back up to the Department and receive guidance from his own desk officer and policy personnel within

the Department, so --

Mr. Westmoreland. So would he be accountable to Mr. [REDACTED]? I mean, would he have to ask Mr. [REDACTED] to do anything?

Ms. Lamb. If he needed physical security upgrades at post, normally the Ambassador would sit down with the RSO and say, you know, I came in today and I was looking at that wall, and I'd like to have it about 3 feet higher. Then the RSO would say, you know, that's a great idea. Let me send a cable back. The cable would go back into [REDACTED] office, and then they would review what is it going to take to raise that wall 3 feet.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. So that's kind of the chain of events for getting --

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I'm --

Ms. Lamb. -- a security upgrade.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- just being -- having been a small business guy, kind of -- you know, I'm kind of instructing people on what to do, and after 2 months, the wall wasn't any higher, I would have gone back to the RSO and gone, Why isn't that wall higher?

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. And I'm assuming then the RSO would have called Mr. [REDACTED] and said, Hey, the Ambassador's on my butt. I need to know why the wall's not higher. Would that be a good assumption just -- that that would be the way the thing would play out?

Ms. Lamb. It could, yes, but, I mean, everything takes -- a real-life example in Benghazi was the need for upgraded cam -- CCTV

cameras and lighting on that compound.

Mr. Westmoreland. Sure.

Ms. Lamb. You can't just fly in and throw them up. A survey team has to come out, measure the distance, time --

Mr. Westmoreland. No. I --

Ms. Lamb. -- and get all the equipment at post, so it takes time.

Mr. Westmoreland. I know. I gotcha.

Ms. Lamb. Yeah.

Mr. Westmoreland. But if I was the boss --

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- and I wasn't getting any answers --

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- and I wasn't seeing these upgrades done --

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- I wouldn't have called Mr. [REDACTED], I wouldn't have called Mr. [REDACTED] boss. I would have called the big boss and say, we raised the flag, I'm the Ambassador, I'm screaming for help, and I can't get anybody to do anything.

Who would that person have been?

Ms. Lamb. It didn't happen --

Mr. Westmoreland. Who was Mr. [REDACTED] boss?

Ms. Lamb. As in the Ambass --

Mr. Westmoreland. No. As in the State Department. I mean, who did Mr. -- you reported --

Ms. Lamb. Oh, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] and I both reported to Scott

Bultrowicz, and Scott reported to Eric Boswell, and Eric Boswell reported to Pat Kennedy.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. So it was somewhere in that chain that these things didn't get done. But you were never in that chain for physical upgrades, right?

Ms. Lamb. Not for physical upgrades, no.

Mr. Westmoreland. Was -- but Mr. [REDACTED] was, right?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. But how come he didn't get put on administrative leave rather than you and Mr. Bultrowicz?

Ms. Lamb. You'll have to go back to the board that made the decision.

Mr. Westmoreland. Does that seem strange?

Ms. Lamb. [No verbal response.]

Mr. Westmoreland. Because nobody in that chain -- nothing happened to anybody in that chain about physical security. I just -- I don't know. It just -- it seems like that somebody's got to have an answer in that chain from Mr. [REDACTED]

Ms. Lamb. I was not privy to all the information, the reviews, the interviews. I can't comment on that.

Mr. Westmoreland. Because your DS agents were very brave.

Ms. Lamb. They were.

Mr. Westmoreland. I'm telling you, they were very brave, and I give them --

Ms. Lamb. They were.

Mr. Westmoreland. After interviewing them, I give them credit for doing what they did and having the guts to not fire a shot, not to make it any worse, just to hold it till somebody else could get there for them. They -- they were very brave. And so what happened that night didn't have anything to do with the DS agents and how they performed. It had to do with what kind of physical assets were there as far as machine guns, you know, all different types of equipment, but nothing to do with DS agents, and that's the reason I'm confused why you were put on administrative leave.

Ms. Lamb. I can't answer that question, sir.

Mrs. Brooks. I have a couple of follow-up questions on administrative leave. Do you have any more that you want to --

Mr. Westmoreland. No, ma'am. If you want to.

Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.

When Eric Boswell came and informed you and Scott in a private meeting after a fuller meeting that you were being placed on administrative leave and told to leave by the end of the day, were you told to, like, clean out your desk?

Ms. Lamb. No. We were just told to leave the building by the end of the day.

Mrs. Brooks. Leave the building by the end of the day. And did you ever receive anything in writing about your administrative leave?

Ms. Lamb. I did, but it wasn't immediate. It seems like it was a while afterwards.

Mrs. Brooks. Like a month?

Ms. Lamb. It was a while.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Or a couple months?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall exactly.

Mrs. Brooks. And did you consult with any attorneys --

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. -- at all? Do you know if consulted with any attorneys?

Ms. Lamb. I do not.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you and Scott communicate during those 8 months?

Ms. Lamb. No, we did not.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And did you -- besides the friends that you -- were any of the friends in the Department that you communicated with, were they higher seniority than you were?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And so after you -- but you received a paycheck?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Every 2 weeks or once a month?

Ms. Lamb. I think we got paid every 2 weeks. It was a direct deposit.

Mrs. Brooks. And were you informed you were going to be getting paid?

Ms. Lamb. Administrative leave with pay means that you will get paid, yes.

Mrs. Brooks. And did you receive your full pay?

Ms. Lamb. I did.

Mrs. Brooks. Are you a member of any union?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Were you at that time?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And so -- so you didn't know when you were going to be returning, because you weren't informed at that point, correct?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. And so did you have any conversation with HR personnel?

Ms. Lamb. I did not.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And did you hear from anybody in the State Department during those 8 months?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you hear from anybody outside of the State Department during those 8 months about your leave?

Ms. Lamb. About my leave? No.

Mrs. Brooks. About anything that happened with Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. So you were really -- did you stay in town?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Where did you go?

Ms. Lamb. I went to be with family in Florida for most of that

time.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And how soon after you were ordered to --

Ms. Lamb. Well, I take that back.

Mrs. Brooks. -- administrative leave, did you leave town?

Ms. Lamb. Let me just clarify. I had children in school in [REDACTED] so during the school time, I was there, but whenever they had leave and then when summer came, I was outside of [REDACTED]

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. So you had children in school in [REDACTED] This happened in December, and so you stayed in [REDACTED] then?

Ms. Lamb. Well, we left during the -- they were on Christmas break, so we left and then came back when they went back to school.

Mrs. Brooks. Had you ever been placed on administrative leave before?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. And do you know what your personnel record reflects with respect to your administrative leave?

Ms. Lamb. I do not.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you have any ramifications with respect to your retirement pay because you were on administrative leave, do you know?

Ms. Lamb. I don't know.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Were you concerned -- obviously having been a police officer, having been in State Department for 27 years, how did you feel during that period of time?

Ms. Lamb. It was an election year, and I just kept telling myself don't take it personally. I'm --

Mrs. Brooks. And so --

Mr. Westmoreland. A lot of us say that.

Mrs. Brooks. -- you felt that that was what was happening?

Ms. Lamb. Well, it had to be reviewed. I mean --

Mrs. Brooks. Sure.

Ms. Lamb. -- it did, that was the right thing to do, but it seemed to be drawn out and there seemed to be a growing number of people wanting to investigate and to get in different people with different interests instead of having it all done under one comprehensive review, which, you know, became frustrating at best, but -- but, no, I did not take it personally.

Mrs. Brooks. How many ARBs had you ever been a part of before?

Ms. Lamb. I had actually been part of several, but not in the capacity that I was for this one.

Mrs. Brooks. In that being head of DS for --

Ms. Lamb. And partially being a witness, because I was in the command center as things were unfolding, so I had firsthand access to certain things as they were happening or being said in that command center, where previously, I was part of -- I would go to an ARB to be there to provide policy -- the ARB would review the event and then they would say, Could you explain the travel policy for this post to us and how did travel policies work? So I was normally at an ARB to clarify the rings of security and operation and post policy versus policy coming out of headquarters, that type of thing.

Mrs. Brooks. And had you ever been a part of an ARB where people

had died, where State Department personnel had died?

Ms. Lamb. I'm trying to recall that.

Mrs. Brooks. Because there have been in your career.

Ms. Lamb. There have been. And there was, I believe four -- there were AID employees that had died. There were some that deaths were involved, yes.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Had you -- but you've already said you had never been placed on administrative leave or disciplined --

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. -- at any other prior time?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And -- and then when -- and you received a letter in UPS or FedEx informing you of your return date?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. And when you -- and you returned, I assume, on that date?

Ms. Lamb. I did. Actually, I think [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I started annual leave for a week [REDACTED] and then I came back.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And when you came back, after having been gone for 8 months or so --

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mrs. Brooks. -- 8-1/2 months, what was your reintegration process?

Ms. Lamb. There was no process.

Mrs. Brooks. So you stepped immediately back into the same -- the exact same position?

Ms. Lamb. No. I was given a new office and desk and just asked to work on special projects.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And I'm sorry. I -- what was your new office and new desk?

Ms. Lamb. It was on the eighth floor, and there was no title.

Mrs. Brooks. What do you mean there was no title?

Ms. Lamb. Well, I mean, I was the deputy assistant secretary in charge of international programs when I left, and when I came back, I came back just to a desk and an office and asked to do special projects.

Mrs. Brooks. And so --

Ms. Lamb. So I was not tied to any office or division within the DS bureau.

Mrs. Brooks. And what -- can you just give me an example of the special projects that you worked on from August of 2013 until you retired?

Ms. Lamb. I took -- originally I took training, because I was -- I had to bid on an onward assignment, so it was kind of like a -- so basically when I came back, I had no position. I had to bid on a new job. Not knowing where I was going to go before the bid season started, there was time, so I volunteered to go to high-threat training. So I went to high-threat training.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. And I took that course and I took -- I'm trying -- I took a blue force tracker course. I took a series of training courses.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. So I did probably 4 to 6 months of additional training.

Mrs. Brooks. You didn't supervise anybody?

Ms. Lamb. I did not supervise anybody.

Mrs. Brooks. You had no authority?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And you were no longer involved -- were you still part of Diplomatic Security?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Did -- were you involved in any meetings?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. You were no longer involved in any meetings?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And what did you think of this process?

Ms. Lamb. I mean, it was a first, I think, for DS to have people go on administrative leave and then come back, and, you know, perhaps they just weren't quite sure what to do with anybody, but it was -- you know, in all honesty, they were asking us to bid on onward assignments at grade that would put us out in a position of responsibility in the field.

Mrs. Brooks. And when you were in your new role bidding on projects, did you -- where did you apply to go?

Ms. Lamb. Bidding on assignments?

Mrs. Brooks. Yes.

Ms. Lamb. I bid on -- I was actually assigned to Ottawa in Canada. [REDACTED]

Mrs. Brooks. And so did you take that assignment?

Ms. Lamb. Yes, I did.

Mrs. Brooks. And you actually went to Ottawa?

Ms. Lamb. No, I did not take it. I went through medical, I went through all the briefings. I did everything in the lead-up, and I was probably about 30 days from actually leaving, in fact, we were down almost to my pack-out date, [REDACTED]

Mrs. Brooks. [REDACTED] Okay. And so then you withdrew?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And then what happened? Was that your last --

Ms. Lamb. That was when I put in my retirement papers, yes.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And prior to your administrative leave, had you had regular performance evaluations?

Ms. Lamb. Yes, I had.

Mrs. Brooks. And when was your last performance evaluation prior to your administrative leave?

Ms. Lamb. It would have been, what was it, December of 2012 that

we went, so that April, May.

Mrs. Brooks. April of 2012 or May of 2012?

Ms. Lamb. I think the deadline is May 1st for the evaluations to be in, so it would have been the spring evaluation.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you -- and who did your evaluation?

Ms. Lamb. It would have been Scott Bultrowicz and Eric Boswell.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And did you have any performance issues that you needed to address in April or May?

Ms. Lamb. No, I did not.

Mrs. Brooks. Had you ever had any performance issues requiring improvement? I mean, I know -- I recognize there are different categories in performance evaluations when done properly.

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mrs. Brooks. Had you had an annual performance evaluation previously?

Ms. Lamb. Every year.

Mrs. Brooks. Every year?

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And were you ever disciplined or given any other problem -- or any other additional supervision or any additional prior to your administrative leave?

Ms. Lamb. No. I received multiple awards over my career. In 2011, I was nominated for a Presidential award.

Mrs. Brooks. What was that nomination for?

Ms. Lamb. For the work I did in the transition for security in

Iraq from DoD to Diplomatic Security.

Mrs. Brooks. And so you were -- you were nominated by whom?

Ms. Lamb. The board that reviews the EERs collectively. At the end of -- when the committee reviews everyone's EERs, they will make a recommendation if they feel anyone is worthy of meeting the criteria for a Presidential award, they put their names forward.

Mrs. Brooks. And it sounds like -- would that be the highest award that a State Department employee can receive?

Ms. Lamb. Yes, it is.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Did you receive that award?

Ms. Lamb. No, I did not.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Do you know how many State Department employees were nominated that year for a Presidential award in 2011?

Ms. Lamb. Not the exact number, no.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Was anyone else in Diplomatic Security nominated for a Presidential award?

Ms. Lamb. To my knowledge, I was the first person ever to be nominated for that award.

Mrs. Brooks. The first person ever for --

Ms. Lamb. Out of Diplomatic Security.

Mrs. Brooks. -- Diplomatic Security to be --

Ms. Lamb. That's correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Well, congratulations on that nomination.

Ms. Lamb. Thank you.

Mrs. Brooks. Thank you for your service. I don't think I have

anything further.

Ms. Lamb. Thank you.

Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.

Ms. Betz. And we'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

[1:53 p.m.]

Mr. Kenny. We'll go back on the record. The time is now 1:53, if I'm reading the clock correctly.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And, Ms. Lamb, thank you again.

A You're welcome.

Q Appreciate your patience with us today.

I'd like to start this round by going back to the last round before we broke for lunch and asking a set of clarifying questions about some of the topics that came up there and then we'll shift into some new topics --

A Okay.

Q -- perhaps in the latter half of our round.

There was a discussion in the last hour about the status of the mission in Benghazi, particularly with regard to its relationship with Embassy Tripoli. Do you recall that discussion?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And it's our understanding that a chief of mission is responsible for all U.S. Government personnel, the security for all U.S. Government personnel in country at any given time. Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. Do you know, is -- does that requirement happen to be spelled out in the FAM, for instance?

A When an Ambassador receives a position, they're sent a letter of instruction from the President, and it is outlined in that letter of instruction.

Q Okay. And, again, that instruction would be that the chief of mission, the Ambassador in this case, would be responsible for the safety and security of all American personnel in country?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And we haven't seen any evidence that there was any confusion about that particular aspect, but I'd like to ask, do you have any evidence that Ambassador Stevens was -- or that there was any confusion about his responsibility for personnel in Benghazi?

A No. I don't believe there was any confusion on Ambassador Stevens' part.

Q Okay. Thank you.

I'd like to fast forward now to the post attack period. You were asked a long string of questions about documents and your participation in certain interviews and meetings following the attacks. You, at one point -- in my notes, I had written down that there were documents that were collected. Did you participate, in any way, with the collection of documents from your office to provide to others in the Department after the attack?

A To the extent that I had a large, all-inclusive staff meeting and asked -- individual DS agents were being -- I mean, the whole entire Diplomatic Security bureau was asked if you had any emails pertaining to Benghazi and Tripoli, you were to make sure that they

got put into the Freedom of Information Act and that they were forwarded. I think they had a place where to send them. And they were also doing electronic searches through the IT department to, you know, grab emails, but sometimes emails aren't readily recognized as being specific to, you know, a given post or something in the way they're written. So I --

Q Did you personally provide any documents to any person or office related to the attacks?

A I had so many documents worldwide, I asked the -- our IT people to personally -- so I didn't miss anything -- go through and pull them, and then I went back through and -- they pulled them, I reviewed them, and then I went back through to find anything that wasn't obvious. And I think I did -- I don't recall, but I think I found a few things that did not come up in what they pulled that I, you know, asked to be added to it.

Q Okay. And I think you had mentioned that that process was begun in response to a congressional request.

A Correct.

Q Is that right?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And do you recall that there was a request letter that was sent from Congress to the State Department before the ARB was convened in the late September time frame?

A There were so many requests from so many different -- I don't know the time frame that letters were sent in.

Q Okay.

A And they did -- they wouldn't come to me, they would come in to the --

Q Okay. So you don't have recollection of specific letters --

A No.

Q -- but you recall there being Congressional requests for information at this time?

A Correct, correct.

Q Okay. And so this process of collecting information was then built, or set up, to respond to those requests. Is that accurate?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A Correct.

Q And I'd just like to ask who told you that, or how did you learn that there were congressional requests for information?

A I believe Ambassador Boswell actually put it out at a staff meeting, because it was affecting the entire bureau of Diplomatic Security, and so many of our agents had rotated through on TDYs and they were scattered all over the world in, you know, their regular assignments, so he put it out in a staff meeting to all supervisors that they were to pass the word down to their staffs to make sure that they fully cooperated in getting all these documents forward to the right place.

Q Okay. And I believe you had also mentioned that at certain

points in time throughout this process, you would be asked discrete questions about certain documents, or questions about specific documents?

A To -- yeah. To explain what something meant, yes.

Q Okay. That's helpful. And did you yourself personally participate in a document review in this time period?

A In my preparation to testify, I personally reviewed documents.

Q Okay.

A And they were already being collected and were all in one place, so I asked for access to those documents --

Q Okay.

A -- rather --

Q So access was provided to you?

A Yes.

Q Did you feel you had sufficient information from which to develop testimony?

A I did.

Q Okay. You had mentioned a basement room where documents were being processed, or documents were being stored. Did you personally participate in any -- any review within that space?

A Yes, because, I mean, a lot of these documents were classified, so I would just go in and I would pull what I needed to see, and I would go sit in a corner and read them.

Q Okay. And what was your understanding, then, of what was

occurring in this space? So can you just describe for us, were there multiple terminals, multiple people, stacks of documents? What sorts of --

A All of the above.

Q Okay.

A There were Xerox machines, there were stacks of papers, there were the -- the big boxes you use to move an office, and there were lots of people in there working to collate these documents.

Q Okay. And when you would review those documents, what was it that you were reviewing them for?

A Primarily timelines. I mean, watching -- and as you know, a lot of questions generated here today kept coming back to timelines, which are now fuzzy, but at that time, it was important, and I felt it was important that I went and prepared, that I accurately had the timeline for everything that was done out there.

Q And were there other colleagues or subordinates of yours who participated in this document review?

A Yes.

Q So there were personnel from Diplomatic Security who participated in that review?

A That's correct.

Q Was your understanding that there were personnel from other departments --

A Yes.

Q -- other bureaus involved as well?

A Yes, yes.

Q Okay. Were you ever instructed, at any point, to separate out any information that might be damaging to the Department --

A No.

Q -- in those documents?

A No, no.

Q Okay. There has been a public allegation to that effect. Are you familiar with that allegation?

A There have been so many rumors, I --

Q Okay.

A -- I don't know.

Q But you weren't personally ever asked, you never --

A No.

Q -- to separate out damaging documents?

A No, no.

Q And none of your personnel, no Diplomatic Security staff, to your knowledge, were ever asked to separate out damaging documents?

A If they were, it was never brought to my attention.

Q Okay. And would you have expected a concern, if someone had a concern about a request like that, to be raised to your attention?

A I believe that the people that were working in there at the time would have been comfortable to pull me aside and say that they had been asked to do so.

Q Okay. So to the best of your understanding, this document review process was -- the purpose of it was to collect information and

to help develop timelines for what happened, to better understand the attack?

A Correct.

Q Okay. One of the specific allegations that have been raised about that particular room or that space was that the Secretary's chief of -- then-chief of staff Cheryl Mills, Director of Policy Planning Jake Sullivan, that they somehow oversaw a process that removed or destroying damaging documents for the Department. Do you have any evidence that would support that allegation?

A I never witnessed anything to that effect.

Q Okay. More generally, did you see anyone destroy, remove, attempt to remove or destroy any Benghazi-related documents?

A No. And I had members of my staff in there full-time, and they would have said something if something would have occurred.

Q Okay. You were asked some specific questions about your preparation for testifying before Congress. I'm not going to ask questions specific to that. I'd like to just take a step back and ask, during that time period, did anyone ever warn or threaten you with reprisal for speaking to Congress?

A No.

Q Did anyone ever tell you to provide intentionally inaccurate or misleading information to Congress?

A No.

Q Okay. Did anyone, in effect, tell you to lie to Congress?

A No.

Q Okay. And it's been noted in the record, but you did appear before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform for a transcribed interview on October 9, 2012. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you provide truthful statements during that interview?

A I did.

Q Okay. And you did ultimately testify before the committee the next day on October 10, 2012. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And did you provide truthful testimony then?

A I did.

Q You were asked about a meeting that -- I'm not sure "meeting" is the word that you used, but an encounter with the Secretary --

A Correct.

Q -- following your testimony on the Hill?

A Correct.

Q I'd just like to ask you, you had mentioned, I believe at the outset, that you had served as the DAS for IP for 6 years. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. So you were the DAS under both the current administration and the previous administration?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Do you recall, was it part of your ordinary course of business that you would regularly or routinely interact with Secretary Rice in the previous administration?

A No. I've never act -- interacted with Secretary Rice. Oh, with Condo- -- I would -- we're talking about Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice?

Q Correct.

A I would, on occasion, be in meetings representing Eric Boswell, who would routinely sit at those morning meetings with her.

Q Okay.

A And I think I only attended two during her tenure.

Q And that's with Secretary Rice?

A Correct.

Q And I believe that's similar to the meetings that you described that you participated in with Secretary Clinton?

A Secretary Clinton, correct.

Q Okay. So there was no difference, then, in your interactions with the Secretary under Secretary Rice --

A No.

Q -- versus Secretary Clinton?

A No.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So when you were asked a number of questions about getting ready to testify before Congress -- well, first of all, was that the first time you had ever testified before Congress?

A I believe it was, yes.

Q And you were asked a number of questions about that and also just your interactions with, among others, Secretary Clinton's chief of staff, Cheryl Mills.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you recall any specific meetings that she was in with you in preparation for your congressional testimony?

A I mean, there were several -- I don't want to say several. There were a few meeting -- [REDACTED] was my -- I stuck to him like glue, and a lot of it was, because it was televised and what's classified, what's not classified, there were a lot of things in -- that needed to be discussed so that there was clarity on what areas we could go in -- I could go into and what I couldn't in that setting of testimony. So to that end, yes, there were discussions.

Q And my colleague asked you more broadly as to whether or not you were ever told to lie to Congress or be anything other than truthful. There have been questions, a lot of questions about Ms. Mills in particular. So just specific to her, did Ms. Mills ever indicate to you that you should withhold information from Congress?

A Never, never.

Q Did she provide you substantive guidance on what you could and could not say to Congress?

A No. I mean, I heavily leaned on [REDACTED] and our counterparts from the Annex to decide what could and couldn't be covered during those testimonies, and --

Q And that was with regard to get -- trying to avoid getting into information that was not in the public domain?

A Was not appropriate for that setting, yes.

Q Did anyone ever indicate to you that you should shade your testimony in a way that was more favorable to the State Department than the facts indicated?

A No, no.

Q Did they ever indicate to you that you should do anything other than represent the facts, to the best of your knowledge and recollection?

A No, no.

Q Did they ask you to paint the State Department in a particularly favorable light?

A No.

Q While we're on the topic, you also had indicated you spoke with the Accountability Review Board with regard to Benghazi.

A Correct.

Q You said you had already participated -- you had also known of other ARBs that were stood up during your time.

A Uh-huh.

Q With regard, specifically, to the Benghazi ARB, with regard to there has been some question about whether the ARB was sufficiently independent. Did anyone at any point in time, prior to or in relation to your discussions with them and interviews with them, talk to you about what you were going to say to the Accountability Review Board?

A In the ARB? No.

Q Did anyone instruct you to lie about any of the facts about Benghazi?

A No.

Q Did anyone ask you to conceal facts that might be damaging to the State Department?

A No.

Q Did anyone ask you, in particular, to conceal facts that might be damaging to Secretary Clinton?

A No.

Q To Under Secretary for Management Kennedy?

A No.

Q Do anyone else in particular within the State Department?

A No.

Q Did anyone ever ask you to withhold any evidence from the Accountability Review Board?

A No, no.

Q And did you feel free to be fully honest, truthful, and forthcoming with them?

A I did. And my instructions from [REDACTED] were --

Mr. Snyder. Object -- well, sorry. You don't have to disclose --

Ms. Sawyer. Right.

Mr. Snyder. -- what you and your lawyer discussed --

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Mr. Snyder. -- of what the instructions are.

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Mr. Snyder. It's just not a good idea.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Yeah. There are sensitivities. We -- you know, we in Congress come across this.

A Gotcha.

Q It's not that we are seeking to get the particular instructions. We just want to make sure there wasn't interference, obstruction.

A No, no.

Q If there was a problem with that, we just need to know and hear about it.

A Yeah. No, there was no --

Q Did you -- were you interviewed -- with regard to prior ARBs that were established during your time, were you interviewed by any of those Accountability Review Boards? Not -- other than Benghazi?

A I'm kind of at a loss how to answer that. Accountability Review Boards would meet, and then every -- for example, if it was an incident involving DEA agents, DEA would be the lead, they would brief the incident and what happened, based on their investigation, the ARB would take in all that information. I would be there, perhaps, representing DS and, again, explaining post policies, the Ambassador's guidance, and the RSO's guidance, and security in general for that

particular country.

So I was part of the ARB review process, but I was not, per se, interviewed, I was providing information. But as far as being interviewed like I was for the Benghazi ARB, no, that was the first time.

Q Okay. And you had indicated, to the best of your recollection, then, understanding it's been, I think, over 3 years now --

A Yes.

Q -- that you had appeared before the panel at an early time with some of your colleagues?

A Correct.

Q And in that group setting, you were providing an overview of your understanding at the time as to what had happened?

A The best information we had at that point in time, yes.

Q And then you also believe that you had been interviewed at least on one other occasion?

A Individually.

Q Right. So you had both the opportunity to speak with them in a group and in an individual setting. Is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q And was there anything you, at any point in time, felt you could not tell them?

A No, no.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I think at this point, I'd like to shift gears a little bit.

A Okay.

Q We have a limited time with you for today, and we want to be as targeted and as focused as possible on the questions. So I'd like to fast forward -- or, I guess, rewind --

A Okay.

Q -- the tape and return to the summer of 2012. And there's been a lot of discussion about a July 9 cable that the embassy in Tripoli had submitted to post for -- I'm sorry -- to DS headquarters and the response by DS headquarters. I'd actually like to back up a little bit prior to that and focus in the late spring, early summertime frame, focus on some of the security incidents that were beginning to percolate in Benghazi.

Do you recall that there were a series of security incidents, there was targeting western interests in Benghazi in the late spring, early summer of 2012?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall what, if any, steps DS headquarters was taking in order to address or resolve any concerns associated with those?

A We were providing support for any requests that post was -- because post is on the ground, and through the Emergency Action Committee, every time there is an event, they review the event and then they will decide what security enhancements need to be at post, whether it's a change in their travel policy, whether they need additional

physical security upgrades, and then they will send a cable back into headquarters and into main State requesting the things that they need, and/or they will review whether or not a tripwire has been -- been crossed.

And then through that mechanism, my office and the physical security folks would provide the resources needed to give post to implement what they had requested.

RPTR YORK

EDTR HOFSTAD

[2:15 p.m.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I see. So the way the system would work is, if there was a concern or an incident, post would convene a meeting called the Emergency Action Committee meeting --

A Right.

Q -- and out of that meeting -- or, during that meeting, there would be perhaps recommendations related to security policies, posture, that sort of thing.

A Right.

Q Okay. And that information would go to DS headquarters.

A Correct.

Q Okay. Okay.

A And to the Department.

Q Okay. And who would participate in the EAC?

A They're usually chaired by the deputy chief of mission. Sometimes they're chaired and/or attended by the Ambassador. And then the core members, at a minimum, the core members of your post security envelope and intelligence if they are present.

Q Okay. And, you know, we've heard the term "on the ground" to refer to those closest to the action, those people at post. So would the EAC, then, be the perspective of those personnel on the ground --

A Yes.

Q -- so to speak?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And those people would be perhaps best situated to understand or appreciate events that were developing in the country. Is that correct?

A Exactly.

Q Okay. And that's -- okay.

So would those views or recommendations that come out of an EAC, is that something DS headquarters would give weight to?

A Oh, absolutely.

Q Okay.

And, again, we talked a little bit before about some of the give and take between post and DS headquarters. So if an EAC made a particular recommendation, would that be the beginning of a conversation about security resources? Or would that be a decision point, then, for DS headquarters to then decide whether to fulfill a particular request, if a request was being made of DS headquarters?

A Well, when a request would come in, that would be the beginning of generating the conversation to how we can best fulfill the need that you've identified.

So if they come in with the EAC cable and say, you know, we realize that we have multiple blind spots in our camera coverage, okay, then that would immediately get shifted over to physical security. They would identify the correct technical personnel to send to post. And

post would set up a time, receive them, support the team, and then they would move forward with resolving that problem.

If they felt that the guards needed more training, we would reach out to the Mobile Security Division and we would get a training team stood up, and we would get them to post as quick as we could.

For example, when [REDACTED] was the RSO that came into Benghazi after [REDACTED], he was on the ground about 2 weeks and he requested -- he felt that he needed, I believe, about 20 more additional static local guards for the compound. And we said, you know, absolutely, let us send a team out there, and, you know, we'll approve it, and let us help you interview, hire, and train these people. And we would, from Washington, provide those resources.

Q Okay. If there was a request in an EAC for additional security personnel, how would that discussion proceed?

A Okay. Now, can you be specific on which security personnel?

Q So I mean broadly, but we can drill down and --

A But are we talking a local hired guard? Are we talking a DS agent?

Q I'm talking U.S. -- a direct hire.

A A Diplomatic Security direct hire.

Q Correct.

A Okay. A direct hire position, if it's a permanent need -- if it's a TDY request that comes in, we just automatically fill it and send them back out to post. If it's a permanent position,

there's an entire process that that has to go through because of the long funding tail that goes with that.

Q Okay.

A And that process takes about a year to establish.

Q Okay. And was Embassy Tripoli in the process of establishing --

A Yes.

Q -- such a process?

A Yes.

Q Okay. But, again, you described it takes a little bit of time. There's a lead time or a lag time --

A Correct.

Q -- to respond. Okay.

And you mentioned TDY staffing, and I thought I heard you say that those requests would be automatically filled. Can you just elaborate for us on that?

A If a country's having -- again, we'll go back to elections and they need a TDY, or, you know, they'll come in and advise us when elections are, and then we ramp up, have the folks identified and send them to post. So they're generally short, time-specific incidents that they need -- I mean, TDY personnel are meant to be temporary duty assignments.

Q Right.

A They're not meant to be a permanent fix or a full-time position.

Q Right. Okay.

So, at this point, we'll go ahead and mark exhibit No. 5.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I'll provide it to you, give you a moment to read that.

And just for the record, I'll note that this is an email. It's dated June 11, 2012, from Scott Bultrowicz to you and cc'ing Eric Boswell and [REDACTED]. The subject is "Re: British motorcade attacked in Benghazi," close quote. The document number is C05388866.

A Okay.

Q Okay. So the email thread begins with a report on the June 11 attack on the British Ambassador to Benghazi.

Later in the thread -- and I'm on the first page here, third email down -- Scott Bultrowicz wrote to you, Eric Boswell, and [REDACTED], quote, "Charlene, this along with last week's incident is troubling. What is post's current movement operations?" close quote.

And you replied, quote, "They're locked down now for the next 2 days. I have [REDACTED] pulling up Tripoli's tripwires, and we're going to apply them to Benghazi just by highlighting in yellow the ones that they have already crossed. I've also asked [REDACTED] to reach out to RSO [REDACTED] and strongly suggest that Post Tripoli hold an EAC to discuss what's going on in Benghazi and determine what, if any, security measures they need to be enhancing, update their travel policy, et cetera," close quote.

And the first sentence here, where you indicate that post is locked down for the next 2 days, do you recall where that information came from? Was that something the RSO in Benghazi would have reported back?

A I received the information from my desk officers. So, I mean, Scott sends me this request, and I contact the desk officer, "Okay, tell me immediately what they are currently doing." And I don't know whether my desk officers called directly to the RSO in Benghazi. My guess is they did. But they could have also gone through the RSO in Tripoli to get that same answer.

Q Okay.

A So you would have to defer to them.

Q And, at least in this first part, there appears to be some concern on your part about the security incidents --

A Yes.

Q -- that were occurring in Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Correct.

Q And there's a mention here to the EAC. We just discussed the EAC --

A Correct.

Q -- process. But there's also a reference to tripwires and your belief that certain tripwires had already been crossed. Can you explain for us the significance of crossing or breaching a tripwire?

A Tripwires are a series of events that are strong indicators when it's time to draw down the size of our footprint and even, worst-case scenario, when is it time to send everybody home and pull everybody out of the post. And this is the guidance that we use worldwide.

Q Okay. And this process may have changed in time, but, at this particular period of time, the tripwire was then the benchmark against which security would be weighed at a post, is that right, to determine if a drawdown was necessary or an evacuation was appropriate?

A Generally, post will have anywhere from 8 to 15 tripwires to cross. Certainly, anti-American sentiment is one of the big ones, and frequent events of targeting of Westerners in a country. But it could also be things such as civil strife, inability to get water and food locally. So there is a number of things that affect the quality of life at post and the ability for us to sustain a mission. If we can't get out to get food and water and electricity, maybe no one's targeting us but we can't survive in a bubble.

So the tripwires are varied, but, from the security standpoint, these are the most important ones. When we start seeing folks being attacked just because they're Westerners, that's a red flag.

Q Okay.

And just so we can better understand, at this point in time, when a tripwire would be crossed or breached, was that binary in the sense that when a tripwire was crossed it would automatically lead to what you described, a drawdown or an evacuation?

A It was our job to help post identify the tripwires that have been crossed and to forward that information up and make sure that Assistant Secretary Boswell was aware and that the bureau was aware that these were being crossed.

Q And I'll note the email above -- or, actually, in this chain, Eric Boswell is cc'd.

A Yes. He was looped in.

Q Okay. So he had an awareness of these security incidents, as well.

A Absolutely. Absolutely.

Q Okay.

And, again, there's a reference to the EAC here. And do you recall why you asked Embassy Tripoli to hold an EAC?

A Just because I felt this was so important, that even though they were in Tripoli and, you know, at the time, they may or may not have had any political officers in Benghazi, it may have just been the security people there, and I just wanted to make sure that they were focused on the fact that this is relevant to our operation and could affect us and that they needed to focus on it.

Q Okay. And do you recall if post here, Embassy Tripoli, did, in fact, hold an EAC?

A I believe they did. Without seeing the cable, I couldn't verify it, but I'm sure they did.

Q Okay. And would they have considered tripwires in the course of that EAC?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

A They should have.

Q Do you recall what that particular EAC may have recommended in terms of --

A There should be a cable to reference, but I don't have access to that.

Q Okay. And do you recall what DS headquarters' response was to any cable?

A Without seeing the cable, I don't know what the -- I mean, I was looking at EAC cables from all over the world. So I don't have them all at my fingertips.

Q Okay. That's fine. And maybe we'll revisit that --

A But that's the protocol.

Q Sure.

Mr. Kenny. Did you have something?

Ms. Sawyer. Without getting into specific measures that might have been recommended, do you have a recollection that coming out of that EAC there was a recommendation to either draw down or have authorized departure or ordered departure from Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. No, I do not recall. There was an EAC cable after the June timeframe, but I do not recall what their recommendations were at that time.

Ms. Sawyer. So you don't recall whether anyone ever did recommend to leave Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. No. I would have to see the cable to know.

Mr. Kenny. If there had been such a recommendation, is that something that would stick out in your mind as unusual compared to EACs from other posts? You mentioned you've read a lot of EACs.

Ms. Lamb. No, I mean, in the course of 6 years, I mean, I think we were upwards of 20 evacuations, either drawdowns, partial, or full evacuations. So it was not uncommon to get a request from post to draw down, to temporarily close, or to, you know, completely close an embassy for various reasons.

Mr. Kenny. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. And you indicated that recommendations -- and I would presume with regard to a recommendation to draw down, authorized departure, or ordered departure -- you indicated that recommendations would be taken seriously. I assume that type of recommendation would have been taken quite seriously.

Ms. Lamb. Oh, absolutely. If a post came in and, you know, said, hey, it's time we shut the doors, that would have immediately been addressed. Yes.

Ms. Sawyer. And so that would have triggered certainly a discussion --

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Ms. Sawyer. -- within the DS bureau and wherever else it would need to go.

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Returning to the email, I'm going to skip the next sentence, and I'll just continue reading that paragraph.

You wrote, quote, "This is very concerning when you start putting the events together. The recent big demonstration that was openly anti-American, the attack on our compound, and now this U.K. motorcade attack. If the tide is turning and they are now looking for Americans and Westerners to attack, that is a game changer. We are not staffed or resourced adequately to protect our people in that type of environment. We are a soft target against the resources available to the bad guys there. Not to mention, there's no continuity because we do everything there with TDY personnel. The cost to continue to do business there may become challenging."

And, again, you appear here for be expressing some very serious --

A Concerns.

Q -- concerns.

A I was.

Q Okay.

You used some specific language in there, so I'd just like to ask for your understanding of what you may have meant.

At the end, when you refer to the cost of doing business there, what was it that you were referring to?

A Keeping people safe was going to be more challenging under those circumstances.

Q And had the costs reached a certain threshold where the ability of DS to effectively protect American personnel may have been

crossed, is DS empowered, itself, to make a recommendation on whether to draw down or evacuate a post?

A The RSO in Benghazi certainly could have picked up the phone and called the RSO in Tripoli and said, we don't feel safe out here, and we don't have the resources. Or they could have identified a specific weakness that they felt could be addressed with additional resources and asked for that.

But the conduit for the DS personnel in Benghazi was to go back to [REDACTED] or [REDACTED], who followed on, to provide them their assessment of what needed to be done and/or what their personal recommendations were.

Q And, to the best of your recollection, neither RSO in Tripoli had made that recommendation to draw down or evacuate the special mission in Benghazi. Is that correct?

A No DS agent made a recommendation to draw down that I am aware of.

Q Okay.

And, again, your language here is fairly clear to us as we read it here today. Were you suggesting that Benghazi had, in fact, reached that point, it had crossed that point?

A I was concerned that we were rapidly approaching it. And our job is to stay ahead of the bad guys, and it's a full-time job. And as they become more aggressive in their tactics, we have to be more aggressive in our protective measures to prevent attacks, whether it be through physical security or more enhanced motorcades and movement

security.

And because this was such a small outpost, it was concerning that we weren't gaining the same momentum on security enhancements that the bad guys were gaining in their aggressiveness.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And, certainly, you indicated one way that concerns could be conveyed would be by picking up the phone. It also --

A Correct.

Q -- appears from this email that you're writing that another mechanism that you are, it says, strongly suggesting is to convene the Emergency Action --

A Emergency Action Committee.

Q Okay.

A And this brings all the key people and agencies represented at post to the same table to discuss it. And, you know, at the headquarters level, we defer to these folks on the ground. We trust them. They're smart. They eat, sleep, and breathe the issues of the day in the countries they're sent to.

So the best thing we can ask, if we're concerned back here from Washington -- and I'll be the first to admit, sometimes Washington gets more concerned than they need to be. Sometimes CNN inflates things and folks get exited in Washington when it's not really the scenario on the ground. But we don't know that.

And so, by asking them to convene the EAC, that ensured myself

and Scott Bultrowicz and Mr. Boswell that we got all the smartest people with have in country around the table to focus on these incidents by having an EAC. And then we have to trust the recommendations that they make back.

Q [REDACTED]

A Every agency at post under chief-of-mission authority would participate in the meetings.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And the concerns that you described for us today, if you move up in the email chain, it does appear that Scott Bultrowicz, your immediate supervisor, the PDAS, also shared those concerns.

A Exactly.

Q Is that correct?

A Exactly.

Q And he'd actually suggested that it would be useful to get the perspective from those in Tripoli and Benghazi. Is that right?

A Right.

Q And that's for the same reasons you just described?

A Exactly.

Q Okay.

Okay. So, moving on, this will be exhibit No. 6.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Kenny. And this is an email dated June 15, 2012, from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and others. The subject is "Re: Staffing." The document number is C05388987. And I'll just give you a moment to review this email.

We'd also like to welcome Chairman Gowdy.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And, Ms. Lamb, just for your benefit, I provided this for a little background. We'll note for the record that your name doesn't appear in this email chain.

A Okay. All right.

Q Okay. So I'd like to just quickly begin at the first email in the thread, which is an email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], subject, "Staffing."

Who is [REDACTED]?

A He would have been one of the TDY DS agents, I believe.

Q Okay.

And I'll just read a few portions of this email and the subsequent thread into the record.

The email under the summary section reads, quote, "Due to the uncertainty of the security environment preceding the upcoming elections, RSO Benghazi recommends a minimum of five agents be deployed at post, with an MSD team on standby," close quote.

A little bit farther down, there's a section called "Details," which reads, quote, "U.S. Mission Benghazi convened an informal EAC meeting which included RSO, PO, and acting MGMT officer. The committee agreed that the RSO office should be staffed by a minimum of four agents to properly support the mission given the heightened threat level. Four agents can adequately support the mission and should be the core/minimum in order to maintain effective security in an unpredictable environment. Recent attacks have intensified in frequency with the active targeting of diplomatic personnel (e.g., the IED attack on the U.S. compound, the complex attack on the U.K. motorcade, and a recent rally by heavily armed Islamists and militia members)," close quote.

██████████ then appears to respond, or forward, rather, the email to ██████████, asking for his input.

██████████ -- and now we're on the first page -- replies, "██████████, yes, I concur with this recommendation. I just had a lengthy meeting with DCM ██████████, who is scheduled to depart tomorrow, and we are both concerned about the ongoing incidents, particularly in the east. These incidents unfortunately track with what we anticipated, both in pre-election violence as well as the increase in extremist activity as they attempt to consolidate their power base in the area. I fear that we have passed a threshold where we will still see more targeting, attacks, and incidents involving Western targets," close quote.

And, again, I'll just note that you're not in this particular

email chain. But from the first portion of what I read to you, it sounds like the special mission did conduct what they described as an informal EAC. Is that correct?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. And do you recall that they had held that EAC?

A Well, this, as you said, informal EAC, this was at Benghazi. The prior document we were looking at was asking Tripoli post, senior post management, to look at the entire big picture of everything. So --

Q Okay. By senior management, you would mean the deputy chief of mission, for instance?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A And if Benghazi held an EAC and had recommendations or needed resources, that would be filed back through Tripoli for post management and the Ambassador/DCM's approval and concurrence that they agree with it. And then it would come forward back to Washington if they needed more --

Q Okay.

A -- resources.

Q So when [REDACTED] writes here that he concurs in the recommendation --

A Right.

Q -- in your view, that was inadequate because --

A No.

Q -- chief of mission hadn't passed on --

A No. He was asking for TDY support for elections. We do that all over the world. That's standard. I mean, he put in here also his growing concern because of all these events, but the temporary need for additional support during the elections, the standby MSD team, that's standard. And that's stuff that the guys can do on their own. And they just -- you know, they would come up and say, hey, we've got elections, RSO would like an MSD team on standby, can we do it? Absolutely, that's what they're for. So --

Q Who would be making those particular decisions?

A The desk office -- MSD deployments would come to me for my concurrence, and then it would go to Scott Bultrowicz was the final person who would authorize MSD deployments. But election support was routine.

Q But how about -- let's set aside the MSD. But if we're just talking about high-threat-trained DS agents, if there was a recommendation for an increase in the number of TDY DS agents, who would make that decision?

A That would need to come through host, because if they're asking to -- this is where it becomes very difficult because post has to support them, feed them, give them a bed. So if they only had three beds, post management now has to find additional beds. So whenever they're asking to increase the numbers for an indefinite period of time, even though it's a TDY slot, that concurrence needs to come from post. So everybody needs to --

Q And when you say "post," to be clear --

A It would be Tripoli.

Q When you say "post," it's Tripoli, but --

A Right.

Q -- here, for instance, we see an email from the RSO.

There's a reference to the DCM, who appears to also endorse or support the recommendation.

A Uh-huh.

Q But, in your view, the proper mechanism for making the request is a formal EAC process.

A Not -- it doesn't have to be an EAC process. But it should come in the form of a front channel cable if they're asking to increase their numbers for a long period of time. If it's temporary support for a short-term incident, you know, we turn those around very, very quickly.

Q Okay.

We'll go ahead and enter -- this will be exhibit 7.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Sawyer. Yes. And just to be clear, this does reference an informal meeting in Benghazi. And that then doesn't mean that there wasn't also, in addition, a Tripoli EAC.

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Ms. Sawyer. They wouldn't be exclusive mechanisms. It might be that it was both considered in Benghazi, passed on to Tripoli, also

considered in Tripoli?

Ms. Lamb. Right. And, you know, ideally, this informal summary of their EAC meeting should have been incorporated into the cable that came out of -- when I was an RSO at a post that had several constituent posts, if we held an EAC at the embassy, we would ask our consulates to hold an EAC at the same time, and then they would send their input up to the Ambassador for concurrence, to make sure everybody was in agreement with the state of affairs.

Mr. Kenny. So, in this particular instance, you were looking for the chief of mission's concurrence in the RSO's recommendation?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall having seen this, these sets of documents, so, you know --

Mr. Kenny. Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So, certainly, this just displays the dynamic that you've been explaining to us --

A Right.

Q -- that there is a conversation that occurs --

A Constant dialogue.

Q -- and this conversation and dialogue is occurring certainly between --

A Right.

Q Some folks at the ground, it looks like, they're at least informing and looping in.

A Right.

Q The junior desk officer; it looks like the senior desk officer.

A Right.

Q And that would not be atypical.

A No, that was common. And for elections, they would routinely -- the desk officers would provide whatever TDYs were needed to our folks on the ground.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So you'd mentioned that the DCM would chair an EAC in the typical process. Was that because certain responsibilities fell to the DCM?

A That's just how the system is set up.

Q And we'll just point out, in the first email here, there is a reference to "DCM [REDACTED], who is scheduled to depart tomorrow."

A Uh-huh.

Q So did you have any concerns -- or would you have had any concerns, in looking back in this process, that waiting for a chief of mission concurrence if a deputy chief of mission is leaving base, that that might slow the process?

A But we weren't waiting for -- I'm not sure what you're referring to.

Q Okay. No, that's fair.

We'll go ahead and just move forward to exhibit 7.

A Okay.

Q And I'll give you a moment to review that.

And I'll just note for the record this is a document entitled "Action Memo for DAS Charlene Lamb -- DS/IP." The date is June 15, 2012. The subject is, quote, "TDY Staffing Support for Benghazi, Libya," close quote. The document number is C05578316.

And we'll just begin -- on the second page, at the bottom, there's a "Drafted" line. You see "[REDACTED]" there?

A Uh-huh.

Q There's a "Cleared" line, "RSO -- [REDACTED]."

A Uh-huh.

Q When you see a parentheses, "ok" in parentheses, what does that signify?

A That means that [REDACTED] has read this memo and he's cleared on it as it's written.

Q Okay.

A So it tells me that the two of them did exactly what they were supposed to; they coordinated on this --

Q Okay.

A -- and they're both in agreement with the document.

Q And when a document like this would be put together, the drafter would create a clearance line and include the relevant offices that would need to clear before the memo goes up. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So here your desk officer, [REDACTED] included the RSO of Tripoli. Is that right?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

I'll just read from the beginning of the memo. It reads, quote, "Due to the uncertainty of the security situation in Benghazi and the fact that there appears to be an active terrorist cell in Benghazi, Libya, planning and implementing attack operations against Western interests, including the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, the RSO is requesting additional TDY staffing for Benghazi. DS TDY staffing for the mission is currently set at three personnel. The TDY RSO in Benghazi and RSO in Tripoli both recommend increasing that staffing to five through the election period currently scheduled for July 7, 2012, and to four after that," close quote.

Again, we've talked about some recognition of the security environment. Here it would appear that your desk officer, perhaps even [REDACTED], his supervisor, also share those concerns about the security environment. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

And there's a specific mention in here to an active terrorist cell. I'm not going to ask for specifics about that, but did you agree with that assessment at the time?

A I agreed that all the incidents that they documented were adequate concern to increase the staffing.

Q Okay.

And, again, there's reference here to the TDY RSO in Benghazi and the RSO in Tripoli making a recommendation for increased staffing.

Does that appear to be the recommendations we just read in exhibit 6?

A It does. It appears to match with that.

Q Okay.

And then the memo contains a recommendation under the "Recommendation" line that "DS/IP authorizes additional TDY security personnel as requested by the RSO for Benghazi," close quote.

A Uh-huh.

Q This version of the document doesn't have a signature. We haven't seen a signed copy of this. Do you know -- first, do you recall receiving this memo?

A Yes, I believe I did. And I believe this was cleared.

Q You believe this was cleared.

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. And if it was cleared, there should be a signed copy somewhere. Is that correct?

A Should be, yes.

Q Okay. And, further, if it was cleared, the drafter of this would be informed that it was cleared. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

So it's our understanding -- and, again, this is based on previous testimony that the committee's received from [REDACTED], some others -- that this memo itself was never approved. So how would you respond to that allegation?

A I don't know. They would have to go back through the

staffing records and look at the support that was provided during the elections. But we have never -- I have never denied support leading up to elections and especially in the event of additional incidents at post. So this would not have been denied. There would be no reason to deny this.

Q Okay. Is there another status that the document could have taken? For instance, it could be approved, it could be denied. Is there any in between those two?

A No. I mean, they either got what they asked for and there were people on the ground and it came out of the budget or nobody showed up.

Q Okay. And if you disapproved this, you would have signed a disapproval copy and sent that back. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And if the desk officer or somebody who drafted the document were to tell us that this specific request was never granted, do you have any reason not to believe their statements?

A We are, again, 3 years out, and I'm a year-and-a-half retired. I don't recall the details of this. But if I were an RSO at post or an ambassador at post and my post RSO sent in a request for TDY support prior to an election and it wasn't anywhere in the pipeline to come to post, I would have been on the phone asking for it, "Where is it?", especially in this environment.

So I honestly believe that they were provided the support that was requested in this memo. But I can't --

Q But you just don't recall the specifics.

A I do not recall the specifics, no.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So just to note for the record, the date of this document is June 15, 2012. It's kind of the same date as the earlier dialogue.

A Uh-huh.

Q So just so that I understand it, my understanding of what you're saying is that -- and understanding that we're 3 years out -- you certainly don't have a recollection of denying this request or having someone raise with you a specific complaint that you had denied the request?

A No.

Q And you had indicated earlier, you know, that issues are -- you know, there's back and forth and there's dialogue and there's an effort to match resources with need that occurs at the ground level, at the junior desk level, senior desk level, and whatever level it can be resolved; that is all the further it need go. Is that just an accurate characterization?

A Yeah, I -- basically. I mean, they have to -- you know, we discussed the process for getting additional TDY people to post. It's got to be in a memo. The memo comes up, it gets cleared up at a senior management level, the request goes out, people volunteer to go. So that happened.

I do recall, though, we had MSD -- I am certain that we had an MSD team doing training out there at the time of the elections. And

they were given guidance to stop training temporarily, to roll into supporting the RSO with any additional needs for security for the elections that the RSO needed. And --

Mr. Kenny. To be clear, this is in Tripoli?

Ms. Lamb. This is in Tripoli, but these are resources that the RSO can send anywhere in country under his authority. So he could use them however he felt best needed. Were they needed in Tripoli? Were they needed in Benghazi? You know, if they didn't have a responsibility to continue training, he could do whatever he needed them to do during that period.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And, certainly, if you felt it had been resolved at your level and that the needs, as requested, had been met, there wouldn't be a need for you to then elevate it to your supervisors, would there have been?

A No. If we weren't able to provide the support because we didn't have been the resources, I would elevate it. But, believing it was taken care of, I would not have necessarily elevated it.

Q So, certainly, if you felt there was a point in time where you had an awareness that there was a need -- and, certainly, this does reflect your concern about the environment -- that was putting people on the ground in danger that was not met, there were mechanisms for you to elevate that to your supervisors --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- including up to the level of the Under Secretary of

Management?

A Uh-huh. I mean, I had a chain of command that I would go up, yes.

Q And, again, you know, was there a point in time, either with regard to this request or another request specific to Benghazi, where you felt the need, because you simply felt that you could not get them the resources they needed and had asked for and you were having to deny them, where you elevated that and it was -- do you recall an instance where that happened?

A No. I think the closest we got was when I was running out of money -- and we discussed that earlier -- because of the CR and the limited funding for these TDY positions. And, you know, once it was elevated, it was resolved and money became available to support it. But that was the only time that I can recall that our hands were tied in providing resources.

Q And so, just in a generalized sense, just to understand the dynamic, with regard to requests would come up to you, there would be back-and-forth, certainly you don't recall having a feeling that you had been presented with a request that you had concretely denied --

A No.

Q -- that people were still upset about --

A No. No.

Q -- where people brought to your attention that you had been denying requests and that you needed to change your mind or someone else above you needed to change your mind?

A No.

Q And so you were never in a position where you felt like you needed to, because someone had brought to your attention that you had made a specific denial that needed to be reversed, that you needed to then go to any of your superiors, up to and including the Under Secretary?

A No.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Did you have more before we -- I think we're up against our time.

Mr. Kenny. With that, we're out of time. We'll go ahead and conclude, and we'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

RPTR GENEUS

EDTR HOFSTAD

[3:17 p.m.]

Chairman Gowdy. We're back on the record.

Ms. Lamb, thank you for being here. I apologize for not being here this morning. As you probably can imagine, all the members have different committees and different commitments, but it's not a reflection of the lack of importance of the issue or you. So I apologize for not being here for more of it.

I want to go over with you, if I can -- and to the extent this may have been already done, then just bear with me, and I'd rather do it twice than not do it at all.

Ms. Lamb. No problem.

Chairman Gowdy. There is an email from you to Scott Bultrowicz, and it is dated June 11, 2012.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Chairman Gowdy. I think you have that in front of you. Do you?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. And the salutation, for want of a better word, is "Latest on Benghazi."

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Chairman Gowdy. And what prompted you to generate that email?

Ms. Lamb. One second. Let me look at the same email you're looking at. Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. That's exhibit 5?

Ms. Lamb. That's exhibit 5.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. And this email was following, I believe, the attack on the British motorcade.

Chairman Gowdy. Right. All I have is one page, and what you have is more than one page, so you may have more information than I do.

Someone notified you of an incident, and then this was your response? Is that right?

Ms. Lamb. The incident came into Diplomatic Security as a spot report.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. And then it was -- when the spot reports come in, it's immediately a trigger that -- anytime the Brits are attacked, it's a red flag for us. We automatically assume that Americans could be next or there could have been a mistaken identity issue of some sort. But it definitely shows a more aggressive pattern in brazenness in the bad guys, wherever these attacks occur.

Chairman Gowdy. All right.

Ms. Lamb. So, in the totality of the events that we were seeing, this was a significant cause for concern.

Chairman Gowdy. I can tell that, from the rest of the email. But we're going to go through it sentence by sentence, okay?

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Chairman Gowdy. "They're locked down now for the next two days."

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Chairman Gowdy. What did you mean by that?

Ms. Lamb. When this came in, Scott Bultrowicz had actually sent me the email, and he wanted to know what was Benghazi doing right now in response to this event. And the answer to that was the RSO on the ground in Benghazi had locked down the compound, meaning nobody was coming in and nobody was going out.

Chairman Gowdy. "I have [REDACTED] pulling up Tripoli's tripwires and we're going to apply them to Benghazi."

Who is [REDACTED]?

Ms. Lamb. [REDACTED] was the senior desk officer for NEA for Diplomatic Security.

Chairman Gowdy. And what were the tripwires for Tripoli?

Ms. Lamb. Without seeing them, I would have to -- I don't want to be misleading, but they were things as in attacks on Westerners, anti-American sentiment, terrorist attacks, infrastructure deterioration within the --

[Discussion off the record.]

Chairman Gowdy. We have to vote, so I'll go quick, and then I'll come back.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Chairman Gowdy. And how many tripwires -- is there a consequence for the tripping of a tripwire? Is there a corresponding response if a certain number of tripwires are implicated? Does that trigger, for want of a better word, a certain response?

Ms. Lamb. The purpose of the tripwires are for the post Emergency Action Committee on the ground to each have this checklist in front of them with the tripwires, and they are to go through them and be in agreement, "Did we trip that tripwire?" And it's to be used as a gauge, is it time to draw down personnel? Is it time to ask for an authorized departure from post? Should we suspend operations at post? Should we close post?

Chairman Gowdy. And is that analysis done in writing? Is it done by a group?

Ms. Lamb. The Emergency Action Committee at post. And that committee is generally led by the deputy chief of mission.

Chairman Gowdy. Right.

Ms. Lamb. They will go through all the tripwires, and the committee will then make a recommendation to the Ambassador with what they find, how many tripwires have been crossed, and what their recommendations are, to either -- for example, by changing our post travel policy, we can mitigate the increased threat of travel outside the compound. So they may just choose to change the travel policy and believe that that's enough to solve the problem at hand.

Or they may look at it and say, we have just crossed four tripwires, and we need to think about drawing down to essential personnel only; we may need to ask for additional resources. And then it becomes a policy-level decision, what they do.

But that will then come back from post to Washington in the form of an emergency action cable, with post recommendation from the

committee with ambassadorial concurrence.

Chairman Gowdy. And I'm assuming our committee has that analysis?

Ms. Lamb. They should.

Chairman Gowdy. And how far back in time would you go to determine whether or not tripwires had been triggered? If an incident took place on July the 1st, is it appropriate to go back 60 days, 90 days?

Ms. Lamb. That's a tough question because it varies. If it appears that it's the same group of people doing the attacks, you want to go back as far as you can establish a pattern. Maybe there was one incident in January, maybe another one in May, and now we've just had five incidents, and they're becoming more violent, more brazen, and more complex.

Chairman Gowdy. But let me ask you this. What difference does it make if it's the same group if it's the same target?

Ms. Lamb. It would -- or the same target. I mean, it doesn't have to be the same group. But any trend, you should go back --

Chairman Gowdy. Like, escalating violence would be a trend.

Ms. Lamb. Absolutely.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. Absolutely.

Chairman Gowdy. So you had tripwires for Tripoli, and you were going to apply them to Benghazi. And you believe that that analysis has been done in writing. And if it has been done in writing, you

believe that the State Department would have made that available to our committee.

Ms. Lamb. That's correct.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay.

Just by highlighting in yellow the ones that have already crossed, maybe you highlighted it -- did you highlight it in here and I just can't see it?

Ms. Lamb. No. We pulled the actual tripwires that were -- each post around the world is required to have, on any day, any post, they have to have a list of tripwires for their country. And those tripwires can evolve if situations change, but they have to have one in their emergency action plan.

So we pulled the one out of Tripoli, and my intent on having the desk officer pull that list and highlight the ones that have been crossed in yellow, I wanted to bring that to Mr. Bultrowicz's attention and Eric Boswell's attention, that the desk officers and my staff feel that post has already crossed those tripwires.

And then we were waiting for the response from that Emergency Action Committee to come in, and we wanted to see if what tripwires we felt were crossed, from quarterbacking over a table in Washington, were matching up with post assessment of the situation on the ground.

Chairman Gowdy. Which is what the middle part of that email would be. "I've also ask [REDACTED] to reach out to RSO [REDACTED] and strongly suggest that Tripoli hold an EAC to discuss what's going on in Benghazi."

Ms. Lamb. Exactly.

Chairman Gowdy. That's what you just described.

Ms. Lamb. Exactly.

Chairman Gowdy. All right.

"And determine what, if any, security measures they need to be enhancing, update their travel policy" -- all right.

"This is very concerning when you start putting the events together." What made you say that?

Ms. Lamb. When you look at the -- and I don't know where it is, but there's actually a list of events that had happened over the last few months. They were becoming more violent and more frequent. And, obviously, the attack on the British motorcade was a significant event.

Chairman Gowdy. "The recent big demonstration that was openly anti-American." What do you know about that, and who told you about it?

Ms. Lamb. It would have been reported from post in the form of a -- probably came in initially as a spot report. That's how most demonstrations get reported. And then sometimes there are followup cables and information provided.

I will be honest, I do not recall the details of that demonstration. At this particular time in IP, we were having demonstrations all over the Middle East.

Chairman Gowdy. But that demonstration would have been memorialized some way in writing, and it either is in the possession of the committee or -- should be in the possession of the committee.

Ms. Lamb. It should be.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay.

"The attack on our compound, and now this U.K. motorcade attack."

What attack on our compound were you referring to?

Ms. Lamb. We had an incident where a hole was blown in the wall.

Chairman Gowdy. Would that trip a wire?

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Chairman Gowdy. "If the tide is turning and they are looking for Americans and Westerners to attack, that is a game changer."

Did you think the tide was turning?

Ms. Lamb. From the sequence of events, that's what it appeared to be, yes.

Chairman Gowdy. And you thought that there was an increase in American or Western targets?

Ms. Lamb. Well, this was the first significant event of an attack on a Westerner --

Chairman Gowdy. Which one, the attack on our compound or the attack on the British --

Ms. Lamb. Well, the attack on the British Ambassador. I mean, attacks on walls on embassies -- it's hard to -- I mean, sometimes you get a disgruntled fired employee that will set something off up against the wall of a compound.

Chairman Gowdy. How big was the hole?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall exactly. I believe it was about a 6-foot hole, but I'm not exactly sure. And this was not a fence that

was built to DS standards, so it was substandard construction. You know, if you put a device on my fence, it would blow the whole thing down here at home, so --

Chairman Gowdy. Did you have disgruntled employees?

Ms. Lamb. At one point --

Chairman Gowdy. Ex-employees?

Ms. Lamb. We had an incident prior to the hole in the wall where -- they call them gelatinos. They use them for fishing. They throw them in the water, and it stuns the fish, and then they pick them off the surface. But one of those was thrown up against the wall, did not do any damage. And, through the local guard contract company, we were able to ascertain that it was a disgruntled guard that had worked on our contract that had been let go. So that was that incident.

Chairman Gowdy. But that one didn't blow a 6-foot hole in the wall.

Ms. Lamb. No. No.

So the totality of these incidents was what was becoming concerning.

Chairman Gowdy. When you used the phrase "game changer," what does that mean? What game are you referencing?

Ms. Lamb. Security. And, you know, I go on to clarify it that, you know, we are not staffed or resourced -- this was an interim facility.

Chairman Gowdy. Right.

Ms. Lamb. And we had not brought it up to the standards of our

embassies.

Chairman Gowdy. Who is "we"?

Ms. Lamb. The Department -- the collective State Department.

Chairman Gowdy. Why not?

Ms. Lamb. Because it was an interim facility. It was not --

Chairman Gowdy. People who are in interim facilities need protection just as much as people who are in permanent facilities.

Ms. Lamb. They absolutely do. I could not agree with you more.

Chairman Gowdy. So who made the decision not to bring it up to standard?

Ms. Lamb. It wasn't -- no one made a decision not to bring it up to standard --

Chairman Gowdy. Who made the decision to use a facility that was substandard?

Ms. Lamb. We would never get into new countries to conduct foreign diplomacy if we had to wait for a standard facility to be built. So, based on the needs of foreign policy and the mission --

Chairman Gowdy. Was the post in Tripoli up to standard?

Ms. Lamb. No.

Chairman Gowdy. So both Tripoli and Benghazi were substandard.

Ms. Lamb. Correct.

Chairman Gowdy. And they both would have been, what, temporary mission facilities? They both would have had the same designation?

Ms. Lamb. No. Benghazi was the permanent site -- no, I'm sorry, excuse me. Tripoli was the new embassy. And because we had a mission

to conduct immediately, we identified a property that we felt was going to be suitable that could be upgraded and brought up to standards.

If we waited for OBO to go in and build a new mission, it could be 3, 4, 5 years before we ever went back into Tripoli. So --

Chairman Gowdy. How many other temporary mission facilities would we have at any given point? Or just -- I won't say a given point. How about September 2012? How many other temporary mission facilities did we have?

Ms. Lamb. I didn't deal with facilities, and I didn't keep those records or information.

Chairman Gowdy. Were there any standards to be applied to temporary mission facilities?

Ms. Lamb. There were no written -- in DS, we did the very best we could to provide the same layers of security that we would at a permanent facility, but they were just -- they were permanent measures. They were not the same as what you would find if you were doing a new-construction facility.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. I interrupted you. You were explaining to me what "game changer" meant.

Ms. Lamb. What I meant was that our temporary security measures that were in place were not going to be enough. As the bad guys become more aggressive, DS has to become more proactive, and we have to stay one step ahead of them to keep everyone protected. And --

Chairman Gowdy. Like a request for personnel or equipment.

Ms. Lamb. Right.

Chairman Gowdy. Like a request for a machine gun.

Ms. Lamb. Exactly.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. Was there a request for a machine gun?

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall.

Chairman Gowdy. Would that request have come to you, or would it have gone to someone else?

Ms. Lamb. It would have eventually crossed my desk.

Chairman Gowdy. You don't recall anyone in Tripoli or Benghazi asking for a machine gun?

Ms. Lamb. I do not at this point, no.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. I've got to go vote. I'm going to turn it over, and then I'll be back, okay?

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Ms. Betz. Ms. Lamb, I'd like to go back to exhibit 7, and I believe that is the June 15 memo that was never approved.

Mr. Snyder. I think we would just take issue with that.

Ms. Lamb. Yeah.

Mr. Snyder. She said she didn't know.

Ms. Betz. Oh, okay. I'm sorry.

Ms. Lamb. No. And all I'm saying is it may not have been approved in writing with my name on it, but I guarantee you post had every staffing position filled that they requested on election day in that country. I know they did. And, you know, staffing records are available. All the records were kept on all the TDY personnel that

came in and out, and it would just be a matter of pulling those records.

Ms. Betz. So, going back to exhibit 7, I want to focus on the first sentence and specifically the reference to -- the portion where it says, "TDY staffing for the mission is currently set at three personnel."

Was it always set at three personnel for Benghazi?

Ms. Lamb. It fluctuated. When I started in Benghazi, there were --

Ms. Betz. What was the approved level for DS agents in Benghazi? Are you aware of that?

Ms. Welcher. Could you clarify what point in time?

Ms. Betz. It is the December 27, 2011, extension memo.

Ms. Lamb. I don't recall.

Ms. Betz. Five doesn't ring a bell? Five DS agents?

Ms. Lamb. I can't guess without seeing documents where things were -- because post agreed to -- changes were not made without post request or concurrence. So whenever there was a staffing change, it was done with post concurrence.

Ms. Betz. So this will be, I guess, exhibit No. 8.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And while the witness is looking at the document, I'll go ahead and identify it. It's STATE-SCB0047413. It's dated December 27, 2011. It is an action memo for Under Secretary Kennedy

from NEA Jeff Feltman, and the subject is "Future of Operations in Benghazi, Libya."

And, specifically, I guess I would focus your attention to page 2 and the second full paragraph, last sentence.

A Okay.

Q And so, while your name is not on this document, it is cleared by DS, by a "[REDACTED], Acting." And do you know who "[REDACTED]" is?

A That would be [REDACTED].

Q And did he serve in an acting capacity at a certain point?

A He would have been acting to clear on this.

Q And are you aware of the memo?

A I did not see it until after the event in Benghazi.

Q Okay.

But turning to page 2 of the memo and paragraph 2 and the last sentence, it specifically says, "With the full complement of five Special Agents," and then it goes on to describe the rest of the U.S. direct hire employees, correct?

A Yes.

Q And this was a memo that was approved by Under Secretary Kennedy?

A I assume. He signed on the --

Q So he approved it at five TDY slots, correct?

A That's what this says, yes.

Q Okay.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 9

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And then I'm going to now show you exhibit No. 9.

And while the witness is looking at the document -- and I would just bring your attention to page 1, really, the summary and action request.

A Uh-huh.

Q But while the witness is looking at the document, I'll identify it: SCB0046265. And it is a cable dated March 28, 2012.

So this is a staffing request per your earlier description of the process of how staffing requests should be made from post, so Benghazi through Tripoli, Tripoli to D.C. And this request is asking for five TDY for Benghazi, correct? It says, "5 TDY DS agents for 45-60 day rotations in Benghazi."

A Okay.

Q Did they get five agents?

A Without looking at their staffing profile, I can't answer that.

Q But they were requesting five?

A Correct.

Q So post is requesting five. And, per your discussion, when post made a request to D.C., you made every -- and particularly if it was a TDY -- you made every attempt to make TDYs immediately available.

So I guess my question to you is, did you make five TDY DS agents

available to Benghazi?

A It is more complex. If they can't get a visa, I may only have two there and not five. If someone has a family emergency that's out there and has to leave, there may be four and not five.

Q Okay. But so here's my question: Under Secretary Kennedy approved five. Post is requesting five. And then you have a June 15 memo that is saying, if I go back to exhibit 7, I have a staffing request to go up to five, but it says that the TDY staffing for the mission is currently set at three.

So I'm wondering at what point was -- who approved a decline in the number of personnel in Benghazi?

A Okay.

Q Was it you? Just yes or no. Did you approve --

A No, this is not a yes-or-no question. I'm sorry.

Q Okay.

A I need to explain what's happening.

Q Okay.

A If you have an FTE, which is a full-time employee --

Q But this isn't FTE. This is TDY. Benghazi is TDY.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Why don't we let her answer the question.

Ms. Lamb. That is a staffing requirement --

Ms. Betz. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. -- okay?

When you have TDY personnel, they are sent to post for specific reasons to do specific things.

In Pat Kennedy's blanket approval to keep Benghazi operational, he talks about eight State Department employees being at Benghazi and space for two TDYers from different agencies to be available there, plus an LES program assistant. That is a staffed-up facility.

What happened -- so this was kind of the cap of what the bureau was asking Pat Kennedy to approve. What they're saying is, at the most, we're not going to exceed this staffing level in Benghazi. That's what this memo is saying to Pat Kennedy. So --

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So it's a cap?

A In essence. Now, I mean, it can --

Q So if there's a terrorist attack, are you saying that no more than five DS agents could be sent to Benghazi?

A No. No, no, no. What I'm saying is, if all things were equal and life went on normally as a normal post, Pat Kennedy assigning -- from a management perspective, he is willing to support this totality of staffing and fund it and support it, and he knows they're out there.

So, in essence, Jeffrey Feltman, who is in charge of the NEA bureau, can't, 3 months from now, we go out there and visit and there's 50 people living out there on the compound that are all State Department employees, that wasn't what Pat Kennedy agreed to. This is what Pat Kennedy agreed to.

In reality, what happened is nobody came. We had the IMO was there with our DS agents, and we had a political reporting officer TDY

that came and went but did not stay there on a regular basis. They were TDY. They were in, and they were out. And I believe the RSOs told me that DOD had a fluctuating presence, coming in and out for various reasons. But it never, ever reached a staffing of eight. And the two TDY billets that were potentially open for other facilities.

So, in a high-threat environment, five DS agents to, say, a staff of 10, which is what they were looking at and what Pat agreed to, that would not be unreasonable. But what happened is they never came. And here we are. We're staffing it with five people -- we are struggling to staff it with five people because of visa challenges and because we're staffing Iraq and Afghanistan and Sana'a with all these TDYers, and then the pool of high-threat people. We had a lot of challenges internally.

So, from a management perspective, I sit back and I look at it. And I talk to the RSO, how much is this post being used? How many people are living there? And it turns out I have one IMO and all my security people, and then I have basically TDYers that come and go on an irregular basis but never more than two at a time.

So then my next question is, well, what do five DS agents do all day long if there's no one else at post besides them and the IMO? Well, we do drills with the guards and with the host country, national security that are on the compound. And, you know, they certainly worked with the annex, they worked with their counterparts and the Brits. But they were not doing any sort of traditional work, and they were not even doing security movement unless there was a person there

at post to do it.

And then, you know, I found out that one of them was acting as a driver and one of them was guarding this piece of equipment 24/7. And so, you know, in an effort to save our manpower without reducing security, that DS agent that was watching that piece of equipment 24/7 was not providing other functions, security functions, at post. So if I could secure that piece of equipment adequately using countermeasures approval -- and they brought in a vault to put this thing in, and alarms -- then I could stop staffing a position that was watching a piece of equipment.

By hiring a driver, which -- we needed permanent drivers there anyway, because that is the safest thing to have in any foreign country, is a devoted, loyal driver. So Tripoli was already hiring drivers. I had an MSD team training drivers in Tripoli. So my next question to [REDACTED] was, hey, do you think we could hire a couple of local drivers and get them trained by MSD while they're in country and use them for drivers instead of DS?

[REDACTED] is who we're talking about here on all of these things. And when I raised those two issues with [REDACTED] -- now, [REDACTED] is removed physically from Benghazi. He's not seeing it day to day. And he is flooded with projects and things going on in Tripoli.

And when I mentioned these as alternatives to staffing, he looked at it, he discussed it at post, and he came back in writing and said, yes, if you can get us safes out here and alarms to secure the equipment and if we can get drivers trained and on the job that we trust, we can

do that.

And then it took time, and they were able to meet both of those requirements. And those were functions being filled by DS agents that did not have to be filled by DS agents.

Q Did you ever have meetings with NEA or DCM [REDACTED] expressing concern about their ability to do political reporting because of the lack of DS agents on the ground? Do you recall?

A To my recollection, that was never brought to my attention, that they couldn't do reporting because they didn't have enough DS agents.

Q You don't remember a February 16 meeting with Deputy Chief of Mission [REDACTED] when she was back in D.C.?

A I did meet with her when she was back. I don't recall any dates.

Q Okay. Did you discuss the security and reporting situation in Benghazi?

A We discussed drivers, and the need to hire local drivers I know was one of the things on our agenda. But I don't ever recall her saying that they were incapable of reporting because they couldn't move.

Q So, just to go back to exhibit No. 7, though --

A Okay.

Q -- where did the three -- the drop in three personnel, was that now the cap for Benghazi? And who made that decision?

A Post makes all staffing decisions.

Q But post is requesting five. We see it in the March 28 --

A Okay.

Q -- cable.

A That's March.

Q Correct.

A The December --

Q Well, and then the post --

A The June is --

Q And not to interrupt, but then post in the June 15 action memo for your approval -- so we saw it in exhibit 8, where -- was it 8? What is this?

Mr. Snyder. Seven. June 15.

Ms. Betz. No. I'm talking about the email. Do you recall what exhibit?

Mr. Snyder. This email?

Ms. Betz. Yes.

Ms. Welcher. Five.

Ms. Betz. Exhibit 5.

So, going back to exhibit 5, and on the third page --

Ms. Lamb. I only have two pages.

Ms. O'Brien. You must mean 6.

Ms. Betz. Six. Okay, 6. Third page, post is requesting five -- I'm looking at the summary. "Due to the uncertainty of the security environment preceding the upcoming elections, RSO Benghazi recommends a minimum of five agents be deployed at post, with an MSD

team on standby."

It seems to me that this paragraph, then, is mimicked in exhibit 7, the formal memo, which then says, "Due to the uncertainty of the security situation in Benghazi and the fact that there appears to be an active terrorist cell in Benghazi, Libya, planning and implementing the attack operations against Western interests, including the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, the RSO is requesting additional TDY staffing for Benghazi. Staffing for the mission is currently set at three personnel. TDY RSO in Benghazi and RSO in Tripoli both recommend increasing that staffing to five through the election period scheduled for July 7, 2012, and to four after that."

Did that ever occur?

Ms. Lamb. They received the staffing they requested for the elections, yes.

Ms. Betz. For the elections.

Ms. Lamb. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. And after the elections, did the staffing remain at four?

Ms. Lamb. I do not recall what happened to the staffing after the elections. But I know through the elections they had exactly what they had requested.

Ms. Jackson. So, from the date of that memo through the election, they had five agents in Benghazi at all times.

Ms. Lamb. Again, they were approved for five agents, but if an agent had a family crisis and left post, they may have drawn down to

four. And, again, [REDACTED] in Tripoli, if he felt it was absolutely crucial to keep five, could have sent someone from Tripoli to fulfill the five until we got a replacement in there.

I cannot tell you there were always five DS agents on the ground. Things would happen. Visas frequently got held up and detained people. So, you know, I'm not going to say 100 percent there were always five on the ground, but we did our very best to maintain that.

Ms. Betz. I'm going to show you what is exhibit -- 10? Eleven?

Ms. Jackson. I don't think we had 9.

Ms. Betz. Okay. This will be exhibit 9.

Ms. Jackson. Oh, no, I'm sorry. We had 11. Nine was the cable, so this is 10. This is 10.

Ms. Betz. Ten.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 10

was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And we'll give the witness an opportunity to read it, meanwhile.

Ms. Lamb. Can we go off the record a second?

Ms. Betz. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Betz. So we're back on the record.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And I'll identify the document. This is SCB0049439, and it is a cable dated July 9, 2012. And it's a staffing request, and, specifically, it's a request for extension of TDY security personnel.

Do you recall this cable?

A If you start reading it, I will -- oh, yes, I do recall this cable.

Q You do recall. Okay.

So, as we mentioned, I'm going to focus on paragraph 5, specifically the last sentence, which says, "Post anticipates supporting operations in Benghazi with at least one permanently assigned RSO employee from Tripoli; however, would request continuing TDY support to fill a minimum of three security positions in Benghazi."

So that would be four personnel, correct?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall ever sending a response to this staffing request?

A We were in absolute full agreement with this. And I do not recall if I would have cleared on a cable that was generated, but this was part of our suggestions to post when they were talking about looking at staffing.

Because part of our challenge in Benghazi was the 30-day rotations, the lack of continuity, and it also creates a lack of an ability to finish large-scale projects, because there's no one there who's been there longer than 30 days. So, by putting one of the permanent positions from Tripoli out there and then putting the TDYer there, it made more sense for continuity.

Q But do you recall, was a formal response --

A There should have been a response.

Q Do you recall testifying that a response got lost in the shuffle?

A We had a cable that -- and, yes, because there were two cables, 690 -- and there was. And, in your records, you should have the draft somewhere that was drafted. But, yes, it was --

Q But this cable was never formally responded to because it was lost in the shuffle.

A Yes, but --

Q Just "yes."

A -- it was written jointly between the RSO at post and the desk officer, the response cable. And I cleared it, and it went up to Scott Bultrowicz's office.

Q So, at that point, he became the decisionmaker?

A His special assistant apparently had a question and returned it. And, of course, this was all after the fact, trying to find out what happened to it. It never materialized. He didn't get the response.

But, nonetheless, everything in that draft cable -- which is part of the official records, and it's part of what got turned over to everybody -- everything in that response cable was fulfilled and was carried out.

Q So they had four agents at Benghazi at all times after that?

A Again, without extenuating circumstances, yes.

Q Going back to this staffing memo and the discussions around it, there was a lot of discussions regarding the SST and the MSD,

correct?

A Correct.

Q And were they sort of within your authority to deploy? Were you the decisionmaker as to where the SST and the MSD went?

A No, I was not the -- I made recommendations and would support the need for their services.

Q For example, when Benghazi didn't meet the requested five, could SST have been sent on a consistent basis to fill that five TDY slot?

A I --

Q Was it in your authority to send the SST to meet that five TDY requirement or level?

A No. Security assets at post, once we pushed them out and approved them to post, all the security assets there then belonged to the RSO and to the Ambassador, and they can put them where they want them.

Q So, when they were making recommendations to you to stay in Tripoli, would you have heeded their requests or recommendations to keep the SST and MSD?

A May I take just a few minutes to discuss the background and the difference between the MSD and the SST?

Q Sure.

A MSD belongs to DS and to the State Department. We have 10 teams -- at that time, we had 10 teams available for worldwide deployment. They would range -- a team, depending on their mission,

could be four to six individuals. The teams we were running through Libya were teams of six.

And so, if you have one deployment team of six and you're keeping them for a prolonged period of time, what happens is they are there for 30 to 45 days. Then when they leave post because they are in a high-stress, high-threat environment, they come back to Washington, they have a bit of downtime, and then they prepare for their next assignment.

So you have the team that just left is a team of six. You have the team that's currently on the ground, which is a team of six. And then you have the team that's getting ready to go in to replace the team that's already there. So, with one continuous, rotating need for MSD, you are tying up 18 MSD agents or 3 teams. We only had 10 to cover the world.

We had up to three MSD teams at a time in Tripoli. We had one doing training and two doing security missions. So, even at one point in the elections, we were tying up all but one team. That's all that was left for a worldwide deployment.

MSD and SST, the one thing they have in common, they are both emergency response skill sets and special teams. The SST was requested because they had skill sets that our MSD teams did not have.

The four things that we needed that we did not have in house were medical support -- in a, you know, worst-case scenario, a combat environment, we didn't know what we were going into originally, and there was no State Department medical office out there to support us.

So we asked SST to come to the table with medical assets to join our team.

We did not have in-house people to do airport surveys. The airport had been bombed during all of the activity that went on there. We were going to need access to the airport to bring in our supplies, people, assets, and we needed to know that that airport was secure and that we could use it. So we asked for people with that skill set.

We also did not have communications, because we -- you know, we just went in with our MSD team and their radios, and this was not enough to set up communications that needed to be done at an embassy level. So they brought a coms package.

We also did not have in-house explosive ordnance device people with expertise on ordnance. And there was live ordnance everywhere after the fighting stopped there, and especially on that route to the airport and on the fringes of the airport.

So we asked them to compile a team with those skill sets to come in to help us until we could -- you know, airport survey, that was a short-term need. And the ordnance was probably going to be a longer-term need. The medical was a need until the State Department could stand up, staff, and provide equipment for the medical unit. So they were not meant to come in and hold static positions on the perimeter or to ride in a car and do mobile security.

And they're emergency assets. And, ideally, once you deploy an emergency asset, you try to allow 90 days, which is generally three rotations, so you have enough time to find a permanent solution so you

can back those assets out and return them to the units that they came from and were available for worldwide deployment again.

So, as early as November, we started, you know, working with the RSO. "You know, we know you have your hands full, but we have to start thinking and planning for the exit strategy for these teams." Now, we knew it was not going to be in November or even January or February, but by the time we're reaching a year to a year and a half later, it's time to put a permanent solution in place.

Q And I appreciate that. But you have an email that you just wrote -- right? -- that you just described to us, that says, basically, "This is very concerning when you start putting the events together. The recent" -- I'm sorry, I'm reading from exhibit No. 5 -- "big demonstration that was openly anti-American, the attack on our compound, and now this U.K. motorcade attack. If the tide is turning and they are now looking for Americans and Westerners to attack, that is a game changer. We are not staffed or resourced adequately to protect our people in that type of an environment. We are a soft target."

A Uh-huh.

Q You have resources at your disposal, and this, to me, sounds like it's starting, if not already, an emergency situation. Why would you not keep SST and MSD?

A They weren't in Benghazi.

Q They could have been deployed, though, by the RSO, as you just said, if they were there.

A Then you would have to ask them why they weren't there.

Q But why not keep them there for Tripoli?

A I'm sorry?

Q Why not keep the SST and MSD in Tripoli? If this is happening in Benghazi, Libya, and there are certain incidents, I'm sure you are aware, that happened in Tripoli as well, why not keep them in Tripoli?

A Because they were no longer doing the functions that they were sent there to do. And we needed to -- the functions that they were doing were functions that were normally done with permanent staff positions, either local hires -- mostly by local hires.

We weren't using them for medical anymore. State had come in and taken over the medical. We weren't using them for EOD clearings. I believe six of them went and started doing mil-to-mil work and were not working under the purview of the RSO.

So the whole intent was to get the RSO to say exactly what do you need. Tell me, how many movements are you making? How many DS agents do you need, how many armed host-country locals do you need to support the numbers of movements, the numbers of the visits that you have? And in conjunction with your travel policy, because the travel policy would dictate the levels that they secure outside movement with. How many guards do you need on the perimeter, and what are you lacking? Let us come in and help you interview, vet, hire, and train local employees to fill these positions.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And how was that working for them? I mean, didn't both Tripoli and Benghazi have great difficulty in finding a local guard force, both armed and unarmed? And weren't there continuous problems with the people that they did hire?

A In?

Q Both Tripoli and Benghazi.

A I am not aware of problems in Tripoli with the staff that was hired there. All the emails and accounts that I got -- I mean, they worked on McCain's detail, they worked throughout the elections, and the reporting I got was that they did fine.

Q Were they getting the sufficient number of applicants that they could train the numbers that they needed?

A It was a slow process. And this is why we did not pull them out, because we were waiting to get the staff numbers up to where they needed to be.

Q And what about for Benghazi?

A Benghazi had the guard contract in place, and they did have, I believe, three armed host national security, if we can call it that, on the compound.

Q And why do you say "if we can call it that"?

A Well, all of Libya kind of turned into neighborhood militias providing security. As we think of, you know, Florida Highway Patrol or Capitol Police or Diplomatic Security under one structure of recognized law enforcement, their law enforcement was done by local militias, and they had not solidified one recognized country security

system.

Q Doesn't that increase the risk for U.S. Government personnel, when you don't have a formalized, recognized, controlled police force controlled by the local government police force?

A We were there in a diplomatic capacity to help them build the government, the new government that was forming there, and it was taking time to evolve all of this.

The people that we were given by the local authorities fully supported us. They trained with our RSOs, and, for the most part, they were very dependable and loyal to the RSOs that were at post.

Ms. Betz. Just to clarify, when you mention the local guard force, those were unarmed?

Ms. Lamb. Yes, the local guards were unarmed. Correct.

Ms. Betz. I want to go back to the July 9 cable.

Mr. Snyder. If I could have one second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Lamb. The 317 brigade guys were armed. So we had the three armed, and the local contract guards were not armed. So just a clarification.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q This is exhibit 10, and I'll read it. It's on page 2, paragraph number 4. So, basically, it says -- this is the fourth paragraph:

"Under current arrangements, post's 34 U.S. security personnel (16 SST, 11 MSD, 1 WAE TDY, 1 RSO, 2 ARSOs, and 3 TDY ARSOs) will draw

down to 27 personnel on 7/13. On 08/05, post will reduce U.S. security personnel to 4 MSD trainers, 1 RSO, 2 ARSOs, and 3 TDY ARSOs, with a further reduction to 7 U.S. security personnel on 08/13, which includes 4 MSD trainers not generally supporting transportation security, VIP visits, or RSO programs."

Were you comfortable with those security numbers, those security personnel numbers?

A I had no reason to second-guess what post was recommending if it was cleared by everyone at post.

Q Well, the point is they were concerned with that drop in number, and that was the reason why they were making the request for additional assets.

A I'm confused by the question.

Q So my question --

Ms. Welcher. Could you point to where in the document you're showing the concern?

Ms. Betz. Okay. So it says, "Under current arrangements" -- so under paragraph 4 -- so this is what [REDACTED] or post is concerned about -- is that, summarizing, post is going to go from 34 U.S. security personnel to 7 U.S. security personnel.

Ms. Welcher. Twenty-seven.

Ms. Betz. Seven.

Ms. Welcher. The last one.

Ms. Betz. "To a further reduction to 7 U.S. personnel on 08/13, which include 4 MSD trainers not generally supporting transportation

security, VIP visits, or RSO programs."

Mr. Snyder. You know, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ?

Ms. Betz. Sure. Yeah, absolutely.

Mr. Snyder. Is that okay?

Ms. Betz. We'll go off the record.

Ms. Jackson. Let's go off the record for that, yeah.

[Discussion held off the record.]

RPTR HUMISTON

EDTR ROSEN

[4:24 p.m.]

Ms. Betz. We'll go back on the record.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And so prior to going off, we had asked the witness about paragraph number 4 on page 2 of the July 9th staffing request in which I had asked you about any concerns that you might have about the drop in U.S. security personnel that the RSO had mentioned in the staffing cable.

A Okay.

Q And so you've had a chance to read --

A Correct.

Q -- the entire document or --

A And -- and I actually as we started reading, I read this yesterday with my October -- I did read this yesterday.

When this came --

Q When you say, "read this," you have this document?

A I --

Ms. Jackson. I reviewed it.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Reviewed it?

A I reviewed it.

Q Okay.

A I reviewed it. It was one of just a handful.

Q Okay.

A But this document was as painful to read the first time as it is this time. When you're requesting large numbers of assets like this and trying to line them all up, this isn't the format that we do.

And just shifting gears really quick, I had just come off of the Iraq transition, and that was the largest, we had hundreds of DS agents on the ground out there -- or 135. In order to know was that the right number, we had to compile matrixes. We kept track of how many movements go off compound, how many State Department employees are we supporting with movement security, how many TDYers are we supporting, how many VIP visits do we have to anticipate protecting. And all of those things go into what we consider the workload, which determines how many employees you -- security employees we need and what kind do we need? How many static guards do we need? How many posts do they have? There are formulas for figuring all of that out.

So when I read this cable in this format, [REDACTED] wrote it as a reporting cable in paragraph format, and it's very hard to line everything up by the needs. So I asked the desk officer to have his -- [REDACTED] at the time was the person working with [REDACTED] -- for them to get on a conference call and to go through this cable, paragraph by paragraph, line by line, and to switch this into the format that shows how many people do you need for which activities, to support VIP visits, movement security, static security, a quick reaction force. Just tell me exactly what you need and then the numbers will pop out

the other side showing what you need.

And they sat down and they did this. And all of that was compiled into the response that unfortunately never went out. But my guidance to them was before that cable went up to Scott Bultrowicz and Eric Boswell, I wanted it to be pre-approved at post, because I didn't want to dictate to post their staffing needs, I wanted to support them. But in this format, it was not clear exact -- because they were coming up on the 1-year transition when everybody was going to leave post and the new team was going to come in, so I wanted it to be laid out, very clear, the current operating support that was being provided for security.

Q So let me -- let me understand what you're saying. Are you -- were you concerned that his staffing request was not in the right format and that he was exaggerating his numbers?

A No, no.

Q Okay.

A It was just not readily apparent from the way this was written as to --

Q But it's pretty clear he's asking for a minimum of 13 TDY U.S. security personnel. That's pretty clear.

A Yes.

Q I don't know why that has to be in a different -- why does that have to be in a different format?

A Because we were trying to -- again, this is all TDY status. Back at the headquarters level, we're still trying to work out the

formula of how many permanent FTE security positions need to be added to post. And you need to articulate what you are using people for.

Q But he's saying that there is a plan FTE of five agents. Until he gets there, he needs additional TDY support as well as additional TDY, however you want to supply them, to replace the MSD and SST that haven't been redeployed per your decision.

A Okay. It is unfortunate. Do you have the response cable?

Q I do not.

A That was --

Q I just have the official cable --

A Okay.

Q -- that went from -- because per your conversation -- per our discussion, official cables are what are acted on, correct? Not drafts. But this is an official staffing cable that went through Tripoli to D.C., and I'm asking what the response is. And --

A And I'm telling you, it's all in writing, it's all 100 percent accurate. And just because it didn't get sent out with a cable number on it, I am testifying to you that everything in that cable was followed through and carried out.

Q So if this cable, or the requests that were made in this cable were fulfilled, there would have been more than the six personnel that were actually on the ground in Tripoli on September 11th, correct?

A [No verbal response.]

Q So my point is, the request was never fulfilled. I mean, we can talk about semantics in terms of draft response, but the point

is that there were six personnel on the ground in Tripoli on September 11th. So what point of this wasn't fulfilled?

A All I can tell you is post worked jointly with the desk to determine the staffing levels that they needed. This was answered, and post concurred.

Q But it wasn't answered in personnel. So you can say that it was drafted on paper, but where are the personnel that were supposed to be sent to Tripoli and, for that matter, Benghazi? That's my question to you. This is all great. We're talking about all these requests that were approved, approved whether verbally or drafts were approved, but the point is, the personnel were never sent. Personnel were never sent to either Tripoli or Benghazi, and you have an RSO that is describing to you, conditions in Libya have not met prior benchmarks established by post, the Department, or AFRICOM for a complete drawdown of TDY security personnel.

He's telling you that the conditions on the ground aren't meeting your normalization or your benchmarks for transitioning. And you're telling me that, yes, you negotiated something on paper, but the point is, the personnel were -- never made it. So why didn't they make it? Whose responsibility was it to make sure that what was put on paper translated to people on the ground? Whose responsibility was that? Was that yours? Was that Kennedy's? Was that Boswell? Was that Bultrowicz?

I mean, this whole discussion today, we've talked about paper, verbal paper, verbal approvals, paper approvals, but the point is, who

was responsible for making sure the people actually were sent?

A The staffing that was sent to post and the staffing pattern that was agreed upon following this cable coming in in this request, a team sat down and worked with post to agree on the numbers that would fulfill their needs and their requirements.

Q I under --

A And that response was drafted.

Q It was drafted, but where were the people? You're telling me that the people -- that you -- so you approved people being sent, but the people were never sent. There were six personnel on the ground in Tripoli that night.

A In Tripoli.

Q Tripoli --

Ms. Welcher. If you could -- there's a lot of assertions -- there's a lot of assertions being made without any kind of documentary support --

Ms. Lamb. Yeah.

Ms. Welcher. -- and it's really complex, so if you maybe put more specificity in what --

Ms. Betz. Well --

Ms. Welcher. -- type of personnel you're talking about or --

Ms. Betz. I'm talking about U.S. security personnel, and we're referring to the paragraph number 4.

Ms. Welcher. MSD or DS. This is a very complicated subject.

Ms. Betz. Well, I'm not talking about MSD or SST right now. I'm

talking about -- she's telling me that the request in this memo was fulfilled, and it was fulfilled in a draft response that more adequately reflected the process that had to be followed in D.C.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Correct?

A It was a joint draft that clarified all of the needs that were raised in this cable, were reflected in the draft response back, and it was jointly done with post.

Q So I understand that, but my question is, if this was approved in a draft response, and you're saying the numbers were negotiated in additional personnel that they are requesting, why weren't they there? Because my question is that from the documents that we've seen, there weren't the additional personnel that were being requested.

Ms. Sawyer. Well, Kim, are you talking about in Benghazi, in Tripoli?

Ms. Betz. In Tripoli -- in Tripoli and then in Benghazi.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So this memo is requesting four personnel for Benghazi.

A This --

Q One ARSO, and three TDY, correct? One ARSO to be sent from Tripoli, plus three TDY.

A This cable was meant to be a reflection of the entire security program. They were closing in on the end of their first-year tour, and people were getting ready to leave post, and I was trying

my best to get post to clarify their needs and their permanent solution staffing for moving forward without having the emergency response units that were there. It was not meant as we're out to get you and pull the rug out and pull people out. It was meant as the template, the plan moving forward. Tell me what you need and what you need it for so we can get you the right assets there.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And what you've said to us is there was an agreement that was reached.

A Yes. That is correct.

Q Then why didn't -- why weren't the personnel that were agreed to in Tripoli and Benghazi on September 11?

A I don't know for a fact that they weren't there.

Q There were only three agents in Benghazi, and the Ambassador brought two with him. There weren't four.

Ms. Welcher. I would say maybe this -- this shows the difficulty in reading this, but I am reading this to say a minimum of three security positions in Benghazi, three.

Ms. Betz. With at least one permanent assigned RSO.

Ms. Welcher. But that's not included in the total of three.

Ms. Betz. Post anticipates supporting operations in Benghazi with at least one permanently assigned RSO employed from Tripoli, however, would request continued TDY support to fill a minimum of three security positions.

Ms. Welcher. Three, including the RSOs, so two TDY, is how I read

that.

Mr. Snyder. Do you see her point? Like, you could read this to say that we're going to supply one from Tripoli, but we also need to maybe kick in some TDY to maybe sure to hit that minimum of three.

Ms. Betz. Well, I think there's been previous testimony by [REDACTED] that that was intended to be four.

Mr. Snyder. Well, that might have been what he was thinking, but just like we can't agree at this table. [REDACTED]

Ms. Jackson. Okay. We'll move on.

Mr. Snyder. Okay.

Ms. Lamb. And then just one other quick thing. Staffing changes take time, because whether it's a TDY person that has to be identified, get a visa and get pushed out, or whether it's a local hire that has to be, you know, advertised, hired, you know, vetted and hired, these things don't just happen. It may take 2, 3, 4 months to bring staffing, but we were trying to identify when he leaves post, how did he determine how many people he needed and where did he need them so we could carry out the continuity at the headquarters level with the next incoming RSO.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Let me ask you this, then. I mean, we've talked in great detail, and I know my time is up. So -- and we've talked a lot about approvals and things that you did. So in your opinion, who should have

been responsible?

A For what?

Q Held responsible for any lack of security, either personnel or physical security in Benghazi.

A [No verbal response.]

Q Or is no one responsible?

A Well, the RSO and the Ambassador are ultimately responsible for security at post. It is very unfortunate and sad at this point that Ambassador Stevens was a victim, but that is where ultimate responsibility lies. And it's up to headquarters to provide resources when post asks for them, and it's also up to Washington to make sure that we don't have, you know, waste, fraud, and abuse of our resources, because we're covering the entire world as well. So it's -- you know, when you say who should be accountable, accountable for what?

Q Well, let me ask you this: Let me rephrase it. Do you believe that Tripoli and Benghazi received the resources that were needed to adequately secure the facilities, in your opinion, and the people?

A Not -- I think there were things that we didn't realize back here at Washington until after the fact. I'm going to give you a quick, really small example. In my combing through emails after the fact, I found one small email from a TDY RSO that -- it was kind of a little snippy and it said, Hey, thanks for all the money you sent me for the batteries I needed, but where the heck am I going to go get them? Am I going to run to the 7-Eleven to buy them?

He had equipment that needed batteries, he requested batteries. He got money for batteries. And I think, you know, sometimes our answer was post would ask for something and we would shove money out the door, but without having local resources to spend that money effectively, we weren't always solving the problem.

And that was just a small thing, but I think it ran deeper than just the batteries, because money got returned that was never spent.

Q So am I hearing you that you felt that they were adequately resourced, both in terms of physical security and personnel?

A No, I'm not saying that they were adequately resourced. I'm saying that the way we do business at that time at interim facilities and the quick, you know, temporary aspect of going into a country when it's needed very quickly is a huge challenge for our security experts within Diplomatic Security. It really is. Our hands are tied. And the longer -- you know, we can come in and we can put up a heck of a security system and all five layers of security very quickly around any temporary facility, but the longer you're there, the more vulnerable you become. And, you know, the Department sometimes cringes that we're hiding behind fortresses in our new embassies, that they're impenetrable, but without that type of a facility, we have had and we will continue to have, unfortunately, incidents like we did in Benghazi.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q If the longer you're in a high-threat area, the more vulnerable you become, then why don't you increase your DS staffing

as time goes on, as the vulnerabilities increase?

A Staffing's not always the answer. Physical security and technical security are normally the number one things that we need for security, the outer layers, the outer rings, the early warning systems. It's the full package.

Q But in Benghazi, you're not going to have that. So what's your alternative? You're not going to have those outer layers of security, because, as you told us, it's an interim facility, they're not going to make it meet any type of standards, any type of physical security standards, so what's your alternative in protecting your people?

A It would not have mattered that evening if we had seven or five under the circumstances what happened there. Increasing physical security possibly could have made a difference at that facility. We have surveillance detection programs all over the world, and they are early warning signs when we have people out who know what's normal and what's not to report in, who possibly could have warned if they saw a demon- -- what appeared to be a large number of people moving towards the front gate of the embassy. The RSO's attention would have been drawn to it much quicker. And these programs just were not in place out there.

Ms. Betz. I think we're out of time.

Ms. Jackson. We're way out of time.

Ms. Betz. So we'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Kenny. So we'll go back on the record. The time is 4:50 p.m.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And, Ms. Lamb, again, thank you for your patience. It has been a long day. We are hopefully near the end of our questioning. And I just have a few quick follow-up questions for you.

A Okay.

Q I know my colleague does as well. But at the outset, you indicated during the break that you would like to offer a correction, or an update on the record, to a previous statement that you gave.

A Yes. There was -- one of the questions asked to me at the end was if there was anything that could have potentially made a difference in my personal opinion. And on -- in reflecting on that question, again, physical security was not my domain; however, I was aware of numerous projects that were going on in Benghazi. One of the projects was a mantrap, sally port-type of setup. And if you're not familiar with that, it's where you have to go through two barriers before you get to the inside of a compound or a building. And that project was funded, and materials to complete that project had actually arrived at post. And somewhere at post, a decision was made not to build it out as it was designed from the experts in Washington.

And in my opinion, with a large number of people that swarmed the front gate, and they did it when the local guard was changing post and coming inside, they overpowered him and came through the gate that was open, it is possible, it may not have stopped them, but it may have provided a lag time that could have possibly made a difference.

Ms. Betz. So, Peter, can I just clar- --

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So are you clarifying that that would have been a physical sort of security upgrade that should have been completed --

A That if it had been complete --

Q -- per your protocol?

A If it had been completed. But, I mean, there were other ongoing -- you know, security cameras and lights were sitting there ready to be installed, and that project was not completed. I do not know the timeline for that project, but I had been told by a TDY RSO at post that a decision had been made not to complete the project as it was designed. So I'll just throw that out.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q That's also what's referred to as the interior fence project?

A I believe that may have been that.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Again, thank you for your patience with us today.

A You're welcome.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So I wanted to return briefly to an exhibit that you were shown and was discussed in the last hour, and it's exhibit 9. And that document is a March 28th, 2012, cable. And the way I read this is it discusses staffing both in Tripoli and some discussion also of

Benghazi, so it seems to cover both. And you explained to us a little bit a dynamic of kind of requests and staffing of Benghazi falling under the umbrella of Tripoli. So this would seem to reflect that. Is that accurate?

A Yes. I believe that is correct.

Q And there's a -- on that second page, there's a little dash mark there with a paragraph that appears specific to Benghazi. The rest of it is more generalized discussion of the umbrella Tripoli issue. But it says, "DS AGENT SUPPORT IN BENGHAZI." And it does discuss, as my colleagues had indicated, had been authorized in a memo. And that first sentence says, "Post requests continued support for five TDY DS agents in Benghazi on 45- to 60-day rotations." It then explains why that amount, at this point in time, is needed.

Further in that paragraph, it says in a different sentence, quote, "Once these positions," and the "these positions" refers to a number of steps that are being taken to fill certain positions, and it does, in that intervening thing, talk about the expectation that there would be an increase in TDYers. -- and I don't think it refers to security, I think it's talking about policy-related and other mission -- in the run-up to the June elections. So they're talking about that. And it says, quote, "Once these positions are filled, post anticipates requiring fewer TDY DS agents to support Benghazi."

And I -- it was that sentence that I wanted to ask you about, because it -- you had discussed the fact that there was back-and-forth discussions about need at particular points in time. This does seem

to reflect that there was at least contemplation that five was an authorized amount, but there were going to be ongoing discussions about --

A Right.

Q -- what exactly was needed at particular times.

A And they discussed protecting the COMSEC equipment as one of the duties of the TDYers, and that was one of the things that we remedied by providing physical security for that COMSEC equipment. And then they also allude to the training of the drivers and being able to utilize local drivers after they're trained.

Q And then just briefly, on the first page of this document, you know, there's a summary and action request paragraph, and right towards the bottom, the second to last sentence reads, "Post is extremely grateful for the extraordinary support provided by DS as the transition to normalize" -- as, I think it says "we," -- "transition to normalized security operations," end quote.

So that sentence there certainly doesn't express that they do not feel -- that they are in strong disagreement with what appears to be the request and the approach.

Was there -- was it your -- again, when we talked earlier, I had asked you kind of if you felt like and had a strong feeling that you were -- you or DS otherwise was denying requests that had been asked. I mean, this would seem to indicate the contrary, but had you gotten a different feeling from that?

A No. We were very proactive and very forward leaning in

providing support for any of the needs that they needed there at post.

Q And my colleague asked you about a meeting that you had with DCM [REDACTED]. You said you didn't remember the exact time frame, but she indicated she thought it might be February.

A If that's -- I mean, she would know her home leave schedule better than I did, but ambassadors would frequently come through my office on home leave time. Some would just pop in and see if I had a minute if they were in the building, and others would call and make specific appointments with agenda items, and I do recall having spent time with [REDACTED].

Q And so if it had been in February, or even earlier in March up to the 28th, this cable back from post would have been after you had met with DCM [REDACTED]?

A Yes.

Q So certainly, at that point in time, what seems to be reflected in that sentence is that post is grateful for the support that is being provided at that point in time?

A Correct.

Q Now, of course this was, you know, February and March, but this -- the dynamic here, this reflect -- you know, reflection of an ongoing effort to assess how many DS agents, and I'm just talking specific to Benghazi, was that a dynamic that you felt continued, then, through the time period running up to and including the night of the attacks?

A Yes. I mean, it was -- Benghazi was constantly in flux,

because they were out there by themselves and it was all TDYers. We didn't have fixed FTE positions out there defined.

Q And then when my colleagues had been talking with you about exhibit 10, which is the July 9th cable requesting extension of TDY security personnel, there was some discussion about the sentence in paragraph 5 that says "Post anticipates supporting operations in Benghazi with at least one permanently assigned RSO employee from Tripoli, however, would request continued TDY support to fill a minimum of three security positions in Benghazi."

You know, there was some discussion as to what that meant, whether that meant three security positions in Benghazi total including the one TDY, so two plus one, or three plus one.

A Right.

Q In any event, this also just seems to confirm and reflect that the discussion about the concrete number at a given point in time was somewhat in flux throughout the entire time that the mission was --

A Correct.

Q -- in Benghazi.

A Correct.

Q So, you know, certainly the memo that we also looked at much earlier, the action memo from December of 2011, contemplated and authorized up to five agents.

A Correct.

Q And certainly when people in Congress see an authorization of five agents, they do have an expectation that, in essence, at all

times, and certainly if ever requested, five agents will be there, but can you, then, explain to us kind of, I think you've done somewhat, but in an encapsulized way, in reality, kind of how that back and forth then worked?

A Right. The agents are there to support the direct hire American staff at post, and to protect the facility. So they had requested a maximum of eight people plus the two TDY slots. So potentially, they would have, on a full day, 10 American direct hire employees working at post.

Five DS agents, that would -- under that environment in that facility, that is not unreasonable, but when you only have one technical person working computers, and one reporting officer coming and going, and no one else is there on a 24/7 basis, you now have five agents that don't have a mission, per se. And this was a very small compound, and we needed to define what exactly were they doing if no one was at post.

And they can always beef up if a delegation was going there, they could ask for more support; we could bring support in very quickly on -- you know, from other countries nearby; they could take resources from within Tripoli and send there temporarily to support a short-term visit, if they had a short-time visit with lots of people. But when I asked the question, what do you do with five agents if there's only one person at post that needs to get off compound to do their job, and then that was when I was told that we have one person watching the COMSEC gear and then one person is the designated driver. And to me, that was not an appropriate use of our DS assets.

Q So as I understand what you're explaining, to the extent there was a goal of having eight to ten mission-related personnel, mission and/or --

A Right.

Q -- supporting mission, but not security --

A Right.

Q -- related personnel in Benghazi, then the contemplated five agents would be what would be reasonable and needed for that number of mission-related folks --

A Right.

Q -- and, as that number might fluctuate, then there would be a need to assess and determine how the DS agent staffing should correspondingly match the ongoing needs.

A Correct, correct.

Q So my colleague pointed out to me that I may have misstated. And I wasn't looking directly at the action memo, so I do want to just clarify with you. So this is just exhibit 8 again.

You know, that does outline that the eight seems to include the five DS, so it wouldn't be -- it says -- well -- it says, "With the full complement of five special agents" -- and I'm looking at page 2. This is, as far as I know, one of just the two places where the staffing number was mentioned, so this is the second place.

"With the full complement of five special agents, our permanent presence would include eight U.S. direct hire employees, two slots for TDY PM and USAID officers, and one LES program assistant.

So it looks like it's five DS, three more, and then a TDY PM, USAID officer, there's no number specified there, and one LES program assistant. So three direct hire, then the other numbers, TDY PM, USAID officers, and one LES program assistant are not truly specified, those numbers. Am I reading that accurately?

A I didn't draft this, and I never saw it until after the fact, so I can't --

Q Right.

A -- I can't confirm that. I mean, I go on the black and white, what is the mission, and how many people do you need to accomplish the mission. If there -- if no one shows up at post that needs to go off compound, you know, at least three of those guys would be utilized to take people off compound and back, and if you don't have people coming to post, but then when I find out one's watching a piece of equipment, and basically has nothing to do with the rest of the protection, I'm just looking for a better way to utilize resources.

And, again, these were recommendations to post, and they did not have to accept those recommendations. I suggested these as alternatives to the way they were currently staffing.

Q And then the last set of questions I had for you, I just wanted to -- a lot of -- we asked you a lot, our colleagues asked you a lot, Chairman Gowdy asked you as well -- about that June time period and the June Emergency Action Committee cable, and I wanted to give you an opportunity to take a look at that and ask you a couple questions about it. So I'm going to mark --

A What exhibit?

Ms. Welcher. She's going to give you a new exhibit.

Ms. Lamb. Okay. Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I'm going to mark as Exhibit 11 --

A Okay.

Q -- a document. I'll give you a copy of that.

[Lamb Exhibit No. 11

was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And just for the record to identify it, it's a two-page document. It bears an identification number down at the bottom from the Department of State that says, C05262742. It's dated June 22, 2012. The subject line reads, "Tripoli - EAC - 06/20/2012."

So we had talked a little bit about communications where you had, in the email, strongly suggested that there be an Emergency Action Committee --

A Correct.

Q -- in Tripoli.

A Correct.

Q To the best of your recollection, would this, then, be the --

A This would be the response to that request.

Q Okay. And then just a couple questions for you based on that. One of the things that you had asked for them to consider was

potentially getting feedback from the British, given the attack had been on their convoy, and in that second paragraph, it appears that that information was gathered and that second paragraph down at the -- and last sentence says, RSO confirmed that the U.K. had withdrawn staff from its office in Benghazi, but planned to return to Benghazi at the end of June.

Do you recall kind of having that confirmed that they had left for the time being, but they apparently were at least contemplating coming back relatively soon?

A Did I confirm that?

Q No. Do you recall having heard that, having gotten the information --

A Yes.

Q -- that you had asked for?

A Yes, yes.

Q And the -- and that information, again, was reflected here. And then at the end of paragraph 4, there is a -- there is a discussion in that paragraph about the RPG attack, saying that they provided further details, and then the second sentence says, quote, "The consensus of the EAC is a continuing presence of extremist groups and individuals in Libya which warrant ongoing monitoring by the EAC," end quote.

So, you know, one of the questions you were asked -- because you indicated in your email that you had concerns, that this was troubling, indeed, if there was some targeting, this would confirm that there was

concern, would it not?

A Uh-huh. Yes.

Q And their consensus, they say, is ongoing monitoring by the Emergency Action Committee.

A Okay.

Q Would that have been something in terms of -- to the extent there was concerns about the environment and whether the environment was deteriorating, would that have been a step that would be a reasonable one to take?

A A continuing monitoring?

Q Yes. Just to have it monitored by the Emergency Action Committee.

A Yes. To me, reading this back in Washington would mean that they would probably be holding more frequent Emergency Action Committee meetings to discuss the evolving situation --

Q So they're certainly --

A -- as they monitor it.

Q And it would certainly signal to you that they're very well aware that there's troubling security incidents, they're going to keep an eye on that?

A Exactly.

Q And you would expect that as they keep an eye on it, if they see something of grave concern, they will flag it for folks at DS headquarters, or otherwise, within the State Department?

A Correct.

Q That very next paragraph, the second sentence just says that -- the first sentence says, "EAC reviewed recent threat reporting that originated with the FBI and was passed to RSO," name redacted, "on June 18th. The EAC did not recommend any additional changes to the mission's security posture, though the EAC is continuously reviewing its updated tripwires," end quote.

Again, there was a discussion of tripwires. You, in your email, indicated you thought that these incidents, the recent incidents indicated that some might have been crossed. So this indicates that the EAC, quote, "does not recommend any additional changes to mission security posture," end quote.

So at this point in time, it seems that they're not asking for any changes specific to those incidents.

A No.

Q I'm sorry?

A No.

Q And then that very last paragraph, it says, quote, "A follow-up EAC will be held on/about July 1 to reassess the overall local security and threat environment and discuss appropriate security measures in preparation for the Libyan election, paren, (now scheduled for July 7) end paren, and the Embassy's Independence Day reception. The next EAC will also review pending changes to SST and MSD staffing patterns (septels), and decide on steps forward to avoid reductions in security staffing," end quote.

So, again, that indicates that they're meeting again and that

further recommendations may come up. Is that accurate?

A That is how I would read this, yes.

Q And then we did discuss some of those further requests in the last hour.

A Yes.

Q And when we had asked you about this earlier, you had said, without reading it, you couldn't necessarily recall whether there had been a recommendation to draw down staff in Benghazi, to authorize departure from Benghazi or --

A Well --

Q -- to de --

A Had they -- I think someone asked me, I would have known if that -- I think the question was, if that had been a recommendation, would you have known. And the answer is yes. Had they recommended that, I would have known that.

Q Right. And they certainly --

A But they did not.

Q -- did not, in this cable, recommend that?

A No, no.

Q And if they had recommended it elsewhere, you also would have been aware of it?

A Exactly.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Just shifting gears a little bit, I just have a few questions on information availability generally within the State Department. It

was the topic that the ARB had also set out to investigate. And it's our understanding that there is a unit, subunit within Diplomatic Security that provides information, a unit, ITA is the acronym. Does that sound familiar?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. Do you know what ITA --

A Intelligence and Threat Analysis.

Q So DS/ITA would be the way to refer to that --

A Correct.

Q -- particular unit, office?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And within that office, there's also another office that is the Intelligence and Threat Analysis office. Is that correct?

A ITA stands for Intelligence and Threat Analysis.

Q Okay.

A So I'm confused with what you're asking.

Q Okay. We've just seen DS/TIA/ITA. And is that a sub office, to the best of your recollection? Our understanding it's been a little while since --

A Yeah. I mean, the Department is full of acronyms.

Q Okay.

A I'm at a loss here, but --

Q But you're familiar with the office?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So the ITA office, or the TIA office, you're familiar

with them?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you have an opinion as to the abilities of that office, the capabilities of that office?

A They were outstanding.

Q Okay. And can you elaborate, perhaps offer --

A I -- my responsibility was oversight for the entire world, and they briefed me on a regular basis on incidents that occurred in different locations, and I would -- whenever I met with ambassadors or DCMs coming in from post, prior to my meeting with ambassadors and DCMs, I would ask ITA to send up their regional officer that covered that post to come up and brief me on the latest, all the incidents they've had and anything that, you know, they knew about.

Q Okay.

A And then I made sure that the ambassador or DCM, whoever I was speaking to, had all that same information, was aware of it, and that they were in sync at post with what the analyst back here in Washington was thinking and reporting.

Q Okay. And we understand they may not have been an all source member of the Intelligence Community, but did they have access, to the best of your understanding, to Intelligence Community reporting?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. Did they have access to internal Diplomatic Security reporting?

A Yes. They supported DS.

Q And that may have included information circulated within Diplomatic Security that may not be reported through the IC channels. Is that --

A Can we just stop right here?

Q Sure.

A You're getting into the weeds on what they have access to. I didn't supervise them and I was an end user of their products and their services, so I am not the right person to ask what did they have access to and what didn't they have access to.

Q Okay.

A All I know is the end product I got, their briefings were -- hands down would stand up to any of the best briefings I got from other agencies in the U.S. Government.

Q Okay. And do you recall who the analysts for NEA would have been?

A By name, no.

Q Okay. Does the name [REDACTED] ring a bell?

A [REDACTED] was one of the analysts in --

Q Okay.

A -- the NEA.

Q So would he fit the description of someone who did a good job as the far as the --

A Absolutely.

Q -- office was concerned?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay.

At this point, we'll shift gears yet again. I mentioned, at the outset, when we began earlier this morning many hours ago now, that this is now the eighth congressional investigation. It's our hope that it's also one of the last.

Ms. Sawyer. The last.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Not one of the last; the last. Correct.

A Thank you.

Q And so in order to help ensure that that's the case, we've been asking witnesses a series of questions about public allegations. You had mentioned you were familiar with some, perhaps not all of them. There are lots of them.

A Right.

Q We've boiled down a list of some of the, what we consider to be main or larger allegations that are currently still hanging out there. And so I'd just like to go through a couple of those allegations, just ask if you have any information or evidence that would support that allegation or not, and then we can just move to the next allegation.

A Okay.

Q So this is the first allegation. It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down, and this resulted

in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q I'll move to the next allegation. It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya. Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated that claim and gave it four Pinocchios, which was its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It's been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries. A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria," close quote, and they further found that, quote -- they further found, quote, "no support for this allegation," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q Next allegation. A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound on the night of the attacks. There have been a number of allegations about the cause and the appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding the team was not ordered to, quote, "stand down," close quote, but

instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's findings there was no stand-down order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with that decision or think it was the right decision, do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind the temporary delay of CIA security personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A Could you read that one more time, please?

Q Sure. It's a long one.

A I know.

Q Do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind the temporary delay of CIA security personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q Another concern has been recognized by one individual that in the course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Deputy -- CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for political reasons, and that he then misrepresented his actions when he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and nonpartisanship," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell altered talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on the night of the attacks and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It's also been alleged that a team of four military personnel Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks, who were considering flying on the second plane to Benghazi, were ordered by their superiors in their chain of command to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials have stated those four individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their location. A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It's also been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on the night of the attack that would save lives. However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, who was the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened and how quickly it dissipated, probably couldn't have done more than we did," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have saved lives that Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to deploy?

A No.

Q And thank you. I appreciate your indulgence.

Ms. Sawyer. So I think I just have two more questions.

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q One -- you know, first, Ranking Member Cummings was truly hoping to come by. His schedule didn't end up permitting it, but one thing that he has been focused very clearly and consistently on

throughout is just making sure that we do everything we can to figure out if there are additional recommendations that we can make to help improve, in any way we can, how the security assessment and security resources function from the State Department. You know, certainly there's been a lot of examination and a lot of recommendations made, including some that touch on some of the issues you talked about today, like the TDY assignments.

A Right.

Q There's now a dedicated DAS for high-threat posts --

A Correct.

Q -- to give greater consistent attention to that.

A Right, right.

Q But I certainly wanted to make sure, and Congressman Cummings asked me to make sure that we had asked you, on his behalf, if there's anything more that you feel that we could recommend be done?

A Boy, I should have known that was coming. That's an important question.

Having crisis funding available is huge. DS agents and operational folks should not be worried about funding in the middle of a crisis when they're just trying to push resources out the door. Staffing FTE are permanent full-time employment status. Even if we have a facility that we know is going to be there for a year, we should put a full -- assign a full-time person there for a year, we should not continue with the TDY rotation, because there's just no continuity. And, you know, we learned this the hard way, Iraq, Afghanistan, there

was an immediate need for agents. We just lined them all up, flooded them all out there, and, you know, the RSOs would just call me with their hair on fire, you know, I can't accomplish things with TDYers, I need full-time staff, and it's a very long, arduous process to get full-time employees. And there needs to be a better process on the security side of the house for full-time employment, especially when we're standing up new facilities. Juba, when, you know, Sudan split and they started their own post, you know, it's the same thing. It takes a year to 2 years to plan and get permanent people out there.

So I think we need some sort of mechanism that makes it easier for security to identify and fill full-time positions, and to be given, again, the immediate funding that comes with those positions, and they're not cheap.

Q Well, thank you for that. We've asked you a tremendous number of questions today. You've been very patient with us. I just want to give you an opportunity -- you know, certainly it's been more than 3 years, I know, and there's been a number of investigations, so I just want to give you the opportunity if there's anything you would like to add to what you've already had the opportunity to tell us that you think would be important for the committee and the Congress to know, I just wanted to give you an opportunity to do that.

A I would first like to give recognition to Ambassador Stevens. He was a brilliant man. He was passionate about his job and the people and the work he was doing out there, and it was an absolute pleasure working with him. And that as you all, I hope, that we grow

and improve to prevent future situations from all of this.

I would also like to say that the experience held by Under Secretary Kennedy in his longevity in his position in the Department is amazing, and his support to DS and Diplomatic Security in any crisis. When we had the earthquake in Haiti, he was up around the clock providing support and assistance and making sure DS had every asset it needed to get in and do what it had to do, the coordination with the military.

I think a lot of people underestimate the knowledge that he has in handling crisis situations, and his understanding of budget and making sure that even in a crisis, we can turn to him and he can -- he knows how to appropriately, without offending Congress or taking money out of the wrong pot to move it somewhere else, he can make those decisions very quickly so that we're not agonizing over money or going anti-deficient as we're trying to get much-needed resources out.

His eye for detail -- I think, someone mentioned, you know, him possibly as a micro-manager. He's just -- in my opinion, he's a conscientious person. I received an email from him at 2:00 in the morning one time over a cable an RSO had sent in with a long 2-page explanation of could -- this RSO wanted to buy a locally-made car instead of an American-made car. And I got an email at 2:00 in the morning from Pat Kennedy saying is there a real reason why we can't give this RSO, you know, a local-made car? He certainly justified it.

And I said -- you know, I wrote back, Pat, it's 2:00 in the morning. You have bigger things to worry about. Let me handle things tomorrow, and, yes, this is a new RSO, it's his first post. He doesn't

realize we have a whole policy, and he can buy a locally-made car for the reasons he needs it, so you don't need to worry about that. But Pat was always and -- is always concerned about providing people the resources they need to do their job.

And I can't say enough about how supportive he is to DS in a crisis and to all -- you know, if I was ever overseas in a crisis, I would want to know that he was back there running the show.

And it's going to be very hard to replace him when he retires. He's -- he's just a wealth of information.

Mr. Kenny. We'll just thank you again for --

Ms. Lamb. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. Thank you for your time, your patience, your service. We know that you are a long-time civil foreign service officer, so thank you very much for that.

Ms. Lamb. You're welcome. Thank you all. And best of luck in wrapping all this up.

Mr. Kenny. We can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 5:33 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

Witness Name

Date

Errata Sheet

Select Committee on Benghazi

The witness reviewed the accompanying transcript and certified its accuracy by providing the following corrections. These corrections are reflected in the transcript as identified below.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>ALL CORRECTIONS MADE BY WITNESS</u>
9-10	25-1	Replaced "deputy assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security overseas operations and programs" with "Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security's International Programs."
11	15	Replaced "Pat Kennedy as special assistant" to "Pat Kennedy's special assistant."
18	1	Replaced "we did" with "we did not."
114	17	Replaced "an unarmed facility" with "an interim facility."

NOTE: On page 63, the witness noted in her errata sheet that the official to whom she referred was not the senior desk officer, but the Regional Director, and that the senior desk officer assisted the Regional Director with overseeing the region. On page 115, lines 1-4, the witness noted in her errata sheet that policy decision makers within the Department, and in coordination with the Ambassador at post, decide when and if an interim facility will transition to a permanent facility. On page 152 of her errata sheet, the witness indicated that she had testified before Congress previously regarding Nisoor Square.